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MAN'S PICTURE OF HIS WORLD

A Psycho-analytic Study

by

R. E. MONEY-KYRLE

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Preface

An early deduction from Freud's theory of psycho-analysis was that the theory would meet with much resistance. This does not imply, however, that all opposition to it is irrational. Many people have approached it with enthusiasm, as if it were the Tree of Knowledge or of Life, only to turn disgustedly away because they were unable to discover, or to grasp, the fruit. If this is a sour-grape response, the probability of its occurrence may be enhanced by avoidable obscurities which render the fruit unnecessarily difficult to grasp.

Of course, we have no right to complain of initial obscurities, and apparent contradictions, of theory in the period of its formation. Sciences do not spring, perfect and complete, from the minds of their creators, like Athene from the head of Zeus. They are moulded like a model, fresh bits of material being added from time to time and gradually smoothed into shape. Moreover, in the case of a science, much of the smoothing, or systematisation, is inevitably left by the original artist for his pupils to complete.

The ideal of the systematiser—still remote as far as psycho-analysis is concerned—is to reduce his science to the fewest possible primitive ideas, in terms of which all its other concepts can be defined, and propositions, from which all its other propositions can be deduced. It is true that these primitive ideas and propositions may be initially more difficult to grasp than the cruder ones, now to be derived from them, with which the science started. But once these principles are grasped, the whole science becomes accessible with a minimum of effort. Moreover, the work of systematisation is likely to expose hitherto unrecognised inconsistencies and gaps, which become smoothed out and filled up. In other words, the rewards of clarification usually include the removal of errors and the acquisition of knowledge as well as economy of thought. Lastly, a systematised science is easier to verify; for the more clearly we understand what it asserts, the easier it is to compare the expectations we base on it with what we actually observe.

Against the suggestion that psycho-analysis should be systematised in this way, at least one, and perhaps two opposite objections may be raised. Some conservatives of analysis may argue that this was already done sufficiently by Freud—although he himself often stressed the incompleteness of his work. The progressives, on the other hand, may well contend that analysis is growing far too fast to be ripe for any such endeavour, which would be out of date before it was completed.

Certainly analysis is growing, and in different directions too. Moreover, different schools express their developing ideas in different terms, so that it is becoming difficult for them to understand or assess the validity of each other's work. I am here concerned, however, only with one school.[1] Among Freud's immediate pupils, the ablest was probably Abraham, who unfortunately died at the early age of forty-eight, but not before making fundamental contributions to analytic theory. Melanie Klein was his pupil, and, supported by his encouragement, was the first to undertake the comprehensive analysis of very young children, for which purpose she evolved an appropriate technique by providing them with toys and interpreting their play. As a direct result of this work, she gradually proposed some modifications, and many additions, to the psycho-analytic theory of development; and further additions are still being made by her and her pupils—particularly those, like Bion, Rosenfeld and Hannah Segal, who have specialised in the study of psychosis.

Since no one knows what fresh discoveries may be waiting for it just round the corner, an attempt to systematise the findings of this school may well be premature. But they could at least be made more easily accessible. The many books and papers, of different dates, in which different aspects of a developing theory are recorded, in different stages of its development, must seem scattered and disjointed to the student who might be less likely to turn from it as inaccessible, or worthless, if it were offered him initially more in one piece.

This is a reason, and to some extent also an excuse, for the following representation of psycho-analytic theory as I see it,

[1] I do not wish to imply that I set no value on the work of other schools. But when time and space are limited, I have preferred to concentrate on that school which I believe to be the most progressive, at the cost of perhaps missing much good work which may be found elsewhere.

mainly from the Kleinian point of view (but within a setting in part derived from, in part extending into, other sciences, and sometimes in terms derived from other fields) as clearly and concisely as I can. It is also an excuse to give rein to the impulse to systematise, for the sake of systematising, which exists independently of any other purpose. I have tried to do so more than once before, in different ways, but never to my satisfaction. In this, my present endeavour, I have, after a preliminary discussion of the nature of the evidence, approached my subject from three successive points of view.

Among the removable impediments to the acceptance of analytic theory is its apparent inconsistency with, or at least isolation from, the general body of other scientific knowledge, particularly in biology. My first approach, therefore, is biological, and is an attempt to show that analytic findings are in accordance with the sort of innate behaviour biology might lead us to expect.

But biology—or at least behaviouristic biology—is a physical science, and as such confined to what can be observed in the external world. It studies the structure and behaviour of organisms, and has no place in it for speculations about the content of their 'minds'. This would not matter so much if, with respect to higher animals, we could also observe, or at least infer, the detailed working of their brains, which constitutes the link, so far invisible, between the impact of their environment and their response. To fill this gap, we have at present no alternative but to attribute to them 'minds', that is, thoughts, feelings and desires analogous to ours. In other words, we replace the cerebral processes, which we cannot yet observe, by their psychic concomitants, which we can at least imagine on the basis of our inner experience. We thus obtain what to the purist is a hybrid science, which uses the concept of a mental process as the causal link between the two physical events of stimulus and reaction. My second approach is from this hybrid, or dualistic, point of view, adopted also by common sense and present day psychology. It enables the skeleton, as it were, of a materialistic theory of instinct, first derived from the biological approach, to be covered with the warm flesh of thought, feeling and desire; and so to be endowed with life.

This hybrid approach is not, however, entirely satisfactory

either. That it offends the purist is not, I think, a serious objection; for the incompatibility, between the concept of a mind-body interaction and that of an unbroken chain of physical causality, is an incompatibility between a dualistic and a mechanistic thought-model, which does not necessarily involve any incompatibility between the statements about observable phenomena each, in its own way, is constructed to summarise and represent. A more serious objection to the dualistic approach, with its common physical world to which different minds react in different ways, is that it may lead us, too uncritically, to assume that other people's worlds are in fact the same as ours. Of course, the almost purely formal world of physics is the same for everyone. But we have no right to assume in advance that this is also true of the perceptual world of things and people we feel we live in. This world, which seems so real and unalterable to us, is in fact quite different for infants and psychotics. We ought not, therefore, to take it too much for granted; but should regard it rather as something constructed, and not always in the same way. My third approach is from this point of view, which is that of subjectivist philosophy.

We may speak of an infant constructing his world, piecing it together out of memory images of visual, tactual and other sense-data until it becomes a unity, each bit linked to every other by what we call space-time relations. But this statement needs expansion before it can unambiguously convey the notion intended.

In the first place, what I have just called his 'world', although thought of as such by him, has also the character of a 'world-model' composed of his thought which represents some 'ultimate reality' beyond itself. What this ultimate reality may be, which his world-model mirrors, has long been a puzzle of philosophy. In my view, we shall not go far wrong if we confine ourselves to saying that what it mirrors, or represents, is his expectations, his beliefs about what could be experienced elsewhere in 'space-time'. According as these beliefs are true or false, so is the model.[1]

In the second place, in speaking of an individual constructing a world or a world-model, we have grammatically endowed our subject with a separate existence. But in fact he is inseparable from his world-model. In one sense, he is a part of it; for he thinks

[1] These notions are further expanded in Chapter IV of this book, and also in Chapter II of my book *Psycho-Analysis and Politics*, London, Duckworth, 1952.

of himself as the kernel from which it radiates. In another sense, it is a part of him, since it is composed of his thought, which is what the cognitive aspect of him consists of.

To know all about a person's world-model, and how it was constructed, is therefore to know all about this person. In other words, a psychology which confined itself to the study of the development of world-models would in fact be comprehensive. It would include everything that properly belongs to psychology. And it would include all this from one point of view, that is, it would have the advantage of simplicity.

Moreover, it would give psychology what I think is its rightful place, schematically at the beginning rather than at the end of the other sciences. For if the task of psychology is to describe how world-models are constructed, that of other sciences is to extend and refine specific parts of them; and, although in practice we usually begin to make things before examining the general principles by which we do so, these principles, once understood, are henceforth taught as a precondition of their most efficient application.

We may therefore envisage an ultimate systematisation of knowledge, with a psychological preface about the general principles of, and first steps in, the construction of a world-model which it is the business of the other sciences to elaborate in detail. And perhaps, too, there will be a place in this system for those disciplines, such as aesthetics, ethics and politics, which appear to be non-scientific because they seem to deal, not with discoverable facts, but with arbitrary values. For if, as I shall argue later, judgments of value depend far more than is usually supposed on judgments of fact, a determination of the facts might automatically decide the issue on the values. In other words, these disciplines might, in part at least, be converted into sciences.

But of course we are still very far from being able to complete a system of this kind, and work on the preface lags sadly behind the rest. I believe the most important part of such a preface would deal with the development of verbal thought,[1] that is, with how the visual and tactual imagery which first mirrors the expected possibilities of sensory experience, comes in its turn to be mirrored in terms of verbal thought. I am, therefore, the more conscious of

[1] Hobbes, in *The Leviathan*, called language 'the greatest invention of all other'.

inadequacy in having left this aspect of development largely unexplored. But I have tried to give some outline of the way our world-model, both verbal and non-verbal, is formed, paying regard to the errors we are liable to make in it, and to the technique of their correction. This occupies the last two chapters of the first part of this book.

In Part II I have tried to apply the findings of Part I to those apparently non-scientific disciplines I have referred to, which seem to deal exclusively with values. At least the dependence of judgments of value on judgments of fact, and the verification of the latter, remain a legitimate field of scientific enquiry. We may enquire, for example, whether a man's belief that he was a deprived child has determined his ethics, whether the belief is true, or a myth invented to hide an unconscious sense of having been greedy and ungrateful; and whether, should he discover the belief to be untrue, his ethics will change with it, and in what direction. In this sort of way I have tried to show how some of our evaluations in aesthetics, ethics and politics are determined by our world-models, and how it may be possible to distinguish evaluations determined by false models from evaluations determined by true ones.[1]

* * *

Authors like to imagine that they are original creators—that what they say is both true and new. But with most of us, the originality consists only in a development and rearrangement of what we have got from others. If we cannot always say in detail where we got ideas, nor how much we have altered them in the process of assimilation, at least we know, or should know, their main sources. We have to acknowledge these without making our benefactors responsible for any misuse of their conceptions.

My own debt is broadly to three main influences: that of the analysts—especially Freud, Ernest Jones and Melanie Klein; that of the philosophers—my teacher Moritz Schlik and his forerunners, especially Ernst Mach and Hume; and that of my parents. The influence of parents, whether consciously acknowledged or not, is

[1] Much of this I have tried to do before in *Psycho-Analysis and Politics*, 1951, and also in a paper 'Psycho-Analysis and Ethics', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1952. If there are some repetitions here, there is also a rather different approach, and some extensions and corrections too.

always the most far-reaching and important. But here I will only mention one point: that in their main political expectations, my parents seem retrospectively to have been much nearer the mark than most of their contemporaries. At the turn of and in the first decade of the century, liberalism was becoming more and more ascendant, and with it a characteristic optimism about the future rapid liberal progress of the world. But already, by 1908, when my father died, I was far more imbued with a sense of impending peril, from German militarism on the one hand, and communist movements on the other—both tyrannical in nature—which would demand vigilance and effort if they were to be safely overcome. For this reason, the wars with Germany, and the development of communist autocracy in Russia, after a revolution first hailed as democratic, did not come as a surprise. Perhaps, too, my father's religious conviction that external improvements must start from within may have predisposed me to my own belief, as a psychologist, that man can never achieve his dream of a safer and a more harmonious society except on the basis of a better understanding of himself. This is a scientific, not a religious, approach. But a disposition to be interested in science I derive, I think, rather from my mother. My father, who possessed that markedly sensitive understanding of people and children which is sometimes to be found in regimental officers, would not perhaps have been so interested in theories about them.

* * *

Lastly, I owe a specific debt to those who have read drafts of this book: particularly to Mr. Alan Harris for helpful suggestions about its style, to Dr. Bion and Dr. Jaques for helpful suggestions about its content. I am also grateful to Mrs. Marion Taylor who both typed, and helped me to improve, the original manuscript.

R. M-K.

London, *May* 1960

PART I

CHAPTER I

The Nature of the Evidence[1]

BEFORE trying to give an outline of psycho-analytic theory, something should be said about the evidence on which it is based—especially as this is so often questioned.

Moreover, according to some methodologists, we must be able to do more than quote positive evidence in its support. There are pseudo-sciences, such as astrology, which are so elastic, which admit the introduction of so many additional hypotheses to explain away unwelcome facts, that they effectively resist disproof. So an essential criterion of a genuine, as opposed to a pseudo-science, is that the kind of negative evidence which would prove it false must be capable of being clearly stated.[2]

It has been argued that analysis fails to pass this test, because its practitioners have several loopholes of escape from the possibility of being pinned down and proved wrong. A patient's denial of an interpretation can, for example, be taken merely as evidence of a 'resistance'; his assertion that the opposite of what is said of him is true can be explained away in terms of 'ambivalence' and the co-existence of contradictory conscious and unconscious impulses; and even when the analyst himself comes to believe that he should have made a different interpretation, he need not withdraw the first one, since, owing to 'overdetermination', it may still be right at some other level. To meet this kind of criticism, we must be able to show that our interpretations, and the theory built on them, are capable of being proved wrong.

An alternative line of attack is aimed against the way the evidence, which purports to confirm the theory, is recorded. This time the argument is not that the theory is too elastic to be disproved;

[1] This chapter is in part taken from my paper 'The Process of Psycho-Analytical Inference', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1958.

[2] See 'Psycho-Analytic Technology' by J. O. Wisdom, *B. J. for the Philosophy of Science*, 1956. Whether or not this criterion, which Wisdom attributes to Popper, is logically necessary, it is certainly a very useful guide in practice.

but that analysts, in their report of cases, remember only such evidence as supports it, and conveniently forget whatever might prove it false.

Use some apparatus, these critics say, which fully records the play of association and interpretation between you and your patients. If we see that their associations in general confirm your interpretations, but sometimes cause you to correct them, we shall be convinced that you are practising a genuine science which is at least mainly true.

This seems a reasonable demand; but several objections can be raised against acceding to it. Most analysts believe that a recording apparatus would be disturbing to an analysis if used with the patient's knowledge, and dishonest if used without it. And if this objection should be overruled, the value of recordings, as proof of the correctness of analytic interpretations, and of the theory built from analytic practice, may still be questioned.

In the first place, the analyst in making and subsequently assessing his interpretations is influenced, not by the minute details of a patient's behaviour in isolation, but by the patterns he abstracts from them; and these could be obscured, rather than brought out, by meticulous recordings. If other members of a party cannot perceive a tiger in the rushes which the tracker points to, it is unlikely that a photograph would help them to see it better. A sketch which emphasized the pattern of the tiger would be more useful, and because of its element of false exaggeration. But it can only help them to perceive the tiger; it cannot by itself prove the tiger to be there. So the type of analytic record most likely to convince a doubter might well be, not a full account with all its overwhelming mass of detail, but an oversimplified abstraction to be used not for proof but for illustration.

Moreover, and this is the essential point, no apparatus can record what is really in question: namely the type of reasoning by which the analyst proceeds from what he observes in behaviour to what he infers about motive. Suppose a new type of microscope to have been invented. We can confirm the honesty of an observer's reports by taking photographs with it. But this does not prove that there is no bias in the instrument. We need a detailed description of how it is made, and how it functions, before we can

satisfy ourselves that it is probably accurate. In like manner, we need to know how analysts are made and how they function. And in the process we may find this to be the best, and perhaps the only, way in which we can hope to understand and deal with criticisms of analytic theory.

* * *

Psycho-analytic reasoning is in essence very simple and of a type on which all our beliefs about other people are ultimately based. If we see two people embrace, we imagine them to be in love because we are acquainted with such feelings in ourselves. In other words, our everyday reasoning about our fellows is anthropomorphic and based on identification.

We have to examine the conditions of its validity in psychoanalytic work. But first we may note that physicists, who once used it too, do so no longer, not because it is invalid in psychology but because it is no longer appropriate to physics. What we now think of as a material universe, our ancestors thought of as an animistic one, the last vestiges of which are to be found in such notions as forces of attraction and repulsion only recently replaced by the abstract concept of fields. This is an advance, not because animistic thinking is generally invalid, but because it is unreliable in proportion to the unlikeness to ourselves of the objects to which it is applied. We no longer use it in trying to understand the movements of the sun and moon. We believe we can still use it, though with more caution than in the past, to understand the behaviour of our dogs. We believe it to remain the most reliable means we yet know for understanding the behaviour of our fellows. In other words, with certain provisos to be mentioned, in psychology it remains legitimate.

The application of this method in analysis differs only in degree from its application in daily life. Most parents, who have experienced jealousy and have given vent to the hatred it stirs, will impute this motive to a child who clumsily knocks down his younger brother—even when the child himself is not aware of it and is sorry for the 'accident'. So, even in daily life, anthropomorphic inferences extend to the unconscious of those they refer to. The analyst differs only in that his own previous analysis has made him conscious of further connections between thought, feel-

ing and action in terms of which he can, with some confidence, infer the motive of like actions in his patients.

If this is the nature of a psycho-analytic inference, we can see at once why it is likely to be received with scepticism and to be difficult to prove. Even the parent who automatically and rightly infers that the child who knocked over his baby brother did it out of jealousy, would have no easy task in convincing a third person who was too shocked by the link between jealousy, hatred and murderous action against a sibling to be conscious of it in himself. It is true that a film of the incident might bring out more details, and preserve them with greater accuracy. But the conclusion goes beyond what can be observed or recorded, and would not be convincing to anyone who was totally unaware of the feeling of jealousy and therefore unable to 'recognise' it, or rather its symptoms, in others. So too the same, or greater difficulties confront the analyst who is required to prove his interpretations to someone who has never consciously had the experiences on which they are based.

Analysis, therefore, can never be proved—though it could be illustrated—by the methods our critics require us to adopt. There is, then, some justice in the analyst's contention that no one who has not been analysed can assess his work. But he is not, and does not claim to be, infallible. Indeed, the above statement of what anthropomorphic reasoning consists of shows clearly at least two ways in which anyone using it may err: He may fail to infer a motive in someone else for something which 'rings no bell' in himself, and then fall back on guesses, which are always likely to be wrong. Or he may have a bias in himself which makes him over ready to impute his own motives to others. We cannot, in any particular case, convince unanalysed critics that an error of one of these types has not been made. But we can show them how the analyst's training diminishes the probability of his making them. We can also show how, in his later practice, he can sometimes discover and correct those he may still make.

* * *

Of the two processes—being analysed and analysing others—that by which the student acquires self-knowledge is more fundamental, because on it depends the improvement of his capacity

for valid intuition. Moreover, it is the only one of the two that he can directly verify. He can be directly aware of the correctness of interpretations made to him; but only his patients can be directly aware of the correctness of the interpretations that he makes. (And here we should note a point to which we must return: that in neither case can a failure to be aware of the correctness of an interpretation be taken to disprove it.)

The student, like any other patient, starts with certain pictures of himself and of the personalities of his neighbours which are inter-related in such a way that errors about himself give rise to errors about others. We may at once observe that these pictures cannot all be true, since they are subject to contradictory variations: moods when he sees himself as a man of outstanding ability and virtue unfairly kept back by the envious intrigues of his inferiors being replaced by moods when he feels himself to be rightly despised as altogether worthless; and these again by moods of confident elation in which he takes it for granted that he is justly liked and admired by everyone. To his analyst at any rate, he will seem to oscillate, if only to a small degree, between paranoid, depressive and manic phases, each in a different way involving inter-related errors in self-knowledge and intuition. But what we have to consider is the means by which he eventually comes himself to recognise them as errors and so to correct them.

Suppose him to be in the first of these moods—that is to say, in a slightly paranoid condition—in which, for example, he sees himself as a generous person surrounded by false friends who do not care for him but only want his money. And suppose that he complains of this with unusual force on the day his fees are due. It may then be pointed out to him that these false friends stand for his analyst, whom he is preconsciously accusing of caring only for the fees. This he may readily accept. But many and more detailed interpretations, during many varied repetitions of the mood, will be required before he is familiar with its deeper causes. Among these, no doubt, will be the existence of an unacknowledged aspect of himself that cares only for what he can get out of his analyst, as once he cared only for what he could get out of his parents; so that, to avoid condemning himself for such ruthless egoism, he accuses others of it—that is, 'projects' it into them. Of course, he may never accept such interpretations at all, or he may

accept them only 'theoretically' as something that 'must be true' of him, but that he does not actually experience. In neither case has he any direct proof that they are true, so to him there must always be an element of doubt about the question. But eventually, perhaps, he comes to recognise the ruthless greed he had seen in his analyst and in other people as really being in himself. Then, in his awareness of a self which has become integrated in this respect, he has the most direct proof that his previous beliefs about his generosity were partly false, and also that these false beliefs about himself determined many of his beliefs about others which he now realises were often without foundation. Moreover, as a result of becoming conscious of the greed he disapproves of, he will become less greedy. And, what is more important for our present purpose, he will become more able to discriminate among those around him, between those who are greedy and those who are generous.

Again, when he is depressed by the opposite sense of worthlessness, his analyst may, for example, relate his self-reproaches both to defects of feeling—in particular, perhaps, to a sense of an incapacity for love—which he cannot correct till he is aware of them, and to complaints, probably unjust ones, directed at external figures—originally his parents—who are now felt to have been 'introjected' as part of himself, and to be, as it were, living on in him in a crushed and despairing state. (And here we may note, for future reference, that two different types of interpretation are involved: for what is asserted in the first and more familiar type is the existence of an unconscious affect—despair about not being able to love—and in the second the existence of an unconscious picture of the self which is not simple but 'molecular', and contains 'other' figures.) As before, interpretations of this kind will be repeated, with many detailed variations, in many different repetitions of the mood. If all goes well, the student will gradually perceive it, for example, as one resulting from a phantasied 'internalisation' and internal devaluation of his analyst; and he will recover 'memories in feeling' of the like way in which, in phantasy, he attacked his parents—as, at a still more primitive level, he attacked parental 'part-objects'. In other words, the interpretations will gradually be recognised by him as true. Then, after a period in which his sense of worthlessness is replaced by conscious regret for the harm he has done to these people—at a still more

primitive level also to 'part-objects'—and a desire somehow to make amends, if only to their memory inside him, his old picture of himself as entirely worthless will be corrected in a more realistic way; and, as a result, he will be able to feel that he 'contains' good figures and is liked, rather than despised, by his friends.

Meanwhile, he will probably have been helped to see that his manic moods were, to a large extent, 'defensive denials' of the other two. So this also will be exposed as involving distorted beliefs about himself as well as about other people and their attitude to him.

Of course this abbreviated account of the process of analysis is intended only to illustrate the kind of mechanisms involved. It does no justice to the vast intricacy of the patterns to be unravelled. Much analytic work on many fluctuating moods, which will also involve the reconstruction of the student's, or patient's, infancy and childhood when the foundations of his character were laid, may, as we know, be needed before he can see the distorting mechanisms operating in himself at all. But if this is successful, he will gradually come to see them more quickly as they are pointed out to him, and, in the end, to recognise and correct them as they arise, without assistance. As far as he can do this, and so know himself, he will have acquired the essential qualities of an analyst, and be able to recognise and interpret the same moods in others. Conversely, the remaining defects in his analytic intuition will stem from remaining gaps in self-knowledge, which, of course, can never be complete.

* * *

At this point, a specific difficulty about the proof of an interpretation which extends or corrects one's picture of, and so one's beliefs about, oneself should be mentioned. In most other sciences, what to all intents and purposes is the same experiment can be repeated as often as we like, so that the result, if doubtful, can be confirmed. But the process of recognising the truth of an interpretation about the self, which modifies the previous picture of the self, in fact modifies the self, and for this reason can never be repeated under exactly the same conditions. Although there can be, and are, many similar direct experiences of the truth of similar interpretations, none of them can be exactly repeated. But this

does not alter the fact that each can be tested once. In other words, the most basic test of error—the comparison of an old belief with a new experience which is incompatible with, and so corrects it—can be, and is, applied by the analysand in psycho-analytic work.

It is important to be clear about the limits of this result. We have shown that false beliefs about the self can be proved false. Moreover, the discovery by direct experience in analysis that a belief about the self was false involves the proof, by the same experience, that the interpretation which led to the discovery was true. But we have found no analogous experience which could have proved the interpretation to have been false. Here, so it seems to me, analysis has to be satisfied with a less crucial test—a confession which need not distress us, since existential propositions can, by their nature, seldom be finally disproved. If, for example, I assert that a unicorn exists, I can only be proved wrong by someone who is acquainted with everything that exists and knows that this is everything. The most an ordinary opponent, who is not omniscient, can do is to fall back on the fact that no one has ever seen a unicorn and, what is more important, that there are no positive grounds for believing that unicorns exist. So, too, in order to disprove a false interpretation asserting the existence of something in his unconscious, an analysand would have both to explore the whole of his unconscious, and know that this was the whole of it—a condition which, of course, can never be fulfilled. The most that can be done is to discover that it was a mistake to suppose that there were good grounds for making the interpretation. But this is a matter less for the analysand than for the analyst whose standpoint remains to be considered.

* * *

It will be convenient to suppose that we are examining the mental processes of the same person at a later stage: those of the former student, now qualified, who is applying what he has learnt about himself to the understanding of his patients. I do not wish to belittle the importance to him of powers of concentration and knowledge of theory; for these enable him to abstract patterns of probable significance from the mass of their observed behaviour. But his inferences about them, that is, his intuition, rests ultim-

ately on his sense of being partially identified with them. And I believe there are two phases in the process. In the first, the patient's words and gestures arouse an echo in him of the feelings which give rise to them. How exactly this comes about we do not know. But similar experiences are common enough, as for example, when we are stirred by the emotions expressed in a dance, participating inwardly with the gyrations of the ballerina although it would be quite impossible for us really to perform them. In this, the 'introjective' phase, the analyst 'feels like' the patient. But normally, I think, it passes too quickly to be noticed into the second, 'projective' phase in which he 'imagines what it feels like to be the patient'. The difference lies in the location of the feelings. In the first, they are located in the analyst and experienced as if they were his own; in the second, they are located in the patient.

It is in this second phase that the analyst interprets, that is, explains the undercurrent of the patient's thought. He can do so because he is able to be more conscious than the patient of what was expressed, and can therefore describe the patient's feelings, and their origin, more fully than the patient could do himself. As long as he keeps in touch, he can go on in this way with a good deal of confidence, and the patient will usually support his inferences by responding in accordance with his expectations, and eventually agreeing that he is right.

But if he gets no confirmation, he has to consider the possibility that he may be wrong, or at least not wholly right. The analyst, as we know, is not immune from the two sorts of error that anyone can make about another in ordinary life. He may guess wildly and wrongly about the thoughts and feelings of a patient with whom he is, for the time being, quite out of touch; and, what is more serious, he can overstress a quality in his picture of the patient which, without his knowing it, is at the moment predominant only in himself. And I think both errors have a common source in blind spots which occur when his own anxieties are on the point of being stirred in what I called the introjective phase of intuition.

I will try to make this clearer by two hypothetical and oversimplified examples. In the first, the patient—who, in order to use the pronouns 'he' for the analyst and 'she' for the patient, may be assumed to be a woman—has been complaining of a deep depression which now seems to be coming on just before an analytic

holiday. To this the analyst may possibly respond, not by a full comprehension of the trouble, but by an anxious sense of a 'good interpretation' being quickly required of him. In this predicament, he may fall back on what, in theory, is most likely to be right: namely, that she is behaving like an infant, who is so angry with its mother for putting it down that it destroys its good memories of her—its 'internal good mother'—which might have relieved its loneliness, and so feels that it has irrevocably lost both. If an interpretation on these lines is both relevant and right, she will probably get some relief from it. But I will assume that it falls flat and she becomes more depressed than ever. The analyst may then perceive that he was out of touch because he did not want to be worried and depressed about her just before his holiday.[1] Having seen this, he may also perceive that this was exactly what she wanted to do to him, because she felt her depression to be a kind of physical burden which is transferable, and that she now feels him to have refused it or thrown it back at her. If he interprets this and she accepts it, she may become more able to accept the other one as well, since it was probably more ill-timed than wholly wrong.

In this much over-simplified example, it was the ineffectiveness of the first interpretation which led the analyst consciously to consider the possibility of his having been wrong in his image of his patient's state of mind. But it was a piece of silent self-analysis, rather than any further external data, that put him on the right track again.

* * *

The other kind of error—that in which the analyst projects too much of himself—is unlikely to occur in a blatant form; since he may be presumed to have had the grosser forms of paranoia analysed out of him during his training. But I think it can occur in subtle ways, for example, when he unconsciously feels he is being got at. The patient may seem friendly enough, but there is an undercurrent of hostile criticism. Now, if this is directed against

[1] In the same way, in daily life a reluctant confidante, who does not wish to be burdened with his friend's troubles, brushes them aside with a facile explanation or reassurance. For a discussion of the effects in a child which may be caused by this mechanism operating in the mother, see Bion 'Attacks on Linking', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1959.

a weakness in the analyst of which he is only unconsciously aware, he may, I think, sometimes throw it back at her as a defence against being overwhelmed by vague self-criticisms. In doing so, there is a sense in which he may be entirely right, if, as is probable, it is she who began the mud slinging by unconsciously projecting what she unconsciously feels to be her own defects. But to the extent to which the analyst denies to himself that some of the mud has stuck, he returns it, not with the tolerance of someone who understands the patient from within, but with a degree of defensive aggression, to which the patient, who senses it however much it is concealed, responds with an excess either of resistance or despair.

It is this excess in the patient of resistance or despair that should now warn the analyst that something has gone wrong. He may then perceive that he has passed the dividing line between the use of projection to understand another person from within, and its use as an aggressive defence against self-criticism. And with this discovery, his intuition loses its bias and again becomes flexible, sensitive and accurate.

* * *

I would stress that, in neither case, would an accurate recording of the patient's associations have been much help to him in discovering and correcting his mistakes. For what he had, in the first instance, missed was something taking place silently in himself. Only after he has perceived this, can he also perceive some hitherto missed bit of the pattern of his patient's associations—a bit which he would previously have been unable to abstract from the session, however accurate his memory for the mass of detail might have been.

Another important point is that, in both cases, there is a degree of unconscious understanding from the beginning, which the resistance or the defensive projection prevented from becoming conscious. In other words, intuition based on the common properties of man is already an unconscious possession. It is less something to be acquired or developed, than something to be freed from its acquired encumbrances.

* * *

The above survey of what happens in analysis, sketchy as it is, may at least enable us to classify three types of analytic 'proof' in the order of the degrees of conviction they provide. First comes the analysand's recognition that something his analyst has said of him is true although it contradicts his previous picture of himself. This is the most basic test of all. The tests which the analyst can use can never be as direct. But he does use tests, both to confirm that he is right and, if necessary, also to convince himself that he was wrong. So long as he feels in touch, and can recognise as it were the picture of an aspect of himself in the patient, which he understands better than the patient, he interprets with confidence; and so long as the patient continues to respond in accordance with this picture, he believes it to be confirmed. In other words, he assesses the probable correctness of his picture in terms of the correctness of the predictions it involves. But as soon as the patient fails to respond in an expected way, he has to consider whether his own reasoning has been at fault. He may then discover that his own anxieties have been aroused and have caused him to lose touch, so that he has been either guessing without conviction, or using a projective defence, that is, attributing something to his patient which is, at that moment, really more in himself. In either case, he will perceive that, while he cannot disprove his interpretations, there were no sound reasons for believing them to be true.

* * *

On the basis of this kind of evidence, analysis gradually constructs portraits, which we believe to be reasonably accurate, of the minds—both conscious and unconscious—of many individuals. It will have been observed that a common pattern is assumed from the beginning as an initial basis for the validity of intuition, and this assumption seems to be confirmed. In spite of wide quantitative differences, we do find the same pattern in our patients as in ourselves, and we assume it to be common to all mankind. The aim of psycho-analytic theory, as opposed to practice, is first to abstract this common pattern from many portraits in which different elements of it are differently stressed, and then to fit it into the still more general body of our knowledge.

The second part of this endeavour, namely, the reduction of

analytic to still more general theory, can be undertaken in various ways. The three that occur to me as the most rewarding are the three I mentioned in the Preface. If by general body of knowledge we mean knowledge of the external world, as expressed in the world-model of physics and biology, we can seek to show that human nature, as the analyst sees it, is such as the biologist might expect it to be. In doing so, however, we shall find ourselves restricted to the explanation of the behaviourist aspect of our nature, since the world-model of physics and biology is constructed of material particles, forces, etc., and has no place in it for the psychological concepts of thought, feeling and desire. To escape these trammels, we can next make use of the dualistic world-model of common sense, which includes the model of physics and biology as one of its two aspects. We shall then be permitted to think of instinct, not merely in terms of observable stimulus and reaction, but as a cognitive, affective and conative response to sensation. As before, man will appear as the expected product of his evolution, but this time he will be a dual being with a psyche as well as a body.

This second type of presentation, though richer than the behaviouristic one, is not, as I argued in the Preface, quite satisfactory either. By projecting our own experience into him, we have given man a psyche; but we are still seeing him predominantly from outside, with the result that we think of him as a physical being, whose psyche responds to the same physical world as we do. In other words, we take the physical world for granted, as existing before, and being independent of experience. For all ordinary purposes it is more convenient to think in this way; but as psychologists, we ought, perhaps, to reverse the order and think first of experience as that out of which each individual builds his world, or world-model. Such was the approach of philosophers like Hume and Mach; and I suggest that psychoanalysis could make use of it also to construct a more comprehensive picture of man in relation to his world.

Each of these three types of presentation, in fact, makes use of a specific philosophy; the physical and biological approach being materialistic, the common sense approach dualistic, and the Humean approach subjectivist. Each has certain advantages. The first is, in some ways, the easiest for anyone with what is called

a scientific training, but it is also the least comprehensive. The third is the most comprehensive, but the least familiar and therefore at present the most difficult; while the second, dualistic one occupies an intermediate position. I shall try, as I said, to get what I can from each in turn, before coming back, in terms of the third one, to the therapeutic, or more fundamentally the educational, operation of analysis in correcting errors in our world-models.

CHAPTER II

Instinct and Evolution

THE strength of any rational belief is determined, not only by the direct evidence for it, but also by the degree of its conformity with the general body of the rest of our beliefs. We are chary of accepting apparent miracles, however well attested, so long as they conflict with our scientific picture of the world. And for the same reason, psycho-analytic generalisations, in spite of the accumulating evidence in their support, are often rejected on *a priori* grounds. If this is the result of a 'resistance', analysts are still not absolved from the task of showing that their analytic beliefs are at least compatible with the general body of those other scientific beliefs which they also hold. I shall try to go further and argue that much analytic theory is not only compatible with, but derives some antecedent probability from, our beliefs about biology. In this chapter I want, in particular, to show that what we know of our evolution should lead us to expect our instincts and our conflicts to be such as analysts claim to find in us, whether we are conscious of them or not.

A difficulty to be surmounted on the way is that Freud's 'metapsychological' explanation of conflict may appear at first sight to be incompatible with the evolutionary explanation I offer. So I shall be obliged, after a few general remarks on evolution, to digress a little from the evolutionary to the 'metapsychological' approach, in the hope of showing that they are compatible and indeed complementary.

* * *

Any species of organism which produces offspring varying a little in every direction from the parents, and produces them in excess of the food supply, is bound to evolve in the Darwinian sense, that is, to become better adapted to survive in its environ-

ment. The conclusion—that it must evolve in this way because in each generation the least adapted tend to be eliminated—is no more than a logical deduction from the premiss. If, as Lamarck believed, the offspring also tend to inherit the acquired adaptations of their parents, the pace of evolution would be quicker. But it would be no more certain. So, in default of any direct evidence in support of the Lamarckian hypothesis, and in view of the antecedent improbability of the germ plasm's being influenced by acquired characters in such a way as to transmit them, it would seem better to be content with Darwin.

Now being adapted to an environment means being adapted to survive in it as a species. A variant which achieved a better capacity for the survival of individuals at the cost of the survival of their offspring, would soon die out. So, of course, would a variant in which the capacity for the production and care of offspring was developed at too great a cost to the capacity for individual survival; but only because the survival of individuals to a certain age is a necessary condition to the production and survival of their offspring. Under conditions of natural selection, therefore, the 'trend' of evolution—promoted as it were negatively by the elimination of lines that least achieved it—is to improve the capacity of individuals to produce offspring that survive; and all other 'trends', including that of the improvement of the individual's capacity for self-preservation, are subordinate to it. When, with respect to a given environment, individuals having a maximum capacity to produce offspring that survive have been evolved, no further improvements can take place; the species ceases to change with time; and evolution may be said to have achieved its 'end' with respect to that environment.

In the course of time, every species must, and does, develop and perfect those organs which promote the production and survival of its offspring, and, so far as is necessary to, and compatible with, this, also those organs which promote the survival of individuals. Moreover, what is true of organs is also true of the instincts that make use of them.[1] All the instinct-patterns of individuals must

[1] An instinct which makes use of an organ may be regarded as itself the observable result of an invisible organ, namely, a pattern of connections in the nervous system. So far as such patterns give rise to innate behaviour, we must suppose that they are themselves innate.

therefore—though with varying degrees of imperfection—be such as promote the survival of their descendants.[1]

* * *

There is nothing teleological in statements about the 'trends' or 'ends' of evolution, which can be expressed in terms of mechanistic and chemical processes alone. They are of the same order as the statements that the 'trend' of a sieving process applied to an aggregate is to increase the proportion of the larger particles, or that the 'end' of a rolling stone is the bottom of the hill. If, therefore, we are inclined to personify the blind forces of selection, and to see in them a 'purpose' to improve and perfect the capacity of our species to survive in our own, or perhaps in any environment, we must suppose this to have become a purpose for us—perhaps even an innate one—which we project into nature. As the question of our ultimate innate aims is of importance, I will digress for a moment outside the behaviouristic framework of this chapter to enquire whether a purpose corresponding to the 'ends' of evolution has become innate in our own or any other species.

The end of evolution, with respect to a given environment and species, is an animal with a maximum capacity to produce offspring that survive. Now among the factors that could best promote the survival of descendants would be a desire to have descendants that survive. So evolution might be expected to implant this, and eventually to maximise it as an overriding purpose. Moreover, as instrumental to this purpose, evolution might go even further and develop a specific desire to have improved, and ultimately 'perfect' offspring with respect to their capacity to survive in their environment—not merely to breed, but as it were to breed eugenically. If so, a purpose would have come into being,

[1] This formulation seems to me to be more exact than one in terms of 'species-preservation'. If an individual promotes the survival of his brother's children in preference to his own, he leaves no descendants to inherit his concern for the species. What is inherited by his nephews and nieces is inherited, not through him, but through his parents and his brother, and this may include a proclivity to produce (as do bees and termites) a proportion of non-productive children whose 'altruism' promotes the survival of the rest. But if so, this proclivity is inherited because it promotes the survival of some of its owner's descendants—not because it promotes the survival of someone else's or of the species as such. When I speak, as for short I often shall, of instincts of species preservation, I shall be using the term in the above restricted sense.

which exactly corresponds with the end which the chance forces of selection tends to bring about.

Of course we must not assume in advance that such a purpose, whether general or specific, has yet been evolved in our own, still less in other species. From the behaviouristic point of view, we can observe and classify innate reactions. We find, as we might expect, that we can roughly arrange them in a hierarchy, according to the level of the end—proximate, penultimate or ultimate—they do in fact promote. But we must not uncritically conclude that the animal concerned purposes the most proximate end, let alone the final one of promoting the survival of its descendants. If the cat escapes on to the roof, this may be only because its hormones make it restless. If it then mates, this may be no more than the innate response to the immediate stimulus of a chance encounter which its restlessness had made more probable. And if it subsequently feeds and hides its kittens, this is more likely to be a direct response to them than a purposeful pursuit of immortality by proxy—the final end to which in fact all its component instincts are subordinate.

But there is much analytic evidence that in our own species such an overriding purpose does exist, always unconsciously, sometimes consciously as well, and that at least in its general and perhaps even in its specific form it is in some sense innate.

It is, I suggest, this purpose of our own that we tend, in poetic or religious flights of imagination, to project, so that nature appears to us to be unfolding a design vaguely conceived of as the production of something perfect and immortal, unconsciously equated with a superior version of ourselves. And we do so the more readily because the purpose we attribute to the blind forces of selection is a purpose we thoroughly approve of. We are less willing to personify what may be the end of the cosmos as a whole, to think of a limitless increase of entropy as a purpose, and so to turn our God into a Devil (*der Geist der stets verneint*).[1] Nor do we like to attribute any analogous purpose to ourselves. But Freud did. He believed in a death instinct which is opposed to the desire for life and purposes our own annihilation.

[1] Of two alternative theories now held by astronomers, most people have a strong emotional preference for a universe in a state of perpetual creation to one which is running down.

Perhaps the best way of approaching his theory is through a consideration of what we mean by the fear of death, and of how this fear, if it is innate, has come to be implanted.[1] It might be thought, at first sight, that the fear of what we call death is a derivative of the fear of physical pain. But the 'painfulness' of pain is related to the degree of bodily injury it consciously or unconsciously suggests; indeed, it might not be experienced as disagreeable if no injury were suggested by it. So the fear of physical pain is, in part at least, a derivative of the fear of destruction. As to this general fear, whether on behalf of ourselves or of our descendants with whom we identify ourselves, we might be inclined to regard it as a fear of being disappointed in our desire for immortality. But again the causal relation seems to be more the other way about. The desire for immortality exists, I think, in its own right. But the tremendous force with which we cling to it appears to be a consequence of evolution having first put the fear of death in us.

Now death is a state of non-being which is difficult or perhaps impossible to picture. Indeed analytic observation suggests that what we call the fear of death is the fear of something animistically conceived as an evil will hostile to our life, which is always as it were lurking in the shadows even when not manifest in a specific danger situation. Moreover, it is found to emanate from us.

It was I think this hostile force (though he reached it by a different argument) that Freud saw more clearly perhaps than anyone before and named the Death Instinct.

Now the notion of an instinct which in the first instance purposes our own destruction is hard to reconcile with the Darwinian concept of the instincts we have being the result of the selection, from those we might have had, of those that most favour our survival as a species. So if the Darwinian concept is unchallengeable (as I believe it to be), a primary suicidal impulse (and I also believe that this exists) can be explained only in one of two ways: either it is not an instinct but something prior to instincts (some kind of psychic correlate of entropy or of the catabolic processes which in fact destroy us); or, if it is an instinct, it exists because

[1] Unlike Melanie Klein, Freud himself did not believe that we can fear death for ourselves—presumably because he thought the absence of our own being to be inconceivable—and sought to reduce this supposed fear to other more concrete ones, such as the fear of castration or of loneliness.

in some paradoxical manner, it in fact promotes, or in a former environment used to promote, the survival of our species.

The first alternative is difficult to envisage, and Ernest Jones has put forward some weighty arguments against it.[1] As to the second, it might be argued, for example, that the suicidal impulse is derived from the inversion, to protect others, of a murderous impulse originally evolved to equip us for survival in a competitive world. Mechanisms of this kind by which a murderous impulse is turned against the self are common enough. And under primitive conditions, murderous impulses can be instrumental to the survival of their possessor and his line. But this theory does not explain the impression we get, in any deep analysis, that the murderous impulse is itself derived from the turning outwards of a still earlier type of self-destructive one.

So far the second alternative does not seem very satisfactory either. It can indeed be made more plausible by remembering that where, as at the beginning of our lives (perhaps always in the deeper layers of the unconscious), there is no clear distinction between self and non-self, any destructive impulse would be likely to be experienced as suicidal. But the degree of self-destructiveness surviving in man seems to be more than can be accounted for either in terms of an unconscious lack of discrimination between self and non-self, or of a secondary inversion of aggression. To explain this on Darwinian lines—that is, in a way that resolves the paradox in the concept of a destructive impulse, primarily suicidal in intent and yet evolved to promote survival—an ingenious hypothesis has recently been suggested to me by Mr. Adrian Stokes. To understand his argument, we must return to the link between the death impulse and anxiety, that is, to our belief that a death impulse, whether an instinct or not, exists and is the ultimate, or at least the major, source of fear, and in particular that external danger is feared because it is perceived as em-

[1] See Ernest Jones' biography of Freud, *Sigmund Freud, Life and Work*, Vol. iii, 1957, and my paper, 'An Inconclusive Contribution to the Theory of the Death Instinct', in *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis*, edited by Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann and myself, in which I showed more sympathy for the 'entropy theory' than I am now inclined to feel. (I have often wondered why Freud, who greatly admired Darwin, should have made so little use of Darwinian concepts. Had he used them, his own discoveries might, I think, have been formulated in a way which would have shown them to be consistent with the evolutionary theory of his great predecessor—instead of sometimes appearing to be incompatible with it.)

bodying a reflection of the death impulse in the self. Now if we were without fear, for ourselves or our children, we should be unlikely to survive long enough to have any; or if we did, their chance of surviving infancy would be still smaller. So in fact, the death impulse which teaches us to fear is instrumental to the survival of our species. And in Stokes' view, this is the only, or at least the most effective way in which fear could have been implanted in us.[1]

Remembering that fear and anger are readily interchangeable emotions, we can combine the arguments of the two preceding paragraphs, to arrive at the hypothesis that the death impulse was evolved because it admirably fulfilled a double function: in its primary form it provided the basis for fear, and in its secondary outward-directed form it equipped us with anger. In a competitive world, both are instrumental to species-preservation. If it was evolved because it fulfilled these functions, it is, in the Darwinian sense, an instinct after all.

But whether we regard the death impulse as the product of a pre-instinctual primal force (which is partially, but only partially, adapted to serve instincts striving for survival), or as wholly evolved in the interests of self- and species-preservation, this need not, I think, affect the superstructure of analytic theory—provided we do not deny its actual primacy or belittle its importance.

As to its primacy, we have an initial resistance to the suggestion that hate, the emotional aspect of aggression, is earlier than fear or love. We might suppose, as I said, that fear of death (for ourselves and our descendants), and hatred of whatever threatens it, are simple derivatives of a love of life for ourselves and our descendants with whom we feel identified. But it seems to be the destructive impulse in us that leads us to expect it in the outer world. In other words, our aggressiveness is responsible for our fear of death, and probably it is our fear of death that is responsible for the strength of our desire for immortality—if not in our own persons, then in that of our real or symbolic children. It looks as if the primary emotions develop in this unexpected order: first self-destructive anger (which is soon in part turned outwards),

[1] Most of the fears of small children are paranoid, rather than realistic. They are terrified of the imaginary tiger under the bed, which is a projection of their own aggressiveness. But only the experience of injury seems to link their capacity to fear with actual danger situations.

then fear based on the expectation of destructive anger conceived as threatening from without (as well as from within), and then love, for whatever gives pleasure, security and life. (While phylogenetically, egoistic or instrumental love precedes the altruistic form which first spares, and then protects, its object, we cannot assume an exact ontogenetic repetition of this sequence. All we can so far say is that, in the human infant, concern for his mother intermittently appears almost from birth, and reaches an early peak when, in about his fourth month, he becomes aware of the extent to which his own anger, or his predatory greed, is felt to threaten her.)

With regard to the importance of the death impulse in analytic theory, since the superstructure of analytic theory rests on the concept of an almost perpetual unconscious conflict between hate and love, a minimum requirement for the acceptance of the superstructure is that the strength and ubiquity of unconscious hate (including self-hate) should not be belittled or denied. A death impulse, whether or not it is an instinct paradoxically instrumental to survival, would be felt as opposed to our desire to live and love. And Freud believed the opposition between the two impulses to be the ultimate source of every psychic conflict.

I have tried, in this metapsychological digression, to present his theory of a basic conflict by means of arguments which, though differing somewhat from his, make it most plausible to me. If the two opposing death and life impulses are as primordial as he supposed, they must conflict in every living organism. I shall now return to the behaviouristic approach, and try at least to show that the evolution of our own species has been such as to make the conflict between destructive and preservative (including creative) impulses particularly severe in us.

* * *

Any animal is liable to conflict if its innate reactions to two different, but occasionally similar, situations are antagonistic.

Sometimes the liability to conflict may be increased by a change of environment such that the animal is more often faced by similar situations of this kind. It was, for example, less difficult for primitive man, living in small hunting and warring clans, to distinguish between competing enemies to be attacked and co-operat-

ing friends to be defended and preserved, than for civilised man whose neighbours may be both at once. And some of our conflict probably springs from this change.

But the conflict, in its most general form between what to destroy, because it is a competitor or perhaps just something to be consumed, and what to protect or at least spare, is far more ancient than civilisation. It was probably more acute in us than in other species before we could be clearly classified as men, and had its origins in the remote past before we had reached the mammalian stage.

Since organisms tend to increase up to the capacity of their environment to support them, they live at the expense of each other. Even plants survive only by outgrowing other plants and so depriving them of light and nutriment. Animals not only compete in this way for food, but live by consuming other organisms—often other animals, and sometimes even those of their own species—that is, only by destroying can they and their progeny survive. From a purely behaviouristic standpoint, which excludes the concept of anger, it is not easy to define the scope of 'aggressive behaviour', nor to decide the extent to which acts of destruction are the result of it. But we may agree that aggressiveness is destructive and does, as a rule, serve the final end of race survival; and, on Darwinian principles, we must suppose that, to this end, the capacity for it has either been adapted (if it has an independent origin) or evolved. Phylogenetically, it would seem to appear first in the pursuit of prey (or more generally, whenever the satisfaction of hunger is frustrated), then in self-defence, next in sexual competition and lastly in the defence of dependents—offspring, the mate or mates, and other members of the group. That is to say, its use in the service of the proximate end of self-preservation is phylogenetically older than its use in the direct service of the final end of reproduction and the preservation of descendants.

It would also seem that each step in the use of aggression has developed from the one before. The prime condition of natural selection, namely, a tendency to increase in excess of the food supply, ensures the evolution of an aggressive response to hunger, which is probably universal though more marked in carnivores. Such behaviour once evolved could be, and I think was, extended to serve the ends of self-defence and sexual competition, the same

organs of oral destruction and the same instincts being modified for the purpose or, in herbivores, new ones such as the horn and the impulse to charge being added to them. Lastly, by a further extension, aggressive behaviour is adapted to the service of the group which the individual may then be said to guard.

But the process involves more than successive additions to the class of object or situation which elicits an aggressive response. This also has to be inhibited with respect to certain objects which formerly evoked it. The mate, the offspring and other members of the species—even sexual rivals—become progressively included in the class of objects to be first spared, and then defended, as if they were the self—a class which originally had the self as its sole member. There is thus a gradual invasion by each component instinct of the field[1] of the other. (In Freud's terminology, these instincts, or groups of instinct, are Thanatos and Eros respectively.[2])

It is obvious that a development of this kind, in which opposed instincts invade the field of each other, must put an increasing strain on those higher centres, which function like calculating machines to assess a situation in terms of past experience and decide priorities for action. Thus the likelihood of paralysing conflicts will be increased. I want in particular to argue that such conflicts will be more acute in mammals than in other classes, and still more acute in our own than in other related species of primate.

Some fishes build nests and protect their young by carrying them back in their mouths to 'put them to bed'. And Lorenz has given a fascinating account of a conflict, with a happy ending, in one of these fishes, between the impulse to eat and the impulse to protect an infant in its mouth.[3] But here a parallel evolution only seems to be involved; since our own ancestors do not appear to have displayed a like degree of protectiveness till they had passed

[1] That is, the class of objects to which the instinct is directed, which, in logic, would be called 'the converse domain' of the relation between a species and the objects of the instinct.

[2] Freud's Thanatos and Eros are for him the two basic types of brick out of which all specific instincts are compounded. Thus his dualistic theory is complementary to, rather than incompatible with the more usual pluralistic theories. It is true that he objected to the *ad hoc* way in which such pluralistic theories used to be constructed. But he had nothing against them in principle, and would probably have welcomed the work of modern ethologists which, in its use of such concepts as 'displacement', is partly founded on his own.

[3] Lorenz, *King Solomon's Ring*, 1952.

the amphibian and reptilian stages and become mammals. The most we can say of them is that as fishes they may have developed some inhibition against preying on like-sized members of their own species, as reptiles against eating their own eggs, and that in their early mammalian stage they definitely protected their young, as well as their mates and possibly other members of their group.[1]

But at this point the progressive extension of the class of objects to be protected like the self, and protected in the first instance against the self, was complicated by the introduction of another factor. Among all mammals, the evolved inhibition against preying on their own kind is, in one respect, relinquished. Mammals do 'prey upon' their mothers; and among many of them, puppies for example, sucking passes into biting at a certain age, so that there is the risk of actual damage. Against this the mother may have to protect herself. I have seen a spaniel bitch do so by climbing on to a bench just out of reach of her puppies (while giving me a guilty look, as if she felt she ought to feed them even if it hurt). But she may also be protected in another way. For Dr. John Fitz Herbert has pointed out to me that puppies begin to bite themselves at the age at which they become capable of damaging their mother. So the crisis may in part be dealt with by the further evolution of a tendency to deflect aggression inwards. I do not wish to suggest that all mammals suffer in the same degree from an early conflict between the desire to exploit—ultimately to consume—and the desire to preserve their mothers. But I believe the seeds of such conflict to be present in all mammals, and so ready, as it were, to develop into a formidable plant in any species, such as ours, in which the period of infantile dependence is very much prolonged. In Kleinian theory, this conflict, and the unconscious phantasies it gives rise to, is the initial source (to which of course other unconscious conflicts contribute) of every mental illness.[2]

If the partial return, by mammals, to a more predatory attitude to certain members of their own species may be called an 'instinct regression', I would suggest that, in our own species, a further and more specific 'instinct regression' has occurred to intensify the

[1] At first, of course, the mothers may have had to protect the young against the fathers.

[2] Freud discovered the unconscious presence of oral-cannibalistic impulses in all of us; but I think he regarded the conflicts they give rise to as of secondary importance compared to those of the Oedipus complex.

conflict between what is to be preyed on and what is to be spared or actively preserved. A number of factors—the gradual deforestation of the ancient habitat of the originally tree-living, and mainly herbivorous, primates from which we are descended, their achievement of ascendency over other species until they became their own chief rivals for survival, their multiplication relatively to other sources of food—all these must have set a premium on those in whom innate scruples against preying on their own kind were least firmly established. At any rate they became omnivorous and, it is thought, cannibalistic too. In other words, some of the innate inhibitions they had evolved were bred out of them again, with the result that our own species has perhaps become unique in the degree to which it is predisposed to prey upon itself.

Meanwhile, of course, the increasing survival value of a capacity to co-operate as a group, both for hunting and for war, was promoting the further development of the protective instincts. The result, as I see it, is that we have become unique, not only in that we prey upon our own species, but in having our own species as the identical fields of two opposed instincts—the Thanatos and Eros of Freud—one ruthlessly destructive, the other altruistically protective. No inherent difference, but only the accident of propinquity, would in the first instance seem to determine who should evoke one rather than the other, and so be treated as an enemy to be destroyed or a friend to be spared and actively protected.

This unique degree of conflict between destructive (including cannibalistic) and protective impulses towards members of our own species seems also to be responsible for special features in the domain of sexual rivalry. Among most species, the rival is driven off but very seldom killed, and almost never eaten. Among baboons in captivity, the females may be, as it were accidentally, killed in fights for their possession, but not the males. Moreover, a weaker male may sometimes protect himself by the homosexual seduction of his stronger rival.[1] Among our own species, the same alternatives exist: the rival may be driven off, or he may become the object of a homosexual attraction—and this alternative is, with us, also a possible outcome of sexual rivalry between women. But it is the existence of law, rather than of innate inhibition, which prevents human sexual rivalry from being very often lethal

[1] Zuckermann, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*, 1932.

to the less cunning or the weaker. Moreover, unlike the females of other species, women, when their sexual rivalry is stirred, are potentially as murderous as men.

It remains for me to mention one further peculiarity of the human species, often stressed by analysts: namely, the prolongation of the period of the human infant's dependence on his parents beyond the point at which his sexual instincts in the narrower sense begin to ripen. They do so in two waves—one reaching its climax in childhood about the age at which our ancestral primates might have been mature, and the other at puberty—with a trough between, the 'latency period' which in its depth and extent varies with the cultural environment. But the only point I am here concerned to make is that the first wave is likely to give rise to exactly those incestuous attractions and jealousies which, in analytic theory, leave permanent traces in the unconscious memory of all of us.

* * *

Such biological considerations as I have mentioned in this chapter, scanty and often speculative as they are, do seem, to me at least, to give a certain antecedent probability to much of that psycho-analytical picture of man which at first sight seemed so unwelcome, so strange, and therefore so incredible. They lead us to expect, rather than to be surprised at, his tremendous ambivalence, his potential cannibalism, his destructive envy, his jealousy of rivals which may alternate with, or be covered by, great love for them—and his unconscious incestuous inclinations.

The problem, indeed, is no longer to explain how we come by such discordant impulses, but how most of us succeed in partially inhibiting and sublimating the more destructive ones. To some small degree, the elimination since the dawn of civilisation of those whose undisciplined aggression rendered them least adapted to it, may have reinstated innate inhibitions, or developed in us an innate disposition to acquire them. But our ability to defend culture against ourselves is itself, in the main, a cultural achievement and, as such, far more precarious and easily lost than an innate endowment. In the next chapter we shall be concerned with the psycho-analytic account of instinct in the child as it develops in the framework of his family.

CHAPTER III

Instinct in the Child

So far, and sometimes at the cost of cumbrous expressions, such as 'aggressive behaviour', which avoid the presumption of mental processes, we have been discussing instinct mainly from the biological or behaviouristic point of view. To the biologist, an instinct is an innate tendency to react in a certain way to a certain pattern of stimuli, internal (endocrine) as well as external. Both the stimuli and the response can be observed, but not yet the cerebral processes which mediate between them. It is with the psychic concomitants of such unobserved cerebral processes that as psychologists we shall henceforth be principally concerned. These, to a great extent, we can experience in ourselves as impulses of various kinds. We can also infer them in others who resemble us.

* * *

But even if we restrict our field to that of our own mental life, it is difficult to dispense with all inferences from what can to what cannot be observed. We know, for example, that sensations and the impulses arising from them which were not consciously perceived at the time can sometimes be remembered afterwards, and we therefore infer that they must have been 'unconsciously' experienced. Still more impressive are the phenomena of post-hypnotic suggestion, in which the subject carries out commands he has consciously forgotten. For reasons of this kind, Freud developed his well known picture of a mental apparatus with an unconscious system between sensation and consciousness. In the unconscious part of the system, alternative and often antagonistic responses to the sensual situation are assumed to be carried out in 'phantasy', the function of consciousness being to decide priorities for action—a process which includes the 'repression' or still earlier the splitting off and disowning of such alternatives as arouse too much anxiety. It thus resembles the head of a department who

chooses between alternatives recommended by his staff. In this analogy, the processes of repression and splitting would be represented by the actions of a chief who sometimes turned down unwelcome suggestions without considering them at all, and sometimes sacked the member of the staff who made them.[1] Conversely, he may also sometimes carelessly allow a suggestion to be implemented which he should have vetoed; that is, an unconscious impulse which would normally be repressed, occasionally escapes in the form of an embarrassing slip. Only when he deliberates, however quickly, on everything not purely a matter of routine before either vetoing or passing it for action, is he like a consciousness that functions to perfection—which of course no consciousness ever does for long.[2]

There is a prevalent belief that the impulses of man—and especially those acceptable to consciousness—are less 'instinctive' than those of animals. But this, though true in a sense, involves a rather confusing dichotomy. An impulse represented by a phantasy, or a behaviour pattern, is not strictly speaking *either* instinctive *or* acquired. It is both at once, since the relation of instinct to acquisition is that of genus to species: we have a general instinct to eat and acquire specific eating preferences and habits. All the impulses of man are, therefore, just as much instinctive as the stereotyped tropisms of the simplest form of life. Of course, his instincts at birth are immeasurably more plastic; they comprise a vast pyramid of potential development which experience progressively narrows. In highly conventional individuals they may end by becoming almost as rigid. But although the most artificially imposed convention remains the specific form of a general innate potentiality, there is a valid distinction between instinct in an early form and instinct moulded by experience. In this sense, unconscious impulses, which have been little altered because they

[1] Sometimes, too, a member of the staff may conceal what he is doing from his chief. I think this also has its analogies in the mind. That is to say, I think there are aspects of personality which, like naughty children, desire their doings to remain unseen by the conscious ego.

[2] In a state, different departments may be planning war and trade agreements with the same foreign power, only one of which will be implemented by the Cabinet. So too different departments of the unconscious may be simultaneously planning how to kill and how to make love to the same person, while consciousness chooses, and is aware of, only one of these alternatives. Much of the chaos in madness results from the fact that the conscious ego is partially destroyed so that incompatible impulses are simultaneously expressed.

were repressed, are much closer to instinct in the raw. It is in the unconscious as recovered in analysis, therefore, that we may best continue that study of instinct which we began on behaviouristic lines.

* * *

What I have just said about the relation of instinct to acquisitions may serve as a starting point. We cannot divide them into separate categories, because the one includes the other. Nor can we divide one aspect of a complete mental process in this way. There are three aspects recognised by academic psychology: the 'cognitive' which judges the situation, the 'affective' or emotional response, and the 'conative' which constitutes the impulse to prolong or change the situation. At first sight, we might suppose that, of these three, the cognitive aspect is wholly acquired by education while the affective and conative are for the most part innate. It is true that the cognitive aspect, which consists basically in acts of recognition,[1] is far more plastic than the other two and is immensely developed by experience. But in an elementary form it would seem to be an essential part of the earliest innate responses. Students of animal behaviour[2] observe that certain patterns of stimuli have the power of evoking innate reactions. To give two examples, a newly hatched gull reacts by 'gaping' (for food) to a red spot on cardboard resembling the red spot on its mother's bill —even though it has been incubated and has never seen her. A little later a young duckling will also react, this time by flight, to a moving cross-shaped object suggestive of a hawk which again it has never seen. In other words, those birds behave as if they 'recognised' certain objects as needed or dangerous the first time they see them. Analytic studies of parallel phenomena in the human infant suggest that the behaviouristic reaction in fact expresses a sense of knowing, in a rudimentary way, what is to be expected from such objects and whether they are to be welcomed with relief as 'friendly' or feared as 'hostile'. It is worth noting that, in both cases, such recognition appears to be related to anxiety; for, while one object relieves anxiety aroused by hunger,

[1] Moritz Schlick, in *Erkenntnislehre*, 1925, stressed this aspect of cognition.
[2] See, for example, Tinbergen, *The Study of Instinct*, 1951, or Lorenz, *King Solomon's Ring*, 1952.

the other arouses it directly. Moreover, the object that relieves the anxiety of hunger is also sought when anxiety is aroused by an external threat. The frightened chick runs to the hen; the frightened infant turns to the breast.

It by no means follows from all this that we are born with innate 'memories' in a Lamarckian sense. If some form of the old theory of innate ideas has to be revived, I believe this could be done on purely Darwinian lines. For if, in accordance with the 'hybrid', interactionist, framework of this chapter, we conceive of the brain as an organ for producing phantasy—and of a type determined by the pattern of its structure—we can suppose that it might have an 'innate initial structure' at birth which produced 'innate initial phantasies' not yet moulded by experience (together with some which emerge after birth solely as the result of cerebral maturation). We may also suppose that, of many mutations, those innate initial structures that produced phantasies that least resembled external reality would tend to be eliminated by selection; so that, if no other factors were involved, an ever closer approximation between the two would be achieved. But too detailed a correspondence between innate phantasy and the objects and situations most likely to be met in the external world, might well interfere with a capacity to learn to deal with the exceptions; and, for this reason, the correspondence in our own species may have become, if not less 'true', at least vaguer and less detailed than it was a few million years ago.

At any rate this theory offers a Darwinian explanation of the apparently innate core of what analysts call the 'inner world' of phantasy, together with a hint of the function performed by the interplay between it and the outer world of conscious thought and sensory experience. For if it is by means of a 'primary projection' of innate patterns into the sensual field that an infant is enabled to perceive, with a feeling of recognition, objects he has never experienced before, it is their 're-projection' after being modified by sensory experience that forms the basis of memory and enables him to accquire a more detailed knowledge of them.

That there is a potential weakness in this learning mechanism—that projection can override the influence of sensory experience, and in a cumulative way, so that the resulting world-model becomes progressively more distorted instead of progressively more

true—is a matter with which we shall be very much concerned. But at the moment we are concerned only with what seems to be innate. We have supposed, in effect, that variation and selection has so structured the brain of the infant that he at first perceives such, and only such, patterns of sensations as he is innately designed to respond to; and that he responds cognitively by extending the pattern to form an 'expectation phantasy' which in turn arouses affect and a 'conative phantasy' to hold or change the situation. Moreover, while he responds at any time to objects arousing an expectation of danger, he probably perceives, or subsequently imagines, needed objects only when he needs them.

Such a pattern of sensations—or *gestalt*, to borrow this term from the Gestalt psychologists—which evokes an innate response with cognitive, affective and conative aspects, may be called a 'primary symbol'.[1] To the newly hatched gull, any more or less red coloured spot, including the spot on its mother's bill; to the newborn infant, any breast-like object including the real breast, functions in this way. Thus a primary symbol so defined is related to but not quite the same as a symbol in the psycho-analytic sense—a concept which differs both in excluding the real breast, for example, as the object symbolised, from the class of breast symbols, and including many objects which have only later become associated with it.[2]

Psycho-analytic observations suggest that there are only a few primary symbols of this kind each having the *gestalt* of a biologically vital object or situation. But there may be many more which have so far escaped attention. Besides round *gestalten* or breast symbols (probably with an olfactory content which later loses much of its significance), there are oblong phallic ones, hollow vaginal ones, and situations of combination or intercourse, all of which arouse specific innate emotions and impulses. But perhaps only the first is operative at birth. The others would seem to

[1] See my paper 'The World of Unconscious Phantasy and the World of Common Sense', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 1956.

[2] If any member of a class having the *gestalt* of a primary symbol is, initially, capable of eliciting a similar innate response, it might be supposed that some one member of the class would soon become selected—by a process ethologists call 'imprinting'— as the 'real' object, leaving the others free to act as symbols of it in the analytic sense capable of eliciting only a token response. But the development of the use of symbols in the analytic sense involves further complications which will be discussed in Chapter IV.

emerge a little later, presumably as the result of an innately predetermined cerebral growth. Gradually, too, other *gestalten* of a more complex kind but also evoking innate responses, seem to come into operation almost of their own accord. These correspond to such vital figures as mother, father and child, for which children seem innately to discover substitutes even when deprived of the normal objects that fulfil these roles. But these later operating symbols are partly developed from and unconsciously fused with the earlier ones, mother with breast and vaginal symbols, father with phallic ones—each, as it were, with an appropriate 'part object'. Moreover, phallic symbols are partly derived from breast ones, and vaginal symbols from the concept of a mouth.

It would seem therefore that cognitive development, which involves the successive recognition of significant differences as well as similarities, is itself in some degree innately predetermined, and that we may start with only one important primary symbol, that of the breast, or possibly two if we include the mouth, from which the others emerge under the double influence of experience and cerebral maturation. Thus, at the beginning of post-natal life the only external sense patterns to be perceived at all may well be primary breast symbols and then only when the infant is under the influence of anxiety aroused by hunger, discomfort or some other cause. Gradually, however, and not without a period of confusion as to where to draw the line, elongated phallic symbols seem almost of their own accord to become differentiated from them and to evoke a differentiated response. Meanwhile, the child's idea of a mouth, originally thought of as that which grasps the nipple, is developed and differentiated into a number of distinct concepts. If the sensory pattern of the mouth arouses an innate sucking reaction which is more than a local reflex, and involves the cortex, we may suppose that to the innate cerebral process there corresponds an innate phantasy of sucking, and we may regard this as the immediate psychic precursor, or cause, of the act. It is for this reason that I would include the *gestalt* of a mouth as one of the primary symbols that function from the beginning of post-natal life. From it, by a process of differentiation, other symbols seem to bud out, again almost of their own accord. In other words, they seem innately to emerge at an appropriate time—or at least at a time which was appropriate at some stage of

our evolution, though they may now be premature. In this way vagina symbols (often combined with anal ones) seem to become differentiated from mouth symbols, and elicit differentiated phantasy responses, at an early age—and in children who have had no chance of discovering the existence of the organ concerned. Similarly, the concept of the sucking relation between nipple and mouth seems spontaneously to give rise, by differentiation, to intercourse symbols evoking typical innate responses of excitement and jealousy in rather older children who have no knowledge by experience of any such event.

To what extent, if any, there are also primary symbols corresponding to the various gases, fluids and solids which enter or leave the body of the child, is a still more difficult problem. Psychologically they are of immense importance to him because they force themselves on his attention and become equated with, or later stand for, other vitally important objects. This is particularly true of the faeces which, because of their plasticity, can stand for almost anything. In particular, they stand for what is almost certainly another 'emergent *gestalt*', that of the child which the child soon wishes to create. Of course his desire to compete with his parents in creativity, and by so doing also to win their admiration, helps to arouse this wish. But although stimulated by the example of the parents, it is so universal that the end of procreation, as well as the 'means' of intercourse, may be assumed to emerge as an innate element in unconscious phantasy, that is, as an innate purpose.

The child's early pride in his faeces, as products of his body and so endowed with the *gestalt* qualities of the children he wishes to create, is possible because at first he has no sense of disgust for them and (although he has paranoid fears of being poisoned) he appears to make no realistic distinction between what is noxious and what is nourishing. Moreover, when the sense of disgust does begin to develop, which again it seems to do of its own accord,[1] he at first struggles against it for two reasons: he does not want to be deprived of his sense of creativity and to be forced, as it were, to admit his worthlessness; and he does not want to become conscious of a link already forming in his unconscious between faeces and

[1] The absence of disgust at the appropriate age is evidence of a disturbed development.

the painful ideas of death, corruption and decay. The fear of these things (together often with a morbid fascination) is aroused in unconscious phantasy at a very early date; for the child also uses his faeces as vehicles of aggression, and then feels them to have become animatistically malevolent.

* * *

That the human mind—presumably in less degree also the mind of any animal—is capable of phantasy as well as of perception is presupposed in the theory of instinct we are considering. Indeed the manipulation of the inner world in phantasy is the expression of those innate alternative impulses to action between which it is the function of consciousness to choose. But at first the human infant makes no distinction between the inner and the outer world, that is, between a phantasied and a real manipulation of environment. Whether an object having the *gestalt* qualities of a primary symbol can be imagined before it has ever been perceived is a question we have already touched on. But it can certainly be subsequently evoked with an hallucinatory vividness. Thus the hungry infant, who has previously been fed, can recall the breast in phantasy, experience the emotional excitement and reassurance of having it, and strive to keep it, just as if it were 'real'. Indeed, his control over the phantasy breast is much greater for the time being, even though it fails to satisfy his hunger in the end; for in imagination he can swallow it whole, or project himself into it to possess it from within.

But it by no means follows that the phantasy life of an infant is always a happy one. He is subject to very great anxieties which have, I suggest, both general and specific causes. For while he may be presumed to share with other animals an innate predisposition to fear those internal and external dangers by which, in natural conditions of a struggle for existence, all are threatened, his difficulties are heightened by innate conflicts peculiar to mankind. It should be remembered, too, that these conflicts are likely to be particularly disturbing in earliest infancy, when there is as yet little or no conscious ego to decide priorities, nor to distinguish between what has taken place and what is imagined. Still worse, perhaps, is that inability to 'locate' affects which the absence of a stable ego implies, so that he does not know whether they are his

or he their object. In particular, he is often uncertain whether it is the breast that wants to eat him, or he that wants to eat the breast. And linked with his difficulty in locating affects, there is the confusion between what happens in imagination inside himself and what happens in the outer world.

Although, as I have already stressed, the final end of evolution is the production of descendants that survive, those social instincts which in higher animals directly serve this end, by protecting offspring, have been much more recently evolved than those which serve the proximate end of self-preservation. And I think ontogenesis reveals traces of this sequence. At least there seems to be a period, which is, however, much shorter than might have been supposed, when the infant cares only for his own survival. It ought not to surprise us to discover from analysis that his earliest anxieties centre in two dangers—both real enough in the past though no longer actual—the danger of being starved and the danger of being eaten.

What could not, perhaps, have been so easily foreseen is that these two sources of anxiety are related. On the one hand, hunger and fear of being starved arouses aggressive greed by which the infant may then feel threatened from without—a state of mind sometimes recaptured, for example, in the spontaneous drawings of patients who depict the nipple of a breast as a kind of vampire mouth. On the other, the idea of being eaten, once aroused, can be internalised to elaborate the discomfort of hunger into the more frightening sense of being 'gnawed' by an angry 'nipple-mouth' within. But perhaps this connection is not so surprising after all, since it is difficult to see how we, or animals like us, could come to fear aggression from without unless we were acquainted with it in ourselves.

* * *

The very great anxieties which arise in the first few months of post-natal life by this 'projection', reification and 'reintrojection' of oral and other primitive forms of aggression was first clearly observed and systematically studied by Melanie Klein. They form the core of what she has called the paranoid-schizoid position. Of course, the projection, or outside localisation, of hostile impulses, which characterises a paranoid mechanism, always involves a

schizoid one, since what is projected is split off from the self. But there is also a splitting of the object. Indeed, unless the infant can split off his idea of a 'bad' breast, formed by the projection of his destructive greed, from his idea of the loved breast, his paranoid anxiety will prevent him from using it at all. So while the 'bad' breast is split off and becomes the embodiment of the infant's unsatisfied predatory self, the idea of the good one remains, purified from all feelings of dissatisfaction, as that which satisfies his contented self. By this means—and also because it is felt to contain, and reflect, his love for it—it is 'idealised' as purely good. Moreover, it is good in two senses: it is not only the passive source of happiness and life, but also the active protector against pain and death now embodied in the bad one.

Meanwhile, the child's picture of himself—of what he is made of inside—is developed by the periodic reintrojection of what he has projected. By this means the good and bad breasts, which embody his own loving and destructive impulses, come to be located in phantasy, not only outside, but also inside him where, as embodiments of good and evil, they are felt to continue the old conflict between love and hate in a new, and semi-independent, form. These, too, he is under pressure to project, and so tends to discover or recognise them in objects and persons in his outer world.

If not overwhelming, the anxieties of this period act as a spur in the first steps of intellectual development.[1] For whenever, as is always liable to happen, the good and bad pictures of the breast again become confused, the child is particularly receptive to the perception of similar, but not identical, objects which can take the place of the good one temporarily lost. Moreover, since the same fate of confusion between good and bad can overtake these first toys in turn, he is forced to find still more distant substitutes. In this way, anxiety compels him to notice similarities and differences between perceptions, to widen his interests, and to increase the number of distinct objects he can separately perceive. Conversely, it would seem impossible for human beings to take the slightest interest in, or even to perceive, anything not ultimately

[1] Too great anxiety has the opposite effect of causing the child's interest to turn inwards away from the perceptual world. See, for example, Rodrigue, 'The analysis of a three-year-old mute schizophrenic', *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis*, 1955.

linked by a series of such displacements with the few primary symbols we are innately predisposed to respond to.

* * *

Although, in moods of satisfaction, a baby may very soon smile at his mother in a loving way, in moods of hunger or distress, he is at first concerned only with his own survival, and conceives her as a 'part-object' important only because instrumental to this end. He is then ready to destroy her without compunction if she thwarts him; and, in any case, would gladly eat her if he could, or burrow, like a rat, right into her for still greater safety.[1] Moreover, in phantasy he does both with an elated sense of triumph, which is 'manic' because exaggerated as a defence against his fear of a retaliatory persecution by this powerful object he now feels himself to contain or be contained by. But about the end of the third post-natal month significant changes have appeared, which characterise what Melanie Klein has called the 'depressive position.'

By this time, that co-ordinating and selecting agency associated with consciousness which we call the ego, is more firmly established. The child is more integrated, has more the sense of being a 'person', with contradictory impulses, who can be either hurt or happy; and, by identification he can, at least intermittently, think of his mother not merely as a 'part-object' but as a person like himself who can, like him, be happy or suffer. He then begins to feel concern for her and depressed about the damage he has done her in imagination which is still barely distinguishable from reality. It is at this time, I think, that the basic moral conflict of mankind—whether to destroy in order to survive, or be destroyed so that others may live—appears first and in its acutest form. Because of his greed for, and envy of, the breast, his cannibalistic and sadistic impulses—for he takes great pleasure in destruction—are still mainly directed, with a desperate urgency which reflects his terror of otherwise becoming their victim, mainly towards his mother. But at the same time, she has become his other self whose imagined sufferings are as intolerable to him as would be his own.

[1] The phantasy, which later arouses the intensest horror, that under the skin raw flesh exists to be consumed, is sometimes recaptured in analysis, and I am inclined to include it among those that emerge innately, almost without experience, at a certain age—perhaps about 3 months.

So he begins to be anxious on her behalf. His chief concern, however, is less for his external mother whose continued existence reassures him of her safety, than for that phantasy figure he has eaten, or eaten into, and now unconsciously feels himself to contain or be contained in.

* * *

Meanwhile his difficulties have already been increased by the emergence of another conflict centring around his relation to his parents' relation to each other. For by now any combination of two objects has begun to evoke typical innate responses to the *gestalt* (primary symbol) of intercourse. There would appear to be two such responses which oppose each other, yet occur together in phantasy. The intercourse is at once marvellous and awful, because of the destructive envy and jealousy aroused, so that it becomes something to be copied and preserved or utterly destroyed.[1]

To a great extent, the conflict is again resolved by splitting; but as this is no longer as complete as in the earlier period, there are three outcomes to consider. So far as splitting fails and the parents remain partly good and partly bad, the sense of having, in the inner world of phantasy, destroyed the good together with the bad will increase the child's depression. But he will also find secondary symbols which can stand for the two split aspects independently. Towards the bad, represented for example by the apparently sadistic attack of one person on another, he will then be able to direct his own sadism without any sense of guilt at all; while the good will evoke his unbounded admiration.

It is through this last attitude of admiration for whatever stands for creativeness that his escape from the depressive position principally lies. He begins to become creative in his games, and unconsciously feels that he is not only making babies, like his parents, but at the same time repairing, in his inner world, everything which in phantasy he has destroyed. The rapid progress he now makes in dexterity and understanding is in large measure the expression of this constructive and reparative urge, which may remain a dominant motive throughout his life.

[1] His own bisexuality, both aspects of which are by now emerging, adds a complication: while his male self envies and is jealous of his father, his female self envies and is jealous of his mother.

This phase begins, however, with a strong admixture of manic over-estimation of his powers, which is itself a defence against despair about ever being able to make or mend anything—primarily in his inner world, and so also in the outer. His tendency to despair is unconsciously conditioned by doubts about the goodness of his motives because of the strong element of destructive competitiveness which is mixed with his reparative impulse. This duality of motive for achievement is responsible for a kind of manic-depressive cycle, between an obstinate assertion of success in face of actual failure, and a despairing abandonment of effort in face of difficulties not in fact insuperable. His capacity for sustained, as opposed to intermittent, success, in later life, will probably depend on the extent to which, in this early period, his competitiveness is fused with, and subordinated to, his reparative impulse.

* * *

That the conflicts just described can really torment an infant already in the first few months after birth may seem incredible. Indeed, Melanie Klein's description of them, now many times confirmed, at first aroused, and still sometimes arouses, much protest even among her colleagues. But in the light of what we know of our evolution, they do not seem improbable. I have argued in the last chapter that, under the influence of changing conditions of survival, our pre-human forebears evolved, and perhaps twice lost, an innate inhibition against cannibalism, which is still less absolute in us than among most mammals. So it should occasion no surprise if children recapitulate some of the conflicts involved in this development. It is true that, in the human infant these conflicts are more 'internalised' than they may be presumed to have been in his pre-human ancestors. That is to say, they occur, in the first instance, in relation to the phantasy objects of his inner world, and can be observed only so far as these become externalised in his relation to his environment. Moreover, if a recapitulation of pre-human, and even pre-mammalian, stages of mental development is to be found in a human baby after birth, it is to be found only as a sub-stratum in a baby which is, from birth, essentially human and so endowed with a capacity for human feeling. But with these provisos, it may not be over-fanciful to

see him pass from positions in which, as one of my patients once said, there can be a 'reptilian' cold-bloodedness in his purely instrumental interest in the breast, to a 'mammalian' social stage, in which instinct conflicts developed during the emergence of our own more carnivorous and more social ancestors from the herbivorous primates, may also be displayed.

We may note, in passing, that this argument could be reversed. For if what we know of evolution gives some antecedent probability to the discoveries of analysis, it should also be possible to use analysis to further our knowledge of evolution. Psycho-analysis, which studies the phantasy life of individuals at different periods of their lives, is the study of the way human instinct grows in different social soils. By its means, we slowly construct a picture of what is constant in different patterns of development; and from this we may then obtain at least an approximate picture of instinct evolution in the race, together with some rough idea of the successive environments to which instinct has been adapted. (In doing so, however, we must remember that phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences do not always correspond in the order of their terms.)[1]

Moreover, future refinements in analytic technique may throw more light, not only on instinct evolution so far as this is common to all mankind, but also on those differences in innate endowment which may well distinguish different races and, within races, different groups and families.

* * *

To conclude this chapter, I would like to return to two questions raised *en passant* in the last one: that of the extent to which the ends of evolution are purposed by man, and that of the existence of a death instinct. Both are difficult to free from the fog of metaphysics in which they are entangled. Moreover, they are related to each other.

Man is no longer at the stage—rightly or wrongly attributed to simple organisms—in which, for example, hunger evokes an unpurposed restlessness which statistically increases the chance of

[1] For example, in the phylogenetic sequence, mating, which is almost ubiquitous precedes suckling, which is specific to mammals; in the ontogenetic sequence, mating not only comes after suckling, but appears, in part at least, to be psychologically derived from it.

finding food; nor, when he finds it, does he merely 'react' mechanically to this stimulus. We feel hungry, desire food, seek it deliberately and attack it with appetite. On rare occasions we may also be aware of a fear of dying of starvation and of seeking food in order to live. Lastly, in situations of great danger, many people are conscious of a passionate desire to live in order to have children, or to look after those they already have until they are self-supporting. Those in whom this impulse has become an overriding aim may well be said to purpose the ultimate end of evolution.

Of course, on this evidence alone, we cannot say whether such purpose is only a specific cultural acquisition or something so general, at least in the unconscious, as to leave no doubt that it is instinctive. Certainly the cultural background, for example, of a title holder may impress on him the obligation to produce an heir; and without analysis to aid us, we might conclude this to be a sufficient explanation of its having become his strongest wish. But we can now add that at least a general desire to be immortal by making and leaving something that endures is a very common conscious expression of an unconscious aim which, though opposed in different degrees by other forces, is predominant in almost every one. This unconscious aim, itself derived in the first few months of infancy from the infant's own will to live, is to preserve 'good objects', including the combined parents together with their reproductive capacity, in the inner world against the destructive envy and jealousy felt to endanger them there. Since it emerges, out of inevitable conflicts, in every child at a certain age, it is a basic part of his innate development. In this way, therefore, evolution, which is itself without a 'purpose', seems to have implanted in us at least the probability of our developing a conscious purpose—to have children in the place of parents—corresponding with its 'end'. (But the replacement of the will to live by the desire to preserve good objects, and so to live by proxy, is not achieved without reluctance. In the individual, some conflict between self- and species-preservation must be expected to remain.)

* * *

What has been discovered about the unconscious sources of the more conscious wish to achieve at least a vicarious survival also

enables us to get a better understanding of the role played in it by the death impulse. No doubt, the desire to create, both in identification with the parents and in competition with them, would be there in any case. But in the inner world, the desire of the child to preserve their capacity to do so, and with it his own, is immensely strengthened by his need to counteract the attacks which the envious and jealous parts of himself threaten to launch on it. And if we go back still farther to the time before there was a differentiation in his inner world between good objects to be preserved and destructive parts of himself, we believe we see his will to live already in conflict with something opposed to it. Whether this something is a force existing independently of the ordinary instincts evolved for self- and species-preservation, or whether it is the inevitable consequence of what would otherwise be self-preservative rage at frustration operating before there is any clear distinction between the self and the frustrating object, is perhaps still best left an open question. But whatever its origin, it is sensed, however dimly, throughout life as the enemy of our own existence as well as the enemy of whatever we identify with, love, and wish to keep alive. All actual enemies are felt to represent it.

There remains the problem of the relation between the death impulse and the fear of death. It may be argued that our own death is too abstract a notion for us to envisage. But why should we fear the agent of destruction, and in the first instance on our own behalf, unless we feared the effect it may bring about? To say that what we really fear is pain does not remove the difficulty, if pain is 'painful' in proportion to the anxiety it evokes. So death itself, and not only its agent, the death impulse, seems to be an object of fear. Moreover, if we cannot conceive the abstract notion of our non-existence in terms of any positive idea, we can very well imagine the process, though not the end, of our dissolution; and, following Melanie Klein, I believe the fear of this to be basic and universal.

What we call the fear of death would seem then to include at least two basic elements: first, the fear of dissolution, and secondly the fear of its agent, the destructive impulse, which in phantasy threatens from within and from without.

If so, the more concrete, and more easily observable, fears we find in analysis are derivatives of these. As far as we can see them

clearly, the earliest concrete fears centre in the infant's relation to the breast. He fears to lose it, or its symbols inside or outside him, because he needs it to preserve his life. Still more, perhaps, he fears to lose his love of it; for as long as he loves it, he can keep it inside in phantasy, protected against his own destructiveness, even if he loses it outside. Moreover if he loses his love of it, because frustration or envy has made him hate it (so that it becomes a persecutor), he loses the very love of life for which it stands. Then even his self-love goes, since this is ultimately based on his identification with the breast which he contains in phantasy, and nothing remains to protect him against universal hate and death.

So we come back to Freud's concept of a primal intrapsychic struggle between hate and love, in which, if death is to be avoided, the hate, though perhaps stronger at the beginning, has to be mastered by, and directed to, the service of love. This conception, when applied, as he applied it, to all living things, is reminiscent of one of those heretical cosmogonies in which God (love) is depicted as originally weaker than the Devil (hate[1]) who, however, he may still hope to conquer in the end. At any rate, in Freud's cosmogony, the Death Impulse (entropy?) is originally stronger, though some ambivalence towards Life (synthesis?), some love of it as well as hate, is presupposed from the beginning. For, presumably, it must be the love of life which causes the initial split into a self to be preserved and an outer world to be destroyed. By this means love emerges as a separate entity—though, phylogenetically, at least, it begins by being purely narcissistic. Later, altruism, or the love of others, emerges in its turn. But even then, it emerges only as the result of a further split, this time of the outer world into 'bad' or hated objects and 'good' ones which are loved because they can be identified, and so reunited, with the self. Whether bad scapegoats for hatred will always be required before love can be disentangled from it remains to be revealed, as it were, in the last and final Book of Life. The most that Christian theology has ever dared to hope for is a universe in which the Devil is bound, not one in which he has ceased altogether to exist.

Scientific thought may perhaps dismiss this cosmogony as a contribution to poetry rather than to knowledge. But judged, as all

[1] Goethe's Mephistopheles, *der Geist der stets verneint*, best fits this picture of the Devil.

cosmogonies should be, as an anthropomorphic projection, it gives a far truer picture of the mental development of man than those sociological and psychological phantasies which attribute a primal innocence to the savage or the child and blame some outer cause for our subsequent corruption.

CHAPTER IV

The Construction of our World-Model[1]

In considering instincts, we began behaviouristically, that is, from the point of view of an observer recording only what he sees in an animal's reaction to stimuli. We then introduced the concept of a mental response correlated with the cerebral processes which mediate between a stimulus and a reaction. But although we thus permitted ourselves to infer states of mind, for example in a child, which we could not observe in him, and so became psychologists, we still maintained the aloof position of observers. In other words, what we had before us in imagination was a physical child having thoughts and feelings about a physical world which we shared with him. But as long as we retain this picture of a common physical world, it is difficult to envisage the mind, for example, of a psychotic. The world he describes is capable of extraordinary contortions quite unknown to physics. It can change colour, go flat, recede to an infinite distance, get inside him, become fragmented and destroyed or be restored; and, so long as we think of a common world, we shall become still more bewildered on learning from him that the minds of its inhabitants are freely interchangeable with his. Clearly his world has none of the comforting solidity of ours and is, in fact, an entirely different place. This leads us to suspect that the infant's world may be very different too—that it is something which may develop either into our world or into the psychotic's. If so, we can only hope to understand it by a further effort of imagination which will involve the abandonment of the observer's position altogether and the attempt to identify ourselves with the child's thoughts and feelings at a time when the normal concept of an external world, and of our place in it, has not developed and is only gradually emerging. Thus to envisage

[1] This chapter is in part based on my Freud Centenary Lecture, 'Psycho-Analysis and Philosophy', 1956, published in *Psycho-Analysis and Contemporary Thought*, 1958, edited by J. D. Sutherland.

and describe, as it were from within, the way in which he both discovers and in a sense creates the world he lives in should be, I think, the goal of psycho-analytic theory.

Fortunately for us, subjectivist philosophers like Hume and Mach, who first taught themselves to think of the world as a psychological construction, have done a good deal of the work for us in advance. So we may begin by reminding ourselves of their achievements.

* * *

To common sense, tables and chairs exist independently of us waiting to be perceived whenever we look at or touch them. But what exists in this independent way? Not the colour or the hardness or any other sensible quality which belongs to the perception. The atoms and electrons then, we are inclined to answer. But atoms and electrons, which in theory are not perceptible, can only be thought of in perceptual terms as that of which the table, if sufficiently enlarged, would be 'seen to be composed'. It is therefore absurd to assert that the parts of which the table can be imagined, but not seen, to be composed have a more 'permanent' reality than the perceptual table as a whole. And from this the subjectivist concludes that our furniture exists when, and only when, perceived.

On being first confronted with arguments of this kind, we are apt to think of the subjectivist philosopher as an uncomfortable person who would expect to be plunged into an abyss if ever he were rash enough to sit down without looking behind him at his chair. But he has as robust a confidence in its expected support as we have. Indeed, there is no verifiable expectation about what can and cannot be experienced which he does not share with us. It would seem therefore that the whole dispute must be purely verbal, or at most concerned with the choice of different thought-models with which to express precisely the same expectations or beliefs[1].

This does not imply that the dispute is unimportant; for one verbal usage may be more consistent, or one thought-model more

[1] This lack of difference between the beliefs, or expectations, held by common sense and subjectivist philosophy was the main theme of my (unpublished) Ph.D. thesis, *Beiträge zur Wirklichkeitslehre* (Vienna, 1925) of which a summary, entitled 'Belief and Representation', appeared in *Symposion I, Heft* 4, 1926.

convenient, than another. The philosopher, by trapping us into the assertions that the unperceived chair both does and does not exist, seems in fact to have proved us guilty of at least a verbal contradiction, which, however, can be easily avoided by regarding statements about what exists as convenient abbreviations of statements about what, and under what circumstances, is to be expected[1]. Alternatively we can claim that statements about what exists can refer to what exists in our thought-model of the world and that we have a perfect right to use whatever thought-model we please provided it coincides with experience at every point at which it can be tested. Moreover, we can assert, with truth, that for most purposes our model, with its permanent objects intermittently perceived, is more convenient. Indeed, for most purposes, the philosopher uses it too.

One point, however, we have by now tactitly conceded: what we call the world is in fact a thought-model, a kind of map, of what we believe to be the possibilities of experience—'true' where it corresponds with these possibilities, 'false' where it does not, and 'incomplete' where it fails to give any information about what is to be expected. We can paint it, as it were, of any colour, or embroider it in the margin as we will, and to this extent it is an arbitrary construction. But if it is to be true, it can only have one 'shape'—that which fits the facts of observation.

* * *

The philosophers who first made this psychological discovery were also the first to try to reconstruct the steps by which memory images of the raw products of experience—sensations of colour, sound, hardness, taste and smell—are built up into an 'external world'. They were concerned, it is true, only with the intellectual aspect of development, and ignored the emotional aspect, which to the psycho-analyst is much more interesting. But to ignore the early stages of intellectual development is equally one-sided and may lead to a confusing picture of the child as having primitive

[1] According to the analysis of existential propositions given by Whitehead and Russell in *Principia Mathematica*, we should, I suppose, begin by expanding the proposition 'chairs exist when not observed' into ' "x is an unobserved chair" is true for at least one value of x'. Now, according to the subjectivists, an unobserved chair involves the same sort of contradiction as that of a round square. But there is no value of x such that 'x is a round square' is true. Hence, round squares do not exist, nor by the same reasoning do unobserved chairs.

emotions towards an intellectually adult sort of world[1]. This can be avoided, I think, if we keep the work of the philosophers before us as a kind of framework to which we can attach what we have subsequently learned about the emotional life of the child.

Since he assumes that the world for each one of us must begin as a kaleidoscope of discontinuous and unorganised sensations, the problem of the subjectivist philosopher is to explain its development; and this he attempts by means of the theory of association. Certain patches of colour, hardness and so on, if frequently experienced together, are assumed to become indissolubly linked in memory to form 'objects' which we henceforth think of as permanent. And these gradually become organised in a space-time framework which is itself an extension of the 'specious present'—specious because the perception of movement involves the perception of 'before and after', that is, of temporal, relations as well as of the three spatial relations, above, and below, left and right, near and far[2].

To this extension belong all material objects which we think of as existing when not perceived. Thus, for example, the unseen chair belongs to it when we sit down without bothering to look behind. But the world we, in fact, construct contains more than material objects. On theoretical grounds alone, therefore, we must postulate a stage when the child begins to notice a difference between inanimate objects on the one hand and animate on the other, and to attribute to the latter thoughts and feelings like his own. Henceforth, the world is dualistic. It contains two different types of entity: bodies and minds.

Clearly this outline of the development of our dualistic world, which we owe to philosophers and to academic psychology, will need some modifications. What we know of instinct suggests that

[1] For example, the idea that the child wishes to swallow, and in imagination does swallow, his parents seems ridiculous so long as we think of them as the permanent external objects they are in our adult world. But at an age—or in a strata of the mind—at which the thought of an object is not yet differentiated from the percept, thought may be as concrete as matter, while matter may be as impermanent as thought and as omnipotently controlled. In other words, if 'permanence' is taken as an essential quality of 'substance', the infant's world can be 'pre-substantial', and subject to the laws of magic rather than of science; and in such a world, anything is possible.

[2] If, as seems likely, the perception of spatial relations involves a 'movement' of attention, the separation of temporal from spatial relations which we subsequently achieve is in some sense artificial. It may be noted too that we use spatial relations to represent temporal ones.

our first post-natal sensations are not quite as unorganised as was supposed. And the final picture of a dualistic world seems to emerge, according to our academic theory, in too sophisticated a way by the projection of the idea of a mind into certain types of object previously thought of as inanimate. But the concept of three main stages remains useful as a framework; and I will therefore give them names which can be appropriately taken from philosophy. Thus the first stage in which there are no permanent objects may be called the stage of 'subjective monism'. We may plausibly assume that, in the beginning, it is also solipsistic. Next comes the stages of 'naïve realism', in which permanent objects 'exist'[1]. These, though by no means wholly material, are probably less animate than 'animatistic' in the sense defined by the anthropologist, R. R. Marett. They are all alike alive, in a friendly or hostile sort of way, but none of them are yet inhabited by souls. Lastly, there is the dualism of common sense. This is the picture of a material world in which most objects are dead, but some contain minds with thoughts and feelings like our own. To this framework we may now add what analysis can teach us.

* * *

The earliest beginnings of mental development are of course still wrapped in mystery. The idea of a golden age in the past or future which occurs in so many mythologies, was believed by Freud to be derived from dim memories of the prenatal state in which all our needs were automatically fulfilled. We may agree that this is likely to have been a tranquil time, spent in conditions of security and comfort which we try to recapture every night in bed. But we cannot be certain that it was not sometimes disturbed by anxiety attacks, either taken over from the mother who may share some endocrine disturbance with her child[2], or produced directly by a fall or other shock—including that of the parental intercourse which at least in dreams is so often represented as a threatening attack upon the unborn infant. Nor do we know to what extent

[1] Naïve realism is not an ideal term as it is often used to denote the dualism of common sense. But it seems preferable to 'naïve materialism' which suggests the exclusion of that animatism which certainly characterises the earlier phases of the stage we wish to name.

[2] To some extent the placenta appears to act as a filter to limit the passage of endocrines from the mother to the foetus.

the unborn infant is conscious of itself. Perhaps the pressure between his body and the womb may give rise to some rudimentary sense of his own form. If so, the first universe, which we must suppose to be on the whole a very pleasant place, has an outer boundary—that of the body surface in contact with the womb—beyond which nothing yet exists.

Birth itself is probably experienced as a disaster—an exchange of paradise for a kind of hell in which at first all bodily sensations are uncomfortable or painful and a new sense of suffocation appears. Under the influence of such a shock, any organisation of tactual sensations into a body image which may already have taken place would be likely to disintegrate—especially as there is no longer a continuous pressure on the body to maintain a sense of its being in one piece[1]. In the words of William James, there is only a buzzing confusion of sensation—probably of a persecutory and terrifying kind—from which a new world has gradually to be reconstructed.

An important conclusion of analysis—which incidentally conforms with philosophic speculation—is that at first there is no distinction between sensation on the one hand and memory or phantasy on the other—that is, between what Hume called Impressions and Ideas. Therefore, the world is monistic; it is of one stuff. Moreover, since there is no distinction between them, ideas cannot *refer to* impressions. There can be no sense of reference to past or future. Everything that exists exists in the present, and nothing not present exists at all. Therefore, apart from the sense of change or movement, the world has no further extension in time.[2]

[1] Perhaps this helps to explain that need to be 'held'—as a defence against the sense of disintegration—which Winnicott has stressed. In any case, the fear of falling to bits appears linked with a specific fear of falling which, in a species such as ours with an arborial ancestry, would have great survival value. That is to say, there may be an innate core round which psychotic fears of disintegration easily become encrusted.

[2] Several analysts—in particular Bion, Rosenfeld, and Hannah Segal—have recently called attention to various aspects of 'concrete thought' which arises when too much of the self is projected into an idea for it to function as a symbol of something else. So to the infant, it is probably for the most part the idea which is felt to be as concrete as the impression, rather than the impression which is felt to be as fluid as the idea. What is confusing perhaps is that, while the impression—the percept-object—may be 'concrete', it cannot be 'permanent' until thought can be used in a non-concrete way to refer to it. We think of concreteness and permanence as almost synonymous, as both essentially belong to our common sense concept of substance. But the 'objects' of the infant's world would seem at first to have only one of them; and in this sense they are pre-substantial.

Since this must apply also to what we call the child's body, only such parts of it as are being stimulated, in reality or in imagination, exist for him. And if these are not continuous, it consists of disconnected parts—as it may again be felt to do in some psychotic states. Indeed the analogy with the psychotic may be closer than we are inclined to think if the infant has not merely not yet developed a detailed body image, but also has lost, in the shock of birth, the rudimentary one already developed in the womb.

Discontinuous or disorganised as this body image is, there is at first probably nothing outside it, the new sensations of sound and colour being located vaguely somewhere on or in its surface. The unorganised world at this stage is therefore not only an almost timeless monism consisting only of one kind of stuff—sensations and the equally vivid memory or phantasy of sensation which are not distinguished from each other. It also begins by being solipsistic, since nothing exists except as sensed fragments of the child's own body.

We believe too that this new world begins by being 'bad': both because it is full of new and manifold discomforts, and because its frustrations produce an innate response of rage, which seems to permeate it and make it persecutory. (There being no distinction between self and not-self at this time, this rage against the world could only be felt as self-destructive.)

Before long, however, some goodness appears in it. Possibly the first breath, which relieves the sense of suffocation, is already experienced in this way. But, if so, air being normally available is soon taken for granted and ceases to be a major consolation—though a deep breath remains an expression of relief. The role of supreme comforter is reserved for the breast, or in a lesser degree, for its substitute the bottle. Whether or not an 'innate idea' of it is aroused by the first pangs of hunger, we have found reason to suppose that the pattern of sensations experienced when it is presented evoke a sense of 'recognition', of knowing what to do with it, accompanied, at successive stages, by the liveliest feelings of pleasurable excitement and content. It is this pattern of smell, taste and touch, now intermittently experienced as a part of a solipsistic world—rather than the permanent and separate rounded object he will later perceive and long for—which is the breast for the infant. Physiologically it enables him to live;

psychologically it makes him want to do so. And ever after it remains the prototype of whatever transforms life from something intolerable, or drab, to something rich and precious.

But because it is so wonderful, satisfying every need, and relieving all anxiety, the occasions of its failure to do so arouse a commensurable rage. It then as we know becomes a persecution. So the first distinction to be made is between a 'good' and a 'bad' breast, associated with feelings of love, safety and life on the one hand, of hate, danger and death on the other.

Probably the first division of the solipsistic world into self and non-self follows the same lines. The bad breast, together with the destructive impulses it arouses, is disowned and becomes a separate though not yet a permanent object, while the memory image of the good one is retained, with hallucinatory vividness, as a present part of the self—a state of mind expressed, for example, in a movement away from the breast accompanied by tenacious thumb sucking. If the bad breast is the first 'separate' object, it is also the first 'external' one, which by reintrojection becomes the first 'internal' persecutor, inside the body but still separate from the self.

These two alternative responses of the mouth to the breast, which may be retained in, or expelled from, the self, are soon paralleled by, and associated with, two alternative responses at the other end of the alimentary canal. To the infant, sensations inside the body are relatively more important than they subsequently become, and possibly much more acutely felt. For this reason, the successive sensations of feeding, of being full in the belly, then in the bowels, and finally of losing or getting rid of something, soon become associated. I think it would be misleading to say that the infant at once 'thinks of' these as successive manifestations of the same object undergoing change while maintaining its identity through a long period of time; for he cannot yet use images to represent anything beyond (transcendental to) themselves. But his successive momentary experiences are of an object now being sucked in, now safely inside and now either lost accidentally if good[1], or intentionally discarded if the anger

[1] I believe this to be the deeper meaning of the child's fear of an 'accident' in his bed while he is asleep. A patient once vividly described the appalling sense of catastrophe he felt as a child when a toy balloon blew out of his hand, touched something and burst like a bubble. He believed—though this was not remem-

of discomfort has made it persecutory. It seems likely that the lost good aspect is at first felt to have ceased to exist when it ceases to be a part of the body image, while the ejected bad one remains in phantasy as an external or internal persecutor. Thus the first objects having a separate and sometimes external, though not yet a permanent, existence are probably the bad breast and the bad faeces which are equated with each other.

The idea of a good object separate from the self is I think more difficult to achieve. By opening or shutting his eyes the infant may feel he can create or destroy the breast at will, but he cannot otherwise control it as directly as he can control his limbs. That in this sense there is a supreme goodness not part of the body image tends, as Melanie Klein has discovered, to arouse an immense amount of rage, which may cause the idea of the separate good object to be immediately destroyed. Such a 'primal envy' is sometimes never overcome, with the result that the individual concerned is impossible to help, since it is impossible for him to believe in anything good that can help him outside himself. Indeed, the primary distinction between good and bad may become so blurred that it is impossible for him to believe in any good at all[1].

But infants who are not so easily overwhelmed by rage and anxiety soon learn to accept the breast as a good external object. I think there is a half-way position, between being able to do this fully and not being able to do it at all, which is achieved by attributing the hostile component in envy to its object. Then the breast is felt as superior but not beneficent, since it is supposed to be despising the inferior self. The sense of inferiority which could arise in this way would be very deep seated and difficult to cure, especially when hidden by a later defensive crust of apparent self-esteem.

bered—that as an infant he must have had a similar experience after the spontaneous loss of faeces, and associated it with his fear of falling from heights, which seemed to stand both for the loss of the external mother represented by firm ground and for the loss of the internal one by falling out of him. Probably such a threatened loss is the prototype of other anxiety states involving an unconscious sense of the loss of other parts of the body, such as the penis, which has to be touched to prove it to be still there. Much compulsive masturbation would seem to have this purpose.

[1] See Melanie Klein, *Envy and Gratitude*, 1957. An inability to 'believe in', that is, to appreciate, goodness may be the forerunner of an inability to believe any proposition, and so to universal doubt.

Those able more fully to accept the initial loss of the best part of the solipsistic self can feel humble without inferiority and achieve a capacity for gratitude towards it—a sentiment which might well be termed religious. By now, supposing this state to have been satisfactorily reached, the world, though still monistic—there being still no distinction between impressions and ideas—is no longer solipsistic. Indeed, it has three parts: the remaining self and the good and bad breast objects which have been split off, but which may be located either outside or inside the body. Soon after, the distinction between impressions and ideas begins to emerge, so that the world comes to contain objects that are also permanent. In other words, it is no longer monistic.

* * *

But we are going too fast. We must try to reconstruct the intermediate steps by which the world becomes 'realistic' and finally also dualistic. We want to know how the idea of a permanent object emerges from fluctuating patterns of sensation, and then how certain objects, namely animal bodies, come to be endowed with minds or personalities.

To do this we must return to the theory of symbolism and to the development of the capacity for symbolic thought. According to the theory of instinct outlined in Chapter III, all members of a class having the *gestalt* of a primary symbol are at first capable of eliciting the same response—which, however, may vary in intensity. They are initially, more or less, equivalent. We might further suppose that, by a process known to ethnologists as 'imprinting', one member of the class would soon become the 'real' object of the instinct, leaving the rest (together with whatever may later become associated with them) free to act as symbols—first only in the psycho-analytic sense, and eventually in the ordinary sense as well. This development does I think take place. But recent analytic research has revealed unexpected complications in it. Hannah Segal[1] in particular, following Melanie Klein[2], has done much to reveal the existence of a pre-symbolic period,

[1] 'Notes on Symbol Formation', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1957.

[2] 'On the Importance of Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego', *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, 1921–45.

in which what later become symbols in the psycho-analytic sense[1] are still equated with what will later become their objects. Now this period of symbolic equations is by no means a mere prolongation of the initial state of equivalence between members of a class from which no one member has yet been selected as the 'real' object potentially symbolised by the rest. For it would seem to exist, not because there is a delay in selecting a 'real' object, but because the 'real' object is introjected and then reprojected into its potential symbols in so concrete a way that they are incapable of functioning as such.

Probably, too, it is the concreteness of the introjection, which characterises the first half of this process, that is responsible for the delay in differentiating between impressions and ideas. The percept, we must suppose, is so vividly introjected as a concrete internal object that it cannot fade into a memory, which, in turn, might otherwise have become the basis of an expectation. It can of course be reprojected; it can exist as an internal, or as an external, hallucination. But, in either case, it belongs to the present, not to the past or future. It can change its location in space, but not in time.

At any rate, whatever the precise nature of the processes involved, there is a period in which, for example, the imagined breast is hallucinated with a vividness equal to that of the perception of the real one. And as long as this is so, the infant's world is an immanent totality of experience not yet differentiated into a core of present experience surrounded, as it were, by an aura of imagery which represents, or refers to, past, future and other possible experience. Images do not stand for, refer to, or in the ordinary sense 'symbolise', anything beyond themselves.

The exact relation between symbols in the psycho-analytic sense and in the ordinary sense is not altogether easy to elucidate. As distinct from those objects, later to become symbols in the analytic sense, which are for a period equated with what will later become their objects, a symbol in the ordinary sense, for example an idea or a word, is quite distinct from, and never mistaken for, its object. Perhaps what is confusing about the psycho-

[1] For a detailed discussion of the psycho-analytic concept, see Ernest Jones' classic paper 'The Theory of Symbolism', 1916, reprinted in his *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, 1920.

analytic symbol is that it has characteristics of both and represents an intermediate stage between the two. Intellectually, it is no longer equated with its object but it arouses emotions which may be quite as, if not more, intense. Hannah Segal has linked the capacity to form symbols of this kind with the depressive position and the capacity to mourn an object. Perhaps therefore we should recognise yet another transitional stage in which 'symbols' arousing persecutory feelings are still equated with their objects, whereas those arousing depressive feelings have begun to symbolise them in the analytic sense. If so, true symbols both in the analytic and in the ordinary sense arise when they begin to *stand for* something at first thought of as missing and irreparably lost, and later as only temporarily absent. They may do this either unconsciously or consciously. It is, I suggest, when some of them begin to do so consciously that the child begins to be capable of 'thought'. This is a momentous step, for when he makes it he is no longer confined to the specious present. He can *think of* a past and of permanent objects which continue to exist in the intervals of being perceived. (It will be noticed that, in my view, bad objects are the first to become separate and/or external, and good ones the first to become permanent. But this is a deduction rather than an observation.)

Philosophically, the child may be said to have passed from 'subjective monism' to 'realism'. He is surrounded by a permanent world of substances. But his concept of substance is still not the same as the adult's, to whom objects are composed of lifeless matter, some only being inhabited by minds. All would seem rather to be 'animatistic' to use R. R. Marett's useful term. For the child projects into them his own good and bad feelings towards them which are felt to proceed from them to him.

The final stage must surely imply the projection of attitudes more complex than simple feelings. That is to say, the child begins to project whole sentiments, aspects of personality. Moreover, by identifying himself with these, as they appear in other people, he can observe, as it were from without, his own relation to objects. In the picture he thus forms of himself in relation to objects his own percept-patterns appear twice over: as permanent objects and as his perception of them. This is the essence of the dualistic, mind-body, picture of the world in terms of which all

sane people—including philosophers—inevitably think in their daily affairs.

* * *

But the distinction I have just made between the stages of naïve realism and common sense dualism is in practice much less absolute than that between either and the stage of subjective monism. Unlike it, neither exists in a pure form. And the conditions for achieving both are very nearly the same. That is to say, the depressive position must have been reached, and a capacity for symbolic thought must have been achieved. But while in naïve realism conscious symbolic thought is largely restricted to the external world, in dualism it is applied to the internal world of mind as well. We may suspect that, in the first, the depressive position has been reached, but largely evaded, while in the second, it has been more accepted and passed.

The capacity to mourn a lost good object and the capacity to feel responsible for the loss are clearly linked; but they are not identical. In the stage of subjective monism, the idea of the object is equivalent to its possession. It is the advent of a capacity to mourn which permits the child to perceive that his present idea is not the same thing as the absent object it refers to. In other words, his capacity to mourn conditions his capacity for symbolic thought. But so long as he is unable to admit his sense of responsibility for the loss of the object mourned, he dare not use his capacity for symbolic thought much upon himself. For this reason, the whole inner world of his own and other people's psyche is largely closed to him.

It is, then, the capacity to feel responsible for a loss mourned—and this involves the capacity to see the self from the mourned object's point of view—that conditions the development of a dualistic world-model. Of course every child who reaches the depressive position at all has in some degree attained a dualistic world-model. He thinks of himself, and other people, as having thoughts, feelings and desires—that is, minds—and not merely animatistic bodies. But many never get beyond a very rudimentary understanding of their own or other people's mental life. And when we consider what a world-model that was really well developed on its psychic, as well as on its materialistic side would be

like, we must admit the meagreness, in this respect, of the models which even the most insightful of us have so far been able to achieve.

* * *

A necessary condition for a correct and comprehensive picture of the psychic aspect of the world in general is a correct and comprehensive picture of one's own inner world. This involves not only a knowledge of the usually unconscious, as well as the conscious, impulses which compete within us to express themselves in action, but also a knowledge of what in unconscious phantasy we believe ourselves to be composed of: the conscious picture of what we are must include a picture of our unconscious picture of what we unconsciously think we are. For whether or not our conscious world-model includes a detailed self-portrait, there is always an unconscious one, which has a most complex composition and is moreover likely to be modified in the process of being understood.

It is, of course, through the analytic study of what we feel to be our inner world that we seek to reconstruct the world of infancy. For the core of the inner world of the adult is the world of the infant. In particular, it has that unsubstantiality of subjective monism which permits objects freely to interpenetrate each other. Thus when the infant is said to 'introject' a breast or penis, or later his mother or father as whole persons, he envisages his body as literally containing these objects. Similarly, when he 'projects' parts of himself, or his whole self, into his mother or father, in phantasy these parts or this whole are literally inside them. (It is worth noting here that these two processes are probably not to be thought of as the converse of each other. Thus the converse of 'introjection' would seem to be not projection, but a sense of a part of the self being pulled out, or robbed, by an external agency, while the converse of 'projection' is the sense of someone else forcibly projecting himself into one's own ego.[1])

Because of these mechanisms the inner world is felt to be not simple but complex. Even its atomic core, the ego, is as it were a

[1] The term 'projection in reverse' was introduced by Bion, 'Development of Schizophrenic Thought', 1956, *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.* I think we can usefully speak of both projection and introjection in this way, as something which we not only do, but also have done to us.

system of particles.[1] It contains the parents, or parts of them—those which have been introjected together with those felt to have been forced in by projection in reverse. And there will be gaps in it left by parts which have been projected out, together with parts felt to have been stolen by introjection in reverse. These, though no longer in the ego, and in this sense external, are to be regarded, I think, as now belonging to an outer circle in the inner world which also contains what was external in the past. The ego's sense of well being or otherwise will depend, in the main, on the state of the objects in its own inner circle, and on what objects are missing. Security consists in the sense of containing good and harmonious parent figures, who are neither too demanding to be satisfied nor too damaged to be preserved, and who have retained enough aggression to be potent for creation or defence.

Now an inner world of this kind does not exist in physical space. It is akin to the world of religion, which is in fact a disguised projection of it. But since it is derived by an 'introjection of the past' from the world of infancy, as this was imagined to have been, there is an important sense in which it is a picture of the world of infancy, and a picture which can be either true or false. Indeed there are two levels at which questions of truth or falsehood are most relevant, and these are interrelated. In the first place, we may or may not have correct knowledge of our own inner worlds. That is, we may or may not have a true picture of our unconscious inner world. And in the second place, our inner world may or may not be a true picture of the world of our infancy. The process of acquiring the first kind of truth causes the second kind also to come about. In other words, as our understanding of the inner world increases, so does it lose most of that paranoid-schizoid, manic, or over-depressive character which falsified it as a picture of the world of infancy.

Moreover, our capacity to understand others will be improved as well, both because those defence mechanisms which tend to

[1] Sub-atomic research in physics has some analogy in analytic research on the structure of the ego. For not only has the ego turned out to be by no means 'indivisible', but its very 'nucleus' appears to be compounded of still more elementary particles. Moreover, intrapsychic projections and introjections can take place to transfer an 'internal object' from the nucleus to the periphery of the ego, or from the periphery to the nucleus. To use terms suggested by J. O. Wisdom, an introject can be either 'orbital' or 'nuclear'. In this way analysis can make use of a thought-model first developed for another discipline.

warp our judgment will have been reduced, and because self-knowledge is the source of intuition.

* * *

To conclude this chapter I will try to summarise the above theory of three stages in the development of our world-model (philosophy), and, at the same time, to relate them more closely, both with three stages in the development of linguistic thought, and with the three clinical concepts of the paranoid-schizoid, the hyper-manic and the normal. I am afraid the result will be a gross over-simplification. But if we are to achieve the intellectual mastery of anything, we must begin with over-simplifications which need not mislead us so long as we remember what they are.

To repeat, the basic characteristic of the first stage I take to be an inability to distinguish between impressions and ideas (Hume) reality and phantasy (Freud), or what is nearly the same thing, between 'outer' and 'inner' (Melanie Klein). From this it follows that at first the world is of one stuff and so monistic. But the first stage probably divides into two sub-stages, one of which is solipsistic and the other not. Perhaps, too, the second sub-stage may be sub-divided into one in which the world consists of self and bad objects, and one in which it consists of the self and good objects, as well as bad.

Throughout the whole of the monistic period—that is, in the non-solipsistic as well as in the solipsistic sub-stages—the world has little extension in time, or even in space. It is confined to the 'specious present', because ideas, being indistinguishable from impressions, cannot yet be used to refer to anything beyond themselves. It is a period, not of symbolism, but of symbolic equation, to use Hannah Segal's term. Intellectually, there can be and is much phantasy, but no thought; for thought, in the narrow sense, refers to something beyond itself. We can say that there is no 'language'—not even a language of pre-verbal thought.

There would seem, furthermore, to be a connection between this period and the concept of psychosis; indeed the psychotic partially returns to it. Moreover, the 'defences' of this period—modes of response which seem, as it were, to take the place of appropriate responses to real or imagined danger situations—are by splitting and projection. The infant feels endangered, for

example, by his own rage, splits it off, projects it, feels threatened by it from outside and in phantasy tries to annihilate it there. But perhaps the most significant connection between these psychotic mechanisms and the period of subjective monism is that they operate to prolong it. There is a type of psychotic defence, isolated recently by Bion[1], and called by him the attack on linkages. By its means, any painful association between two ideas is prevented from occurring, so that they remain separated, or split apart from each other. In particular, he has shown how this is used by psychotics to split sentences into words, or words into letters, and so deprive them of their potentially painful significance. We may reasonably suppose, therefore, that this defence may also operate in the infant, who is on the point of using ideas in a new symbolic way as thoughts to refer to something beyond themselves, to destroy the link between them and their meaning whenever this meaning threatens to be painful.

At the same time a complementary process, also stressed by Bion, may operate to the same effect: an intensely aggressive projection of some part of the self into an idea which makes or keeps it too real to function as a mere thought capable of referring to a separate reality.[2]

In these, and perhaps in other ways still to be unravelled, the ability to distinguish between impressions and ideas, and hence to use thought to represent anything beyond itself, is delayed—or if acquired, again destroyed—by psychotic mechanisms of splitting and projection. For not only are these defences characteristic of the infant's monistic world-model, but their excessive use in later life precipitates a partial regression to the world-model of the monistic stage. The psychotic treats thoughts as things; to the extent to which he is psychotic, he does not distinguish between impressions and ideas.

* * *

The second stage is more hypothetical—at least in the negative characteristic I ascribe to it. Positively, it is characterised by the

[1] Bion, 'Notes on the Theory of Schizophrenia', 1954; and 'Development of Schizophrenic Thought', 1956, *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*

[2] The effect of this mechanism in producing disturbances in thought has recently been stressed by Elliott Jaques in a paper read at the 21st International Congress of Psycho-Analysis 1959. See his forthcoming book.

appearance of a distinction between impressions and ideas. For this reason, ideas can stand for, refer to, or represent absent impressions. In other words, the child in this stage has begun to be in possession of a language, though at first only a language of pre-verbal thought. Thus the world-model can expand in time and space; it can contain a reference to material objects thought of as continuing to exist beyond the specious present. The world-model therefore has become 'realistic'.

But if, as I suppose, it is a naïve realism, it is characterised, on the negative side, by containing only matter, at first animatistic matter, but not yet mind and matter. This may seem a paradox, for we have just said that its most basic positive characteristic is a distinction between ideas and impressions, that is, between thoughts and the sense objects they refer to. But for the world-model to become dualistic, it is not sufficient for thoughts to be capable of referring to absent sense objects. It is also necessary for thoughts to be capable of referring to the relation between thoughts and sense objects. In other words, the infant must be able, not only to think of an external world, but also in imagination to project part of himself outside as the observer of his own thoughts and feelings about this external world. We can put the same point in another way by saying that he must be in possession of a second order language—if only of pre-verbal thought—to represent the relation between his first order language and what it represents. And in my view we should, at least conceptionally, distinguish an intermediate position, that of naïve realism, in which a second order language is not yet acquired.

Of course, naïve realism is unlikely ever to exist in a pure form. But on the assumption that it did, it would be characterised, positively by what we call a correct perception of external reality, and negatively by the complete absence of self-consciousness, that is, of the perception of psychic reality. Yet this would not be in the main the result of psychotic mechanisms of splitting, since if these were still present to a marked degree, the picture of the external world would be disturbed. There are, however, other defence mechanisms which do come into operation when splitting and projection are diminished, such as manic denial and repression. Moreover, denial and repression are specificially directed at whatever would be painful in the perception of the self, so they would

be likely to produce and prolong exactly such an intermediate stage as we have envisaged.

In psycho-analytic language, it would seem that we should stress the concept of a period, or rather a 'position', however fluctuating it may really be, in which manic denial and repression cushion the shock of the depressive position[1]. This position occurs, as we know, when splitting defences diminish and the child is faced with the problem of his ambivalence, and so filled with remorse and despair because of his phantasied attacks on those he loves as well as hates. He may escape this depressive distress by regressing to the paranoid-schizoid position, or by a manic denial of the importance and extent of the imagined damage; and here the term denial denotes a more destructive attack on truth than is denoted by the term repression. But he can also use repression to prevent himself from becoming consciously aware of the distressing picture of himself, as greedy and ungrateful, which is unconsciously forming. In doing so, he uses a neurotic mechanism—though only so far as this mechanism fails, does he have neurotic symptoms. So far as it succeeds, he is merely psychologically obtuse to his own and other people's feelings. Except that his world-model in this period begins by being more animatistic—containing objects with elementary feelings, but not objects with sentiments or 'minds'—he might be compared to an extreme behaviourist for whom only the external world seems to have existence.

* * *

The transition to the third, dualistic stage implies, as I have already argued, the capacity to be self-conscious, that is, to observe as from outside the 'psychic self' in its relation to its objects. And this, as I have also said, is equivalent to being in possession of a second order language if only of pre-verbal thought, with which to think of the relation of thought to what it represents.

Psycho-analytically, the condition for such an achievement is the power to identify with other people, and so to perceive the world, with the self in it, from their point of view. The concept of a personality must be supposed to be first built up by projecting

[1] We are already accustomed to regard manic denial as a defence against depression. I am suggesting that it deserves to be regarded as also responsible for a phase or 'position' of intellectual development—namely, that of 'naïve realism'.

whole sentiments, rather than mere affects, into the perceived body of another person, originally the body of the mother, which is thus endowed with what we call a mind. In other words, the infant's identification with his mother, his perception of his psychic self in her body, must precede and condition his perception of a psychic self in his own body; for only after he has put himself in her shoes could he begin to see himself from outside as she does.

But his capacity to do these two things—to form a picture of another personality by identifying with her, and then to form a picture of himself from her point of view—implies a capacity to tolerate the full pain of the depressive position. On the one hand, he suffers in identification with her, and on her behalf, the imagined results of his greedy, ungrateful and often destructive attitude to her, and particularly to her as an internal figure. On the other, he suffers because of his perception, from her imagined point of view, that he is greedy, ungrateful and destructive. As we know, this pain is lessened by his growing capacity to show consideration and to make amends both to his external and to his internal mother. And if, by these means, it becomes tolerable to him, there is no further impediment to his forming, by degrees, an ever more accurate picture of both their personalities—and also of the personalities of other people in the world. That is to say, so far as it is achieved, the world-model of this stage is not only dualistic, but also rational. Defence mechanisms no longer prevent it from becoming as true as experience can make it. And behaviour is rational in that it is directed at avoiding pain, not by distorting the picture of the world, both external and internal, but by trying to modify the world, including the self, in a realistic way. In other words, what Freud called the reality principle, as distinct from the pleasure principle, is dominant.

* * *

Such a world-model, if it were accurate and complete, which of course it can never be, would represent all actual possibilities of experience, both in other times and places and in other people's bodies—not merely what is believed, perhaps wrongly, to be possible. Within these possibilities, important distinctions remain to be made. With regard to the past, the model represents what it would be like to re-live an experience we have had, what it would

have been like to see an event which 'happened though we did not see it', and also what it would be like to experience an event which would have happened if we, or others, had chosen to bring it about.

With regard to the future, there is a category for what it would be like to see events which will happen, but which we shall not be able to see; and this corresponds to the past category for what it would be like to have seen events which happened without our seeing them. There is, however, no distinction corresponding to that between the past categories of what was and what might have been, their place being taken by one category of alternative events, any but not all of which may be[1]. For these still depend upon our choice. Purposeful behaviour consists in the manipulation of the present in order to determine which of these alternative future possibilities shall come to pass, that is, to decide the future—both in its material and in its psychic aspect. And such behaviour may be termed rational when, within the limits of our knowledge it is most likely to achieve that future which is most in accord with the resultant of our innate desires.

[1] We can only make the distinction between what will and what may be by projecting ourselves far enough forward in time to look at the future as if it were already past. It may also be worth noting that, psychologically, the difference between past and future would seem to be derived from the difference between what can, at least in principle, and what cannot be influenced by us.

CHAPTER V

Distortions in our World-Model—their Effects and Correction

OUR common-sense dualistic world-model, as its name implies, represents two kinds of what we believe to be possible experiences. On the material side, it represents what we should expect to perceive at other 'times' and 'places'; and on the mental side, what we believe it would be like to be in other people's shoes. So far as these beliefs or expectations are true or false, the model itself may be said to to be true or false[1].

In considering its development, we distinguished—too artificially perhaps—three stages: that of subjective monism, characterised by the absence of symbolic thought which can refer to anything beyond present experience in what we later call space or time; that of naïve realism, characterised by permanent objects in space-time which are all animatistic and not yet divided into inanimate and animate; and the end stage of dualism itself, in which some, but not all, material objects have a psychic counterpart. In considering the defects of this final product, however, it becomes necessary to think of it as in some sense a compound of a developmental process in all three. Moreover, in order to stress what for our present purpose is most important in the developed form of each of them, we may conveniently relabel them the paranoid-schizoid, the hyper-manic and the rational elements respectively. All exist, in varying degrees, in everyone, together with the paranoid-schizoid, hyper-manic and rational belief-systems they represent, though the more irrational elements usually remain unconscious. In particular, we are usually unconscious of the basic pattern in our picture of our own inner worlds—of what, in phantasy, we are made.

[1] If two different world-models represent one and the same 'true' set of expectations, they are both 'true'. But one may be more convenient, or useful, than the other.

It is by the externalisation of unknown distortions in the inner world that most of the distortions of the outer one are brought about.

The paranoid-schizoid element in a world-model is characterised by defensive splitting and projection, the hyper-manic element by denial (and also by the less violent defence of repression), and the rational element by the acceptance of what is perceived irrespective of whether it is agreeable or not. An over-simplified analogy may serve to illustrate these differences. Let the world-model be represented by a solar system, ego-centric with the ego as a sun surrounded by objects and persons as planets. Then, if the model is paranoid-schizoid, each of these bodies will be divided into at least two, one good and the other bad. There will be a white sun representing the good self and containing good objects, as distinct from a black one, and each planet will also be divided into a white and a black component. Or the process of subdivision may be continued until the solar system altogether disintegrates into a confused aggregate of bits. Even the sense of the system's solidarity may be lost and with this the sense of its continuous existence through time. That is to say, there may be a complete regression to the phase of subjective monism before ideas and other symbols began to refer to anything beyond immediate experience.

In a hyper-manic as distinct from a paranoid-schizoid world-model what is unpleasant is denied and repressed. For example, the sun and some of the planets, though not divided, may appear as unduly white. Many dark patches will not be consciously perceived, though so far as they are repressed rather than denied, there will be an unconscious awareness of their presence. Moreover, denial and the weaker defence of repression are directed far more against the psychic than the physical aspect of our dualistic world. They seldom cause us grossly to misperceive objects, but they do cause us to be blind to large sections of our own and other people's emotional lives. It is this that betrays the affinity of a hyper-manic world, in which defences restrict emotional awareness, with the phase of naïve realism, in which they operate to delay the emergence of the concept of persons. But neither the child in the phase of naïve realism, nor the adult with a hyper-manic world-model, is necessarily afflicted with neurotic symptoms. Repression, as opposed to denial, is a more purely neurotic mechanism used

as a defence against unpleasant feelings. Neurotic symptoms are compromise formations which arise only when denial and repression partially fail.

As opposed alike to a paranoid-schizoid or a hyper-manic world-model, a rational one is characterised by the ability to accept what is perceived—including what can be probably inferred—whether this is agreeable or not. The sun and the planets of our analogy are neither white nor black, but of such intermediate shades as perception and reason, when undisturbed by defence mechanisms, will paint them. If there are still errors, if there are colours in the model which do not correspond to the actual possibilities of experience, these will result from insufficient or misleading data and not from emotional flight from truth. We are apt to assume that most of us have world-models of this type. But surprisingly large elements of the paranoid-schizoid and hyper-manic models, and accompanying belief systems of infancy and childhood survive in the unconscious below the rational one to disturb the thought, feeling and conduct of the most sane, most able and most distinguished individuals our culture has yet produced—as any honest biography will very clearly show.

We speak of 'consuming' time, of 'digesting' experience, of memories being 'stored up' in us, and such phrases would seem to reflect an unconscious notion of our past as, not merely retained in unconscious memory, but surviving concretely inside us—even though there may be much of it we should prefer to be 'without'. In this sense, I think, all the objects and persons of our past world-models, including what was felt then to be external, are now, though in different degrees of centricity—all felt, when not consciously remembered, to be part of our inner world. And they are felt to exist there either preserved intact, or changed, sometimes very substantially, by what in phantasy has been done to them inside.

There is a constant interchange between the outer world of perception, and conscious thought, and this inner world—no less real in its own way for being so largely the product of unconscious phantasy. The very perception of a situation involves the projection into it of a meaning derived, in part from conscious or pre-conscious memories[1] of similar situations, in part from primary,

[1] Bion, in his paper 'On Hallucination' (1958, *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*), shows hallucination to be the projection of something introjected. Perhaps we should think of

or near primary, symbols which belong to our innate endowment. The situation, with its symbolic meaning from which it derives most of its emotional importance, is also 'taken in', internalised, and usually modified inside in accordance with the mechanisms operating there. If this internal and largely unconscious manipulation is comparatively free from paranoid-schizoid and manic elements, it will provide the unconscious basis for rational thought about the situation. But so far as there is violent splitting, projection or denial, in the inner world—mechanisms which are products of the destructive impulse and which, by preventing its fusion with more positive impulses, operate to maintain its strength —the result, when re-projected, will falsify the picture of the external world as well. Moreover, the pattern of the projective-introjective cycle elicited by a current situation tends to repeat that of the response to the last similar situation, and so back to infancy when these patterns were laid down. So far, therefore, as the paranoid-schizoid or manic defences of infancy were not overcome at the time, they will be likely to continue to operate in the inner world, and to distort the perception of the outer.

The effect is that of an intrusion of unrealistic elements from the inner world into the outer. It is as aspects of this inner world of phantasy that survivals from the paranoid-schizoid and hypermanic worlds of infancy and childhood, in the first instance, continue to exist. But, so far as they are themselves distorted, they are always liable to obtrude into and distort our current conscious world-model. Not only symptoms of mental illness, but misassessments of fact, warped evaluations and irrational behaviour are among the probable results.

* * *

Although a distorted inner world-model need not give rise to symptoms of mental illness recognised as such, no symptom can occur unless there is distortion, which is thus a necessary but not a

remembering as a projective activity—a kind of regurgitation—which gives rise, in the psychotic phase, to an hallucination and only later to a true memory. When a current situation arouses feelings appropriate only to a forgotten past one which it superficially resembles, we may, in fact, be regressing to something akin to the hallucinatory type of remembering which falsifies the present. Only if we consciously remember, can we perceive the present as similar to but not identical with the past, so that it ceases to be distorted and we to be disproportionately affected by it.

sufficient condition of their appearance. It is true that, in psychosis, the distortion and the symptom may be almost synonymous: a model in which the external world, mirroring the inner, has lost its substantiality, or which is in bits, or which is falsely perceived to be full of lurking foes, is in itself a symptom of psychosis. And for this reason it would be correct to say that anyone who sees enemies where none exist, or fails to see friendship where it is obviously present, is in this respect psychotic, even if he is otherwise gifted and successful. But there are other symptoms generally recognised as psychotic which are not identical with the distortion which is their cause. Hypochondria, for example, is conditioned by an unconscious picture of internal persecution. But the conscious false belief about having some physical illness, which constitutes the symptom, is not the same as the unconscious false picture of the bodily self being inhabited by demons. Often the link between the two is still more remote. The psychotic distortion may be quite unconscious and the only symptom of it will be a vague, and to the sufferer quite irrational, depression or anxiety.

Just as psychotic symptoms result from an internalised paranoid-schizoid world-model, so neurotic symptoms may be said to result from a neurotic one in which hyper-manic defences, and the defence of repression, have partly broken down. In practice, what are ordinarily called neurotic symptoms are seldom purely neurotic; for the neurotic defence or repression usually overlies an earlier splitting mechanism so that the symptoms it gives rise to are likely to be in some degree psychotic. This need not, however, prevent us from making a conceptual distinction which approximately corresponds with actual differences. The loss of function or the anaesthesia so common in hysteria, for example, would often seem to result in the main from repressions. And the compulsive actions of obsessional neurosis may represent no more than a symbolic undoing of what has been done in unconscious phantasy, but consciously repressed. They differ only in the degree of their complexity and compulsiveness from such actions as keeping our fingers crossed to protect a friend against the uncharitable wish we unconsciously harbour against his success. In such cases, too, the cure is straightforward. For if we become aware of the repressed uncharitable wishes against someone we are fond of, they both cease to be confused with acts—that is, they lose their

omnipotence—and tend to be neutralised by our stronger conscious goodwill, and we have no further need of magic to protect him against them. This cure involves the correction of a part of the unconscious world-model which comes about when we perceive a hitherto denied or repressed aspect of ourselves—when we perceive that the 'sun' in our analogy was darker in places than we had previously supposed.

* * *

The unconscious survival of paranoid-schizoid or hyper-manic models of the inner world—and these I repeat are maintained in some degree in everyone by the repeated operation of the early defence mechanisms which first created them—may or may not give rise to symptoms; but they are almost certain to compromise the rationality of our conscious world-model. And the distortions in this will compromise what I hope to show may justly be called the 'rationality' of our evaluations and of our behaviour.

The distortions I now have in mind are such as to be found in otherwise quite normal people. The material as well as the mental aspect of the dualistic world may be affected. But unlike the material aspect, the mental aspect, as far as it concerns other people's minds, is always a matter of inference, never of direct observation; so that errors in it are less easily corrected. Only in imagination, but never in fact, can we be in someone else's body. We can never prove our picture of him to be true by comparing it with the experience of being him, and must rely on the indirect and potentially unreliable evidence of his behaviour. Nevertheless, this limitation should not be overstressed, since it applies to much of our picture of the material aspect too, of which only the small cone representing our possible future experience can be directly verified by any single individual. Our image of what is too far in space or time, or too small or too large to be perceived, cannot be compared with a perception.

We cannot, for example, yet see our solar system from without; and for this reason, it was easy for our forebears, in defence against a humiliating sense of littleness, to cling to a geocentric theory of the universe in which the world—as a projection of the baby who wishes to maintain the illusion of being the sole centre around

which his parents revolve—is the biggest and most important item, long after much indirect evidence to the contrary had been accumulated. And for all we know other unconscious motives may still be impeding the advance of physics. But the wishes and fears, both conscious and unconscious, which concern our picture of our own character and of the personalities of those about us—and especially of their emotional attitude to us—are usually much stronger than those which concern the physical aspect of our world. And for this reason, it is in its mental aspect that rational inference is most often overruled.

That each one of the different personalities we imagine as belonging to other people reflects, as in a mirror, something in ourselves may seem an improbable, as well as an unwelcome, proposition. But a moment's thought must convince us of its truth; for we are unable to imagine any sentiment or passion in another unless it has been in some degree, either consciously or unconsciously, experienced by us. Moreover, the affects and sentiments we imagine in others, on the basis of their behaviour, are as a rule only a selection from the affects and sentiments their behaviour might lead us to infer. For we are seldom dispassionate observers, and, for the most part, are interested in seeing only such aspects of them as concern their relation to ourselves.

These ego-centric interests, I suggest, prompt us specifically to note and infer in others such qualities as enable us to classify them into three main groups: friends, chosen enemies and what for want of a better name I will call necessary adjuncts, all of which we consciously or unconsciously feel we need in order to complete our world. It is also important to remember that, by projection, we have been peopling our outer world with these three types of person, in a manner specific to ourselves, since early childhood, and that we internalise our past. So the new friends, chosen enemies and necessary adjuncts we find, or imagine that we find, are to a great extent replicas of the old ones—projections not only of aspects of ourselves, but re-projections of former personalities, as they were rightly or wrongly conceived by us to be, which have been absorbed into our inner world. The qualities each of these three types, respectively, are felt to contain are those we possess and consciously like in ourselves, those we unconsciously possess but consciously repudiate, and those which we need but

do not possess as individuals and can acquire only through unions with those who have them.[1]

A friend, then, according to this definition, is someone admitted to be like ourselves. He need not be like us in all respects. Indeed, we usually possess several categories of friend each corresponding to some one of the many facets and interests of our conscious selves: one set to share our business activities, another to participate in our social lives, and perhaps yet another for our special hobbies. In each case, it is the common trait or interest that establishes the bond. These friends each in their way enlarge some aspect of our ego, making it stronger and less vulnerable in a potentially hostile world. For this reason we need them, and also take pleasure in supplying a like need in them.

A 'chosen' as distinct from an ordinary enemy is not someone we dislike because he dislikes us, but someone whom we dislike because he seems to possess a trait we unconsciously dislike in ourselves[2]. And if we have several such traits we have several types of chosen enemy: one personifying our unacknowledged conceit; one personifying our quite opposite, but equally concealed, sense of uselessness and failure; another personifying our sadism, and so on. The complete list would be a long one, but these three examples are fairly representative.

I do not wish to suggest that dislike of a trait in others necessarily implies that we possess it in strong measure. But if the dislike amounts to intolerance this implication would probably be right. People who are genuinely modest, for example, may dislike but are seldom enraged by arrogance in others; nor are those who are genuinely confident much given to outbursts of contempt for the unsuccessful—still less to seeking occasions to exaggerate and stress elements of inadequacy in people who are in fact by no means below the average. However confident a man may consciously be, he usually contains a depressed element which feels itself to be a failure, unworthy, unwanted and unloved (and so in danger of annihilation). If, therefore, he is to remain free from feelings of this

[1] This and the following paragraphs are in part taken from my paper 'On the Process of Psycho-Analytical Inference', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1958.

[2] That people not only do, but often must, find targets into whom to project their 'bad objects' and therefore cling unconsciously to the very 'defects' in social institutions they are consciously trying to eliminate, has been most clearly shown by Elliott Jaques in his book: *The Changing Culture of a Factory*, 1951.

kind, he must have an external depository for them. As a rule, he does not have far to go to find someone well suited for this role, whom he can despise for real defects which he exaggerates but does not invent. The collective bullying which used to be common in the lower forms of boarding schools illustrates the co-operative application of this defence against the sense of inferiority. Someone has to be 'unpopular' and each member of the crowd is too afraid of becoming unpopular himself to allow the current victim any peace.

(It seems relevant to note that people who are unable to use this mechanism, and are therefore periodically exposed to a sense of being a failure and unpopular themselves, are apt to surround themselves with critics. A critic of this kind may also be a projection, this time of a self-critical aspect of themselves. To be surrounded by critics can be, of course, extraordinarily painful, but at least the ego is somewhat less helpless against them when they are external. Such critics belong, therefore, to the class of chosen enemies when they are created as a defence against a still more depressing sense of inner persecution.)

My last example of a chosen enemy—created this time to carry our projected sadism—may serve to illustrate the difference between hatreds that do, and hatreds that do not result from a distorted world-model. That an impulse which seeks both to preserve and to hurt its object is likely to be present in, and peculiar to, man would seem to result from a peculiarity in our evolution discussed in Chapter II: namely, the partial loss of an innate inhibition against preying on our own kind. Thus sadism (either direct or inverted into masochism) expresses the unique degree of our ambivalence. It is a compromise, by which a destructive attack is eroticised and the victim, at least for the time being, is preserved from death. But while sadism is thus the result of a measure of sympathetic attachment to the object of a destructive impulse, it is in turn opposed by a further development of sympathy. So because of the guilt aroused by it, it tends to become hated in the self. Provided that it is not denied and projected, so that its presence in others is not exaggerated, no distortion of the world-model is involved in the act of hating it also in them.

Two kinds of distortion, however, easily arise if either the sympathy or the sadism is denied. The man who denies his sympathy,

and the guilt feelings which its repudiation will unconsciously stir in him, has to this extent a distorted picture of himself. But he may be unashamedly conscious of his sadism and so devoid of any motive for exaggerating its presence in others. In the man who denies his sadism, a double distortion is likely to take place: for what he has failed to see in himself will appear in full measure in others whether it is in them to the same degree or not. And he will persecute them sadistically for it.

I come now to the third, and perhaps the most complex, category of figures with which, in reality or imagination, we tend to surround ourselves. Like a 'friend' or 'chosen enemy', a necessary adjunct contains something of ourselves, but something which has been irreparably lost to the ego so that we seek to regain it, in the only remaining way, by attaching to ourselves someone who has, or seems to have it.

The simplest example is that of marriage, the outcome of which depends, in no small measure, on how compulsive and specific was the previous expectation of each partner of finding in the other what was needed to 'complete' the self, and of how far these expectations are realised.

In normal development the homosexual component of an originally bisexual disposition is in part sublimated and in part renounced to be rediscovered later in a successful union. That this is usually true of women was pointed out long ago by Freud. He discovered and stressed the little girl's longing for the sexual organs of a boy—a longing first renounced and at last satisfied, as it were by proxy, in marriage. It is not only the organ, but a whole aspect of psychology felt to belong to it which may be lost and regained in this way. In particular, some women seem to have lost a great part of their capacity for aggression together with their masculinity, so that they feel defenceless and need a husband, not only as sexual partner, but also as protector. Their wish to find this lost capacity of their own in him leads them to imagine in advance that it will be there. If it is not, if the husband's own aggression turns out to be also inhibited, so that he cannot fulfil this role, the marriage is unlikely to be happy.

That man, too, has to make an analogous renunciation in the course of his development was not fully appreciated before the appearance of Melanie Klein's papers on the subject. But while a

woman's sense of loss at not being a man is often overt, a man's sense of loss at not being a woman is more often betrayed only indirectly through his efforts to deny it, for example, by his claim that the creations of a masculine mind are of greater value than those of a feminine body. (Perhaps this helps to explain why he tends to be more exacting in his demands on his wife than she is in hers on him; that being less conscious of his sense of inferiority, he projects more of it into her, and so sees there not only his lost feminine self, but also that part of himself which feels inadequate because it is not feminine.)

Though in 'normal' marriage each partner sees in the other his or her lost homosexual self, the possible modifications of this theme are almost endless. It may, for example, be reversed when an effeminate husband and a masculine wife find in each other some lost aspect of their heterosexual selves. Or, when both partners have retained in some degree their original bisexuality, the two opposite patterns may be combined. Indeed, in a statistical sense, such a composite relationship is probably more normal than the pure type which we perhaps wrongly have as an ideal.

While marriage presents the most obvious example of the concept of a 'necessary adjunct', the demand for them, as well as for friends and enemies, appears in all social fields. Thus, the ideal aimed at in any social organisation is a structure in which every equal colleague in the same department should be a friend, while all inferiors and superiors (perhaps too all equal members of other departments) are necessary adjuncts—all 'chosen enemies' being projected into some rival institution. Our inner needs lead us to expect things to arrange themselves for us in this way, and we are therefore unduly disappointed when they turn out otherwise. Nor is the fact that they disappoint us due entirely to the recalcitrance of others. We are ourselves unable to keep the several categories distinct, and by projecting what belongs to different ones into the same object, make enemies of those we intended to keep as friends or necessary adjuncts.

Now mistakes of this kind, in which our initial picture of people turns out to be wrong, or gradually becomes distorted, tend to have a repetitive character. Indeed each fresh one is the end product of a projective-introjective series, with a given bias, starting in infancy.

It is, therefore, an initial error in the first world-model, now internalised, that is the source of all the others.

Such errors arise in the period dominated by the Pleasure Principle, when the infant seeks to protect himself against anxiety by defence mechanisms which falsify perception, rather than, in accordance with the Reality Principle, by a rational manipulation of the environment to make it safer.

My point here is not that we wish to arrange the world in a certain manner—to structure it into a specific pattern of friends, enemies and necessary adjuncts—but that we still tend to distort our world-model in accordance with these wishes so that, to this extent, it fails to correspond with the actual possibilities of experience—particularly as regards the behaviour of others. This is because the worlds of infancy and childhood, created and maintained as they are by defence mechanisms rather than observation, obtrude into and distort the rational one. That, in spite of this, we are unable to maintain happy delusions would seem to have a twofold cause. Not only does our reality sense, our capacity to observe what is, threaten our delusions; but the incompatibility of our wishes prevents them from being happy even at their source in the paranoid-schizoid and hyper-manic worlds of early childhood.

* * *

Any distortion in our world-model is likely to affect our evaluations and our behaviour. An evalution is an emotional response, and, according to relativists, there is no means by which we are entitled to say that one evaluation is 'better' than another. This view, however, seems tenable only so far as different evaluations of the same perceptual object express different innate emotional responses. Such differences, of course, exist; but I think they are very much exaggerated.

Most of the difference between the evalutions by two people of the 'same object' would seem to result from two other, inter-related factors: differences in the 'maturity' of the two observers, and differences in their 'perception' of the object, which, in fact, is not the same for both of them. Now maturity is a function of integration, and the degree of integration of an ego is the degree of its capacity to form a true and complete picture of itself. So we may

say that the evaluations of a mature person, who knows himself and knows what the whole of him likes, are more rational than those of a person who only knows part of himself and what this incomplete part likes. Moreover, the capacity to see external things as they are—to have an external world-model that fits the possibilities of experience—is also a function of maturity and integration. In this sense, too, the evaluations of the 'truer' perception, by the 'maturer' person, is more rational.[1]

Considerations of this kind suggest the possibility of a new and fruitful approach to the old, and so far apparently insoluble problem of comparative values in aesthetics, ethics and politics. For with the aid of analysis, it may be feasible to determine how far what is differently valued, or condemned, by different authorities in these disciplines is being correctly perceived, and so to assess the rationality of the corresponding evaluations. It is this possibility which is specifically considered in Part II.

* * *

Meanwhile we have to consider the effect of distortions in our unconscious inner world-model on our behaviour. The motive behind all behaviour is ultimately provided by our instincts. Rational behaviour should, therefore, be defined, I think, in relation to instincts, as the pursuit of the most effective means, so far as an undisturbed assessment of the situation enables us to see them, of the basic instinctual life-aim. This aim, at its source in the unconscious, is to win a battle, against that part of the destructive impulse not harnessed in its support, for the preservation, reparation and creation of the 'good' self and of good objects in the inner world; and it is normally expressed, in the outer, by behaviour in the interests of self- and species-preservation. Irrational behaviour may be defined, then, as that which, because of internal distortions, is inimical to, or jeopardises the achievement of, this aim's external equivalent. Thus irrational behaviour

[1] Dr. Bion, commenting on this passage, referred me to a specific aspect of integration—the co-ordination of the different senses—which, he points out, is the basis of a rationality aptly described as 'common sense'. Put in my own words, we may say that the original criterion for the objectivity of a perception is the presence in it of a pattern common to a number of senses, and to a number of people. Thus, for example, whatever is seen, touched and heard—and by a number of people—is supposed to be unlikely to be an hallucination.

has a suicidal quality about it; for it is at least the passive, and sometimes the active ally of the suicidal impulse in us.

These categories of the rational and the irrational, as I have defined them, though mutually exclusive, are not intended to be comprehensive. There is room between them for much that is neither one thing nor the other. As to irrational behaviour, we can perhaps distinguish three main types, which, in practice, often overlap.

In the first, the inner aim is abandoned as altogether hopeless, the resulting attitude to the outer world being characterised by despair, or by apathy, or, as a secondary defence, by the over-anxious pursuit of any immediate pleasure. Of course, moods of this kind are in part the periodic response to inevitable fatigue. Sleep itself is a temporary abandonment of the struggle, and is all the easier after a day's work which seems to have left the world in a sufficiently secure state to be left uncared for overnight. Moreover, few people can work all day without their favourite relaxations, which, if the work is satisfactory, they also feel they earn. But when drowsiness, or a craving for relaxation, persistently invades work, the cause is despondency about the inner world, and the effect a weakening of the drive to work to keep oneself and one's real or symbolic family alive.

In the second type of irrational behaviour, the aim is maintained in the inner world, but by means of primitive defence mechanisms which operate with such a degree of compulsive strength that the external world is manipulated solely in their interests. So much effort is put into making the outer world symbolise internal security against phantastic dangers (threatening ultimately from the death impulse) that the external aim of self- and species-preservation is seriously compromised.

Here, too, it is the degree that counts. A vast amount of our activity is directed to the symbolic manipulation of the outer world in the interests of phantasy. But this need not jeopardise our survival unless it is carried to excess. Much of our architecture, for example, consists in the creation of good mother and potent father symbols, which contribute to our sense of well-being and security because they are unconsciously equated with reparation in the inner world. But while the creation of symbols is not exactly rational in the narrow sense, we do not regard the building of

aesthetically satisfying houses as irrational so long as they also function efficiently as dwellings. Nor do we regard it as irrational to create works of art which have no utilitarian function, so long as they are not intended to fulfil one. Life would be very drab indeed without them. But an architect who was to such a degree under the influence of unconscious phantasy that the houses he built were impossible to live in, would be behaving irrationally. So would a sociologist who, for the same reason, designed a constitution which failed to provide either security or happiness—as no doubt Plato's Republic would have failed if the tyrant Dion had been persuaded to try it.

In the third, and least fundamental type of irrational behaviour, the instinctive aim is retained in the outer as well as in the inner world, but owing to an intrusion of unrealistic elements from the inner world of phantasy, the outer one—particularly the character of people in it—is misassessed, with the result that ineffective means are chosen and the aim is not achieved.

Ineffectiveness can also arise through a failure to assess a situation—or the people in it—at all, because it is potentially too frightening or depressing to be faced. Here the ultimate cause is an initial failure to face corresponding anxieties or depression in the inner world. But such failures of assessment are mentioned only to distinguish them from those more active misassessments—especially of people—which wrecks so much endeavour.

As we are not only social animals but possess also the power of speech, much of our behaviour consists of attempts to manipulate our fellows by communicating with them. Moreover, our purpose, whether we are aware of it or not, will be the furtherance of an innate end, which need not, of course, be egotistical in the narrow sense. If we like, and are in some respect identified with people, we may just wish to please them as 'friends' or encourage them to further their own interests, or the interests of some cause we have in common. If we have our own interests in mind, we may want their help as 'necessary adjuncts' in furthering these, to get them on our side, or in a general way wish only to get them to like us—perhaps to 'seduce' them into doing so. Or, if we believe them to be hostile to some interest of our own, or of those we care for, they are 'enemies' we may wish to intimidate into passivity. In all such cases, it is ultimately with the survival of something with which

we have identified ourselves that we are concerned, if only in a remote way. And so far as our assessment of people is true, and not distorted, our approach to them will be such as is most likely to succeed.

But whenever our conscious world-model is interfered with by such intrusions from the unconscious as make us over-ready to see friends, chosen enemies or necessary adjuncts in persons whose real characters do not fit them for these roles, the actions we base on our misassessments will be inappropriate to the ends we seek. The same point can be made in different, and more familiar, terms by using Freud's concept of transference. For what I have called the intrusion of former forgotten worlds into our present conscious one causes us to equate persons in our current lives with persons who were important to us in infancy—not perhaps as they really were but as we consciously or unconsciously made them—and who survive in the world of phantasy inside us. So we react to their current representatives, often most inappropriately, as to 'good' or 'bad' parents or siblings. Much of our social behaviour is in this sense irrational. And in important issues of business or politics, the results may be disastrous.

What is common to the last two—the second and third—types of irrationality is that defensive projection operates in both. In the third it operates only to distort our conscious model of the world, but does not distort our purpose. In the second, it operates far more compulsively, to change the outer world in the interests of an unconscious and unrealistic purpose. Since the compulsiveness of this second type of defence gives it great practical importance, I will return in the next paragraphs to it.

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There is a form of defensive projection which is used not merely to falsify our idea of another person, but also to force some role upon him. And when projection has this unconscious intent, the recipient will experience it as a pressure to which he may willingly or unwillingly give way, or against which he will be aware of having to use force in order to preserve his own different picture of himself. In extreme cases, he may feel like the innocent victim of a third degree examination, and in danger of coming to believe himself guilty of whatever he is accused of.

Forcible projection—or projective identification as it was called by Melanie Klein who first drew attention to it—forms an extraordinarily interesting field of analytic study still only partially explored. What concerns us here is that it seems to be one of the main mechanisms through which the second, and more fundamental type of irrational behaviour is expressed. Of course when used to create collaborators in the pursuit of an innate purpose in the outer world, it can be rational enough. Indeed, it will be so if we have correctly assessed their pliability; while, if we have not, its irrationality will be only of the third type. But it is a form of manipulation which can be, and is often, used purely as a defence against depressive and persecutory anxiety—that is against phantastic dangers in the inner world.

For this purpose—that is, under the spur of a desperate irrational anxiety—people try, not merely to find, but to create friends, enemies and, above all, 'necessary adjuncts' if they cannot find them ready made. The compulsion to control and mould others in this way, though common enough in ordinary people, is to be regarded as a manifestation of a psychotic element in them; for the compulsion is derived from the feeling that some member of the 'inner population', forming part of the psychotic picture of the self cannot safely remain inside. It may be a 'good' part endangered by bad ones, or a 'bad' part endangering the rest, which has to be projected into a suitable recipient.

The border-line between the normal and the psychotic use of projective identification is not always easy to draw, especially when it is a good part of the self which is projected in this way. For example, the desire to have children, or perhaps disciples, is in part the expression of the desire for immortality by proxy and derived from a normal fear of death. But anyone who tries compulsively to force his children, or disciples, to be exact replicas of his ideal self is under the influence of something more than this normal fear. He is trying to project into them a good part of his inner population which he cannot defend against his own aggressiveness. In such cases, the unconscious psychotic picture of the self is that of an arena in which good parts of the self, allied, or identified with good parent and sibling figures, are engaged in a losing battle with bad, destructive components of the self, and with the bad aspects of these same figures. For this reason the

unconscious fear of death is abnormally high and gives rise to desperate efforts to save something good—and indeed idealised—from a constantly impending destruction by forcing it into an external recipient. So long as the recipient is a willing one—and children and disciples do often wish to be replicas of their real or symbolic parents—all may go well. But the inordinate degree of anger, depression or anxiety aroused if they prove recalcitrant, or otherwise fail to live up to the ideal imposed on them, betrays the pathological nature of the compulsion.

The same sense of an internal battle, in which the right side is inevitably doomed, can give rise to the forcible projection of bad aspects of the self as an alternative solution. This involves a good deal more than the mere perception of one's own vice in others whether it is there or not. The primary victim of the vice is so afraid of it that he has to force someone else to display it actively. The most sinister, but by no means the least common, form of this defence appears in those who are under a compulsion to make someone else responsible for their suicide. In such cases it is the potential suicide who, in the first instance, wrestles unconsciously with a murderous impulse which he feels to be too strong for him to master. So he tries forcibly to project it into someone else—probably the external person who stands for the internal figure against which it is primarily directed—and then compulsively provokes this person, if not into murdering him outright, at least into wishing him dead and so into becoming responsible for his suicide. But at the same time, there is usually the hope that this other person will at the last moment somehow contrive to save him.

A modified form of the same process is to be found in compulsive masochism. Again it is basically a murderous impulse that has to be projected in order to prevent the self from killing someone in the external world, or as a protection against the alternative of suicide. But this time the recipient of the projection is expected to sexualise the murderous impulse and turn it into a comparatively harmless sadism. All may go well so long as the partner is compliantly sadistic, but should he become recalcitrant in this respect, he forces back into the masochist the murderous or suicidal impulses which the latter had so desperately endeavoured to project.

Masochism of this kind is sometimes so well concealed as to have the fictitious appearance of normality. But when anyone becomes suicidal if deprived of a seemingly normal sexual outlet, he or she may be suspected of needing sexual partners, less for their own sake, than for the subsidiary purpose of their accepting a destructive impulse of his or her own and transmuting it into passion. For this purpose, an aggressively passionate partner is, of course, essential.

(Such compulsive projection of bad parts of the self, of which I have described three forms, is probably far commoner than one might suppose: and, in the social field, perhaps in part responsible for certain disasters to which societies are prone. Pacifism, for example, as a response to a real external threat seems so likely to encourage the aggressor to risk an actual war, from which he might otherwise have been deterred, that one begins to wonder whether this is not sometimes its hidden purpose. If so, there is a type of pacifism involving the unconscious projection of a discarded militarism, which must be regarded as akin to masochism and suicide. In the same sort of way, a martyr may seek his fate in order not to become a persecutor.)

Yet another form of projective identification has the aim of getting rid of depressed parts of the self. The sense of inferiority, of being despised as useless, is to be derived from the unconscious sense of having no good internal objects, or no capacity to love them, which is often combined with the sense of having lost good parts of the self by projective identification. In severe cases, there is no will to live because there is nothing to counteract the lurking desire for death, and this in turn may lead to a further grievance against life. But an incipient feeling of this kind may be warded off if others can be found who, by being treated as failures, can be made to feel they are—persons, that is, who have poor defences against the projection of it.

Since the sense of having no inner resources is in turn ultimately derived from a sense of being too enviously destructive to preserve memories of the 'good' breast as an inner source of life, it easily arouses and becomes mixed with a deep sense of depressive guilt. This, too, is often dealt with in the same way by projective identification. In such cases, it is not sufficient merely to regard others as guilty of our own offences; they have to be subjected to a kind of third degree to force them to believe that they are guilty. Of

course, it is only so far as they have latent guilt feelings of their own to be aroused that such techniques can be successful. But since everyone, in some measure, harbours latent guilt feelings, no one is altogether immune to forcible projections of this kind. It is the psychological fact that the arousal of guilt feelings in one person can cause them to subside in another, that gives both the impression that these feelings have been as literally projected as they are in phantasy.

The forcible projection of bad qualities in this way is often combined with the forcible and greedy introjection of good ones. The victim feels as if he has not only become worthless or guilty, but also lost such abilities or virtues as he thought he had—because his attacker now claims them as his.

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In this chapter, I first stressed the unconscious survival—owing to the repetitive use of primitive defence mechanisms—of paranoid-schizoid and hyper-manic world-models originating in infancy as sub-strata to the world of common sense; and then tried to classify and outline some of their effects. Besides being responsible for symptoms, they are always liable to disturb the rationality of our evaluations and behaviour. In particular, they are responsible for irrational attempts to keep ourselves and our 'good objects' alive in face of dangers which, however remotely, always seem to threaten. Apart from cases in which the basic aim is abandoned altogether, there are, it will be remembered, two sub-types to be distinguished. In both there is an intrusion from a phantastic inner world into the outer. In both the aim, or one of its derivatives, remains active in the inner world. The difference may be said to lie in the extent to which the phantastic intrusion affects the perception of the nature of the threat—and there always is one, however slight it may seem to be—in the outer world against which the good things are to be preserved. In the one case, there is a correct perception of the outer threat, though secondary misassessments of the agents for dealing with it result in ineffective action. In the other, the outer threat is so strongly identified with a phantastic inner one, that people in the outer world are manipulated in accordance with primitive defence

mechanisms, operating in the inner—rather than in accordance with the demands of external reality. Projective identification is a means of manipulating people in the interests of security in a phantastic inner world.

If consequences of this kind are considered evils, as to the rational part of us they inevitably are, both because they are based on falsehoods and because they endanger our survival, we must endeavour to remove them. But no direct attack has much chance of permanent success. We may succeed, for a time, perhaps in reasoning ourselves out of one of them, for example, out of some irrational suspicion or dislike which plagues us in spite of our conscious conviction that it is groundless. But so long as their cause remains untouched, they, or some equally irrational alternative, will soon be reconstructed. There is, in fact, only one way in which they can be permanently reduced, and that is by bringing their cause to the light of day. For the falsities in the pre-rational world-models of infancy have only to be exposed to be automatically corrected by conscious perception and inference, and then all their consequences as automatically subside.

To do this, however, is in practice extraordinarily difficult. The earliest world-models begin their development in a period before there is any clear distinction between an actual danger situation and the sign of one. For this reason, they are the product of defences against pain. And pain has to be endured whenever these defences are undone. It is true that the end result is a diminution of pain. But many people, so far as they are still in some degree at this level of development, would prefer to endure permanent discomfort than undergo an operation without an anaesthetic—and the nature of a psychic operation is such that it is not effective unless the patient remains conscious of what is going on.

This does not imply that nothing can be done to diminish the quantity of pain, which is greater with a surgeon who has to probe about vaguely till he discovers exactly what to do, than with one who knows at once where to locate the trouble. But much of the difficulty arises from the fact that, in either case, the surgeon is working against the short term interests of the patient who may either run away or endeavour to mislead him whenever he probes too near a painful spot.

We may turn now from such analogies—always liable to be

dangerous if applied beyond the single point they are intended to convey—and consider how the unconscious is brought to light (not cut out) by the psycho-analytic method.

Perhaps what most distinguishes it from any other form of psycho-therapy is that the analyst confines himself to the making of interpretations. He avoids, and has no need of, gestures of friendship or hostility, of praise or blame. He makes no predictions and gives no reassurances. By so doing, he presents himself as a blank screen for his patient's projections, and will soon find the patient using him, directly or indirectly, as such. In other words, the patient will begin, either directly to talk about his own relation to the analyst, or indirectly about his relation to persons, or about their relation to each other, which the analyst can recognise as symbolic of the analytic situation. Now the patient's portrait of the analyst, and of their relation, as it emerges in this way, will in part belong to his rational world, but it will also contain elements from his paranoid-schizoid, and hyper-manic ones. In particular, the patient's portrait of the analyst will be influenced by what he does to him, and in the past did to early figures now equated with him, in his inner world. If he attacks him there, he will perceive him outside as either hostile or injured, according as he is in the paranoid position or has begun to approach the depressive one. Or, if he is using a manic defence, he will deny any incipient sense of feeling depressed inside, and be correspondingly unobservant of, or insensitive to, any feelings in the analyst outside. Meanwhile, the analyst, so far as his own previous analysis has made him familiar with his own early worlds, is able consciously to identify with his patient's unconscious and so to recognise the paranoid-schizoid and hyper-manic elements in the patient's picture of him. Then he interprets in an endeavour to make the patient also aware of their existence and of how they are formed. But this arouses the pain of which I spoke. The psychotic and neurotic elements were originally erected as short term defences against pain, and it is now in the patient's short term interest to prevent their removal and, for this purpose, to erect others in their support.

Consciously he is most anxious for the analysis to succeed as soon as possible, and blames himself or his analyst for its stagnation; but unconsciously he is doing his best, by confusing the ana-

lyst, to prevent all further progress, and perhaps also to undo such progress as has been already made.

As if such difficulties were not enough, a further, and at first wholly unexpected, motive for opposing the work may operate with extraordinary strength: namely the patient's envy of the analyst's success. Of course, we have always known that envy is a common human trait; but its origin, and analytic importance in the transference, was not understood till the publication of Melanie Klein's study of the subject. Since then, analysts of her school have come to regard it as a major difficulty in every analysis and occasionally insuperable. For the process of bringing it to light exposes the patient to a double pain. He becomes conscious not only of his deep sense of inferiority in face of those he envies, but also of the extent of his ingratitude towards those, from his parents to his analyst, whose wish and ability to help he has enviously endeavoured to destroy. So, as before, he has a powerful short term motive to resist the discovery of truth.

The analyst's ability to surmount all these, and other impediments, which the patient will unconsciously put in his path, depends, as always, on the extent to which, through his own analysis, he has become personally familiar with their operation. So far as he can recognise, instead of being merely confused by them, he will be able to help his patient to understand and surmount them too, and so bring the analysis to a conclusion which both will regard as satisfactory.

But what has been accomplished, much as it may be, is perhaps small in comparison to what is theoretically possible. The results so far, from the average analysis, are a diminution of symptoms and a life more rational and more satisfying to the individual, and more pleasant for his circle, than he would have been able to lead without it. The best analyses give more. But those who have had them, though certainly far more rational, accomplished and agreeable than they were, are not necessarily more so than others who, because of a fortunate heredity and environment, have grown up relatively free from psychotic and neurotic disturbances, and have always had a good understanding of themselves and of their neighbours. Moreover, as compared with the theoretical standard of a completely 'normal' person, the amount of irrationality among the sanest of us, whether analysed or not, remains considerable.

Though it is important not to minimise the difficulties and present limitations of analysis, it is also important to be aware of its immense potential rewards—especially if it could be carried out on a scale wide and deep enough to affect the world as a whole. Enough has been said, I think, to show that most of man's troubles result from his irrationality, and would disappear if, through analytic knowledge, the unconscious paranoid-schizoid and hypermanic elements in his world-model could be brought to light. We have, therefore, scientific grounds for believing in at least the possibility of a happier future for mankind.

PART II

CHAPTER VI

Beliefs and Evaluations

LANGUAGE, having been evolved for practical affairs, can be notoriously misleading in psychology. To say that we walk implies no more than that our bodies move. To say that we think, because of its grammatical similarity, suggests some entity which does the thinking. (And, in unconscious phantasy, there are figures which do so.) But as Hume disturbingly observed, the most careful introspection fails altogether to detect an actual mental entity separate from the mental activities the grammatical ego is said to indulge in. Strictly speaking, we do not contain the ego of our grammar (or the more complex population of unconscious phantasy); but we—that is, our mental selves—consist of mental activity and nothing more. So to say that we think is equivalent to saying that thought is one of the mental activities of which we are composed.

A mind—that is, a given totality of mental action—has three distinguishable aspects: the cognitive, which includes perception as well as thought, the affective and the conative. The main function of the cognitive aspect is the construction of a world-model—a process which we tried to follow in Part I. Only a small part of it is, as it were, present in a mind at any given time. The rest (not counting what is permanently unconscious) is available as and when required. It consists of pictures, including verbal pictures, of everything that the individual concerned would expect to experience in other times and places and in other people's shoes. It is, therefore, dualistic: it refers both to those percept-objects which belong, as we say, to the external world and to the perceptions, thoughts, feelings and desires which belong to, or rather constitute, his own and other people's minds. It represents the sum of his 'beliefs' about both these aspects of what we call reality.

* * *

There has been much dispute about whether the mind at birth, in its cognitive aspect, is a *tabula rasa* or endowed with some kind of racial memory. We have found reasons to reject both these hypotheses in favour of a third; namely, that the selection of chance variations has so structured the brain that its correlated mind is predisposed to expect what is likely to be experienced. This can be put more fully in the form of two premisses leading to a conclusion. Let it be assumed, as the first premiss, that cerebral structure is innate and subject to mutation; and, as the second that this innate structure determines innate cerebral processes which are accompanied by innate ideas of primary symbols—or at least by an innate tendency to abstract them from sensation. Then, since individuals having such innate ideas (or dispositions to perceive specific patterns) as least resemble important actual objects and situations would be least likely to survive to transmit their innate cognitive defects, a race having such innate ideas (or perceptual dispositions) as do correspond with important actual objects and situations would be likely to evolve. This, in my view, is what has happened in our own, and perhaps in every species. In other words, not only our affective and conative responses, but also that which gives form to sensation and turns it into perception with an aura of imagery about what is still to be expected, would seem to have become, in some degree, innate.

But if the general pattern of our world-model is determined for us by our heredity, its detail is the product of experience. For this reason, the innate cognitive aspect of mind is very highly plastic.

It might be supposed that the affective and conative aspects are also plastic; for our emotions and desires appear to undergo great and varied changes in the course of our development. But in fact our affective and conative responses to situations probably mature in a rather fixed and rigid way, their apparent variability being secondary to and conditioned by changes in our world-model, both conscious and unconscious. For example, when a timid child becomes a comparatively fearless man, I believe this to be the result, not of any basic change in his innate tendency to be afraid in situations he regards as dangerous, but of his ceasing to regard as dangerous most of the situations he used to be afraid

of. That is, it is his assessment of situations, rather than his reaction to a given assessment, that is plastic.

* * *

The view that only the cognitive aspect of mind is plastic, the affective and conative aspects being relatively rigid, or rather maturing in a relatively rigid way, leads to far-reaching conclusions about the difference between one person and another. Of course, there are important innate differences in the affective and conative aspects of our minds, as well as in our capacity for cognitive development. The violence of love or hate, the force of desire, the scope of intelligence are innately different in different individuals. But such variations pale into insignificance compared with the immense dissimilarities in the world-models they have acquired, and which now govern their attitude to life. Thus character is pre-eminently determined by belief.

In saying this, however, we must remember to include among beliefs everything expressed by a world-model, whether it is conscious or not.

* * *

The unconscious part of our world-model is the main object of psycho-analytic study. It still remains imperfectly explored. But we do know that much of what is unconscious constitutes an inner world which profoundly affects our moods, and so also our behaviour in the world of common sense. The unconscious inner world is peopled by figures and objects from the past, as they are imagined often wrongly to have been. It is maintained by frequent repetitions of the mechanisms which first created it, current situations being unconsciously equated with past ones, and in the inner world dealt with as before. It contains not only persons—parents, brothers, and sisters—but also animatistic 'part-objects', survivals from the still earlier period of infancy when the *gestalten*, or primary symbols we are innately predisposed to perceive and respond to had just begun to be moulded by experience. Thus the inner world of psycho-analytic study resembles the outer world by which many primitive peoples, and some psychotics, consciously feel, and occasionally see, themselves to be surrounded. And this is not surprising, for what they consciously feel or see is a

reflection of a part of their world-model which is unconscious to most of us. But they do not feel or see it as internal; nor do they understand how it was constructed. Strictly speaking, therefore, the spirit world of superstition is not the inner world of unconscious phantasy, but a projection of it. Moreover, in the process of becoming a part of the external world into which it is projected, it is subject to much secondary elaboration.

In contrast to the world of superstition, the inner world of unconscious phantasy is felt to be inside the body.[1] That this should be so must seem surprising till we remember the extent to which the infant is at first dominated by oral desires almost to the exclusion of all others. He is interested only in what he can consume, and in phantasy consumes whatever interests him—as the infantile part of us, in some sense, continues to do unconsciously throughout our lives. It is, therefore, by successive acts of imaginary incorporation that the unconscious inner world is gradually constructed[2]. Moreover, it is internal also in the sense that it is unconscious and quite distinct from the world of conscious thought and sense perception. But there is a continuous interaction between the two. Indeed, cognitive development itself probably takes place by means of an alternating cycle of projections from unconscious phantasy (which begin by being innately predetermined) and re-projections from the outer, conscious, world—a process which may lead either to the correction of the one, or to the distortion of the other.

Thus imaginary events in the unconscious inner world affect, not only our moods, but also our conscious picture of the outer world, which is always, in some degree, a projection of it. If the inner world contains a very good mother and a very bad father, corresponding figures will appear in the external one and so on. Often the conscious outer world-model is substantially transformed in this way, particularly as regards the characters of public figures;

[1] The extent to which internal objects or figures are experienced as 'material' or 'spiritual' may in part depend on the extent to which tactual and kinaesthetic as well as auditory or visual imagery is unconsciously employed.

[2] When we remember that phylogenetically we passed through a stage of being little more than an alimentary tract, and that our first sense organs did little more than secure the needs of physical incorporation and ejection, it may seem less surprising that later sense organs, such as the eyes, should still, in unconscious phantasy, be felt to function in a similar way as organs of introjection and projection.

its geography being, as it were, distorted by intrusions from the paranoid-schizoid and manic worlds of infancy.

* * *

It is, therefore, to the inner world, in the first instance that the epithets paranoid-schizoid, manic or normal should be applied. That an inner world of unconscious phantasy can ever be described as normal may seem strange; since we are apt to regard it, as Epicurus regarded the world of superstition, as the enemy of reason. Our apparent therapeutic purpose is to diminish its domain. But what we really do, when we analyse the way it was built up, is to change and not to destroy it. We expose its errors so that it becomes more 'true'. That there is a sense in which an inner world can be true may seem a further paradox. The objects and persons which in unconscious phantasy inhabit our insides, do not physically exist in us. But there is a vital sense in which this unreal world can be true or false. For the objects and persons it contains formerly belonged to the external world and may, or may not, have been correctly perceived at the time of their incorporation. To take the simplest example, a child who was the apple of his father's eye may, because of his own jealousy, have unconsciously incorporated the picture of a hostile god—which, incidentally, is likely to embitter or frustrate him throughout life. In this case the picture is false and can be corrected by analysis. Thereafter, his inner world will not be without a father, but the nature of the father it does contain will change in the direction of truth. (And even if the real father had been less friendly, the inner relation can be improved, without distortion, into what it might have been had there been a better mutual understanding.)

A 'normal' inner world may be defined as one which, in the above sense, is true. In practice it always has paranoid-schizoid and hyper-manic aspects, as well as true ones, though these are present in very different proportions in different individuals. The paranoid-schizoid aspect is the product of the internalisation of an outer world which is itself the result of defensive splitting and projection. Moreover, there is no symbolism in it, only symbolic equivalence (Segal); for this reason, it has a bizarre concreteness which is foreign to conscious rational thought, and so difficult

to envisage[1]. As distinct from the paranoid-schizoid aspect, the hyper-manic aspect of the inner world may perhaps best be described as the product of the internalisation of an outer world which has been distorted by defensive denial and repression.[2] The aim of analysis is to expose the mechanisms by which the paranoid-schizoid and hyper-manic aspects of the inner world have been built up, and so to change it in the direction of normality and truth.

* * *

Since our inner world influences our conscious world-model, a change in the one inevitably affects the other. The man in our example who had a false picture of a hostile father in his inner world is certain to feel himself thwarted by similar figures in the external world, even if they do not at first exist there; and by his hostility to them, he may well end by making them hostile, so creating the situation he was over-ready to expect. It is clear then that if, as the result of analysis, his inner world is corrected and comes to contain the kindly father of his actual childhood, he will tend to expect, and be more likely to find, friendly superiors in his work. But he will not go to the opposite extreme and imagine friendliness in them when it does not exist; for the splitting and projective defences which created the false inner world in the first place will have been diminished, so that he will no longer be prone to an over-idealisation or a blackening of his objects. In other words, his capacity to discover the actual characters of persons will no longer be disturbed.

We have said that the main difference between one person and another lies in his world-model—in his system of belief. To this we can now add that his capacity to form a true conscious world-model is limited and conditioned by the degree to which his inner world of unconscious phantasy is, in the sense appropriate to it, a true one. Therefore the main differences between people depend upon, or reflect, different degrees of truth in their

[1] An example may help to illustrate this point. A patient dreamed that he was hitting a man, but on waking noticed, with surprise, that his dream picture was of angrily hitting a table. He had caught a glimpse, as it were, of a psychotic world in which a man and a table could be identical.

[2] There is often some confusion as to where to draw the line between psychosis and neurosis; and to define it in terms of the distinction between splitting and denial or repression as defences may be over-simple. Much light has recently been thrown on the problem by Bion in his paper: 'Differentiation of the Psychotic from the non-Psychotic Personalities', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1957.

inner worlds, that is, upon the degree of their integration or normality.

* * *

The recognition of this fact has important implications. In particular, it opens a new approach to those disciplines which seem to deal, not with beliefs, but with evaluations.

We may say of someone that he is beautiful or good or wise; and because of the formal identity of the arrangement of the words we are apt to suppose that, in each case, we have asserted an empirical proposition about him. But as soon as we reflect on the meaning of these sentences, vital differences begin to emerge. If by 'wise' we mean having a good understanding of, that is, true beliefs about the self and other people, we express, in the last case, our belief that our friend has true beliefs about himself and other people. It may not be easy to prove this in practice; but there is no difficulty in principle. We can test his beliefs about himself and other people to discover whether they are true. If they are, so was our belief about him; and this can be proved to anyone capable of repeating the tests we have applied. But when we say that someone is beautiful or good, there appears to be no procedure by which we can prove our point to anyone whose standards of beauty or goodness differ from ours.

For reasons of this kind, aesthetic and ethical judgments have sometimes been dismissed as meaningless. But I think they always have a meaning. In saying that someone is beautiful or good, we may mean no more than that we believe him to conform to our own standards. This is either true or false; we can find out by getting to know him thoroughly. But the form of our words suggests something much more general: namely, our belief that he will be judged beautiful or good by anyone who knows him thoroughly. And in view of the apparent differences between different people's aesthetic and moral standards, a proposition with this meaning would seem, at first sight, to be quite clearly false.

We can put the point another way by distinguishing between judgments of fact and evaluations. A judgment of fact is a product of the cognitive aspect of mind; it expresses a belief and must be either true or false, that is, in principle it is capable of being tested. An evaluation is an affective response, and not the

kind of thing that can be either true or false. If, in saying that someone is beautiful or good, we mean that he would be so valued by anyone who knows him thoroughly, we are making a judgment of fact about evaluations; and at first sight this judgment would appear to be untrue.

But if, as I have argued, the main differences between people lie in their cognitive, rather than in their affective or conative aspect, the whole question can be profitably reopened. Since innate differences in their affective and conative constitutions undoubtedly exist, I do not claim that general statements about evaluations can ever be exactly true. But I do think they can be approximately true to a much higher degree than is usually supposed. Thus, in our example, I believe the apparent differences in the evaluations of anyone as beautiful or good are in the main attributable to two related factors: first, to differences in the degree of self-knowledge (or what is the same thing, integration or normality) of the persons making the evaluation; and secondly to differences in the completeness and truth of their pictures of the person evaluated. Moreover, the second factor is dependent on the first because the condition for being able to form a true external world-model, including a true picture of people, is the possession of a true picture of the inner world. This, of course, is private and unique to each individual. But a number of individuals each having a true picture of his private inner world (that is, being integrated or normal) would be likely to have a true picture of the outer one too, which would then be the same for all of them; and this I believe is the condition for their having similar, though not identical, evaluations. In other words, approximately similar evaluations are likely to be made by all normal people.

Such a result, unexpected as it is, seems to be important. Admittedly it is rather academic, since normality, or the possession of an inner-world model which is completely true, seems to be an unrealisable ideal. But it offers what seemed theoretically impossible before: namely, a theoretically valid procedure for achieving by rational argument some measure of agreement in those branches of aesthetics, ethics and even politics, which appear to deal, not with facts, but only with evaluations. To explore this possibility, if only in a cautious and tentative way, will be my aim in the remainder of this book.

CHAPTER VII

On Aesthetics

As Ernest Jones once pointed out, after an 'Ernest Jones Lecture' by Professor Gombrich, artists tend to resent, and possibly to fear, psycho-analytical excursions into their particular domain. Yet many analysts, from Freud onwards, have been unable to resist its lure, and by now much is known about the psychology of artists. Moreover, this knowledge at last includes, thanks to such authors as Hannah Segal and Adrian Stokes[1], a good deal about the differences between the psychologies of those artists who, in the opinion of the critics, are 'good' and those who are not. But is it possible to take the final step and discover non-arbitrary criteria of the difference between good and bad art? Or, as I would prefer to put it, is there any means by which we can determine the validity of aesthetic evaluations?

An evaluation, so far as it is an emotional response rather than the expression of belief in an observable fact, cannot itself be true or false. If two observers have different emotional responses to the same perception, we cannot say that one is more valid than the other. The possibility remains, however, that the different responses are not, as may superficially appear, to the same perception, but result mainly from the differences in the perception of the same 'thing'. The point I am trying to make may be brought out more forcibly perhaps by assuming the two observers to be the same person at different ages. He may say that his evaluations have changed as he got older. But perhaps it was the process of integration and maturation in himself that enabled him to perceive more fully and more accurately what he judged, so that it was not the emotional response to the same perception, but the perception that changed. We may then legitimately ask whether one perception is truer than another. If so, the emotional response

[1] Besides being indebted to their writings for this chapter, I am grateful to Mr. Frederick Grubb for many constructive comments on the first draft of it.

to, or the evaluation of, the truer perception may be described as more valid.

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But before attempting the by no means easy task of applying this criterion to art, it will be as well to consider a few points about the psychology of artists.

An initial difficulty arises over the precise content of aesthetic feeling. Some people may not experience this emotion at all, or not with sufficient strength or frequency to link it clearly with its name. They may, for example, be mainly aware of a diffuse erotic excitement in seeing certain pictures, of a manic elation in listening to certain music, of wonder at the profundity of a poet's thought or of admiration at the skill with which an architect has solved a problem. And they may call one or other of these feelings aesthetic. But although all such pleasures may be linked with aesthetic feelings, their too insistent presence probably obscures what those who experience it most would call a pure sense of beauty.

There are good reasons to believe that the capacity for this more specific emotion first appears in the infant in the depressive position, as a new type of response to the breast[1]. Before this, as we know, his opposite feelings towards it are kept apart with the result that there seem to him to be two breasts: one good, satisfying and, I think, indestructible; the other bad, and not only poisonous but malevolent. With the partial integration of the two opposite feelings of satisfaction and love on the one hand and frustration and hate on the other, the good breast is no longer felt to be indestructible. And it becomes the more precious because it is dimly felt to be threatened by the child's own unconscious destructiveness, against which, as well as against his associated greed, it has to be protected. Probably a number of attitudes and emotions towards it emerge at this time and become fused as the core of what may be called the aesthetic feeling of beauty. Thus, from the conflict between the desire to possess and consume the object, and the desire to preserve it for ever from these predatory appetites, emerges the beginnings of a non-utilitarian attitude to it as something to be admired and loved but not used up. And,

[1] See Segal, 'A Psycho-Analytical Approach to Aesthetics', *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis*, edited by Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann and myself, 1955.

arising perhaps from the same conflict, is that peculiar sense of the object's being at once, or perhaps in rapid succession, both a part of the self, which suffuses the self with its virtue, and unapproachably objective[1]. There is presumably a moment when this introjective-projective cycle, operating in a baby who is becoming integrated, enables him to endow his mother with enough of himself to think of her, for the first time, with a new kind of objectivity, not merely as the animatistic instrument of his joys and sorrows, but as a person with a life of her own to be respected. Like Prospero's daughter, he may then feel his world to have become suddenly enriched with a new vitality. If so, something of this feeling may be recaptured whenever he experiences an 'aesthetic revelation', for example, on looking at a picture which comes alive for him.

No doubt other feelings also enter into the sense of beauty, which remains a complex emotion extremely difficult to analyse into its components. Moreover, it is probably more in relation to symbols of the breast, than to the breast itself, that aesthetic feeling develops. It may happen that, towards the end of a mood of depression, arising from the unconscious phantasy that the good breast has been irreparably destroyed in the inner-world, the child may see or hear something that unconsciously reminds him of it, to which he reacts as to the purified and intangible ghost of a loved and lost person.

The experience, we may suppose, suffuses life for him with a sense of its beauty and so of its worth. And ever after, in moods when his more manic defences against depression—compulsive work or play, or some time-killing narcotic of the mind—lose their effectiveness in later life, the repetition of such experience may remain for him the one indestructible safeguard against suicidal feelings of personal inferiority or cosmic purposelessness.

The capacity for a feeling for beauty is not sufficient, however, to make him an artist—or even fully capable of appreciating the work of artists. There must also be, in some measure, the impulse to preserve, to reconstruct or to create, a work of art. Often one or other of these component drives predominates. The writer Proust tells us that his main motive was to preserve, and recon-

[1] Adrian Stokes has stressed this double, or alternating sense of oneness and otherness in his book on Michelangelo.

struct, the personalities of people as he had once known them—people who had since died or much decayed[1]. Similar motives must have predominated in many painters whose aim has been to preserve some aspect of a person or of a landscape from oblivion because it seemed beautiful to them, and poets who have striven to immortalise a mood. In others the less humble impulse to create what is both beautiful and new, which must surely be present in all artists in some degree, is more conspicuous.

Now the impulse to create, which has its biological foundation in the reproductive instincts, is usually competitive and seldom free from envy of the creativeness of others. Moreover, this association is a very old one. The infant—and in Melanie Klein's view to a degree which is innately determined—first envies the breast, and soon also his mother's general capacity to produce and feed children. Thereafter envy remains the ambiguous ally of his ambition. It is a powerful spur to personal achievenent. But it is also a source of persecutory anxieties which inhibit or impede success; for a phantastic picture of the mother, into whom the child's own envy has been projected, may be incorporated as a 'fifth columnist' to sabotage his own creativeness.

Much will depend on the strength of the inner enemy. Since no one, and certainly no infant, is wholly free from envy, the internal saboteur is never wholly absent. If present only in a small degree, it may act as a spur; and I think that, even when too strong to be directly opposed, it can sometimes be cheated. There are, for example, over-modest artists who disclaim the creative originality which their work in fact displays. The price they pay for their success is that they must never admit or enjoy it; for, if they did, it would desert them. More often, however, the presence of a powerful saboteur inside results in failure. And if, as seems likely, people seldom attempt success in art unless they are aware of some technical ability, most failures probably spring more from the attacks of inverted envy than from lack of potential skill.

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We are not yet in a position to define failure—or success—objectively. So by failure I here mean no more than the artist's own sense of not having achieved his purpose—of not having

[1] See again Segal, 'A Psycho-Analytical Approach to Aesthetics'.

created a live and satisfying symbolic child which itself also symbolises, at another level, the preservation or restoration of the breast inside the self. But we must be careful to distinguish between a superficial and a deep conviction. I have already argued that some artists avoid the perils of *hubris* by consciously asserting failure to cover a deep unconscious conviction of success. Conversely, a deep unconscious conviction of failure may be consciously denied, and replaced by a manic assertion of achievement.

Blatant self-esteem, as opposed to confidence, may always be suspected of covering feelings of inferiority. This too has a long history, and its origin, though it may seem pathetic in an infant, becomes in retrospect both sordid and ridiculous. That the infant's own mess forms his first 'creations', as well as his first gifts, was an early discovery of Freud. But to Melanie Klein we owe our ability to recognise that the child who prolongs the period in which these seem good to him, and obstinately resists their devaluation, is using a manic defence against a depressive sense of his total inability to produce, restore or preserve, anything that really matters to him.

The acceptance of this underlying sense of failure in infancy is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition of ultimate success. It should be remembered that the object, whether breast or child, which the infant enviously wishes to create is the same as that which his envy and jealousy as well as his frustrations, has caused him to attack. The sense of failure, therefore, if followed by grief and self-reproaches about the phantasied destruction of the first object in the inner-world, leads to a more loving and less envious memory of it. If it is incorporated in imagination in this form, the child will feel as if he had exchanged an envious opponent for an inner helper; then his inhibitions seem to disappear and he begins to create symbols that are really satisfying to him.

* * *

Since blatant self-esteem involves the denial of that part of the self which can be self-critical—and probably the projection of this into others, who are then felt to be destructive critics even when they are trying to be helpful—it implies a lack of ego-integration. Conversely, the acceptance into the self of the capacity to be self-critical implies integration, and conditions the capa-

city to experience constructive criticism from others as helpful, and so to profit by it. This applies, in particular, to the internal critic, the super-ego, which, through the withdrawal of hostility previously projected into it, becomes, during the working through of the depressive position, a much more friendly mentor. Only so far, therefore, as anyone has reached, and become stable in, this stage of integration or maturity can he judge his own work with the whole of himself, and, without fear of having to defend it against internal enemies, see it as it is.

* * *

Some such development as this, in Hannah Segal's view, must occur in the infancy of an artist, if he is to produce good work in later life. Of course technical proficiency is also needed for the realisation of his vision. But there will be the ability to have the vision; and this will be beautiful to him. Can we add that, if realised, it will possess objective merit?

The answer would seem to depend, in the first instance, on what we understand by the objective perception of a work of art.

Perception is not the same as sensation, but an abstraction from, and an amplification of it. We have found reasons to believe that this is so even from the beginning of post-natal life—that we are innately predisposed to perceive primary symbols amid a welter of otherwise unorganised sensation. And soon memory comes to add its quota of imagery to what is merely sensed. Thus, for example, when we recognise a friend at a distance, we perceive much more of him than we actually see—a fact which at once becomes apparent on those occasions when we find we are after all mistaken; for then the familiar features we perceived melt away to be replaced by the face of a stranger. Perception, then, can be correct or mistaken. Only those which are correct because they have been carefully arrived at deserve to be called objective. But clearly the objective perception of a picture means more than that we have correctly recognised it, for example, as Sickert's Raising of Lazarus, and not carelessly perceived it as an elephant.

Opinion is divided about whether the appreciation of a work of art does or does not involve an identification with the artist. It may be argued that we can appreciate natural beauty which has no artist. But I think the anthropomorphic idea of a creator is

always somewhere in the background, together with a sense of being alternatively identified with, and grateful to Him. So without claiming to be certain on the point, I will assume that the full appreciation of a work of art involves a perception of the artist's point of view.

Now we speak of the perception, not only of a person's features, but also of his state of mind. Indeed, we often reserve this term for his mental states, as when we 'see' that his face is lined and 'perceive' that he is worried. And since what he makes may express his mood as clearly as his features, we can, in contemplating a work of art, perceive the artist's state of mind; in particular, I think it is his perception (or vision) that we try to perceive in identification with him.

Of course, the truth of our percept in this extended sense cannot be directly verified. All inferences about, or perceptions of, another's state of mind depend upon projection, and we cannot 'see' into it to prove or disprove the real existence of what, in imagination, we put there. But if—and this is a main thesis of this book—the projective mechanisms of the perceiving mind are 'normal' and not defensive, such inferences or perceptions will not be falsified by bias. And if a number of them also pass the test of self-consistency, they are likely to be right.

While the correctness of a psychological perception depends mainly on freedom from projective mechanisms of defence, its profundity depends on the depth of the perceiver's acquaintance with himself. And if, as I believe, the differences between different human minds are as the variations of a common theme, our capacity to perceive what is in others is limited only by the extent of our self-ignorance. From this it follows, in particular, that a sensitive art critic, who was acquainted with the vicissitudes of the creative impulse in himself, would be able to perceive the psychological struggle and achievement of others in their art.

I do not claim that anyone can do this very fully; and, being no artist, I certainly do not claim to do it well myself. But I think we can lay down some of the qualities which a critic who could do it well would have to have. In the first place, he would have to be potentially an artist—though he need not have the technical ability to be one. For otherwise he could not sufficiently identify with artists to perceive what they put into their work. In the

second place, he would have to have reached and to a large extent passed through the depressive position. For otherwise he would not be able to distinguish the manic productions of those who had not reached the same degree of integration from the mature productions of those who had. So far as he had achieved this maturity, further essential attributes would also be his; such as independence of judgment, so that he would not be over influenced by fashion; and freedom from emotional bias. In particular, he would not belittle what he envied, or go to the opposite extreme of over-idealising it. All these qualities at least would seem to be required for the full and correct perception of a work of art, and so for its objective assessment.

* * *

That fairly full and correct perceptions of this kind may remain 'pre-conscious', and so unexpressed in communicable words, need not detract from their profundity and truth. But the critic who aspires to interpret his own insight to others must be capable of expressing it in clear terms, that is, he must be fully conscious of it.

It is, I have suggested, above all the artist's perception and mood projected into his work and so immortalised that a good critic consciously or preconsciously perceives and evaluates. Thus he may praise it even if the artist's technical ability is relatively poor, or fail to do so even if he is technically proficient. This state of mind may, of course, be misperceived in many different ways. But there is only one way of perceiving it fully and correctly. Therefore, every critic who did fully and correctly perceive it, would evaluate the same perception. The final question is: 'Would they all arrive at the same evaluation?'

Now, in virtue of their deep acquaintance with the creative and reparative impulses in themselves, and with the psychological difficulties involved, these omniscient critics should be able to perceive, not only the meaning of the work to the artist, but also his own response to it. In particular, they should be able to perceive whether he himself experienced a sense of failure in his attempt to create symbols of something which has the quality of life, whether his work betrays a manic and blatant (dishonest[1])

[1] The persistent associations of the concept of 'truth' and 'goodness' with those of beauty suggest that the artist's truthfulness as well as his morals are also being, in some sense, assessed.

denial of his own underlying sense of subjective failure, or whether at a deep (and relatively post-depressive) level, it gave him aesthetic satisfaction. If either of the first alternatives were true, I do not think it would be praised by any of these critics. But I believe they would all praise it—that is, they would share his aesthetic satisfaction—if they perceived that the artist had achieved his own creative purpose.

It does not follow that they would necessarily arrange a number of satisfying works in the same order of merit; for we must allow for the existence of minor idiosyncrasies of judgment that are irreducible. But if all the critics were capable of a correct perception of what they judged, they would neither be unduly influenced by, nor unduly intolerant of, the idiosyncrasies of judgment of their fellows. And if as a result they were able to agree on what to include in the class of objects of aesthetic merit—and on what to exclude from it—art would not be, as the relativists must hold, merely a matter of fashion. My thesis is that they would do so.

* * *

The above theory is an attempt to rescue art from the relativist argument—which once seemed irrefutable to me. Whether, or to what extent, it can be applied in detail remains to be tested. I will here content myself with one or two examples in which, at first sight, it would appear to lead us into difficulties.

Many of the poems of Gerald Manley Hopkins are replete with a sense of utter failure[1]. Are we then to condemn them in spite of their apparent beauty? The escape from this paradox lies, I suggest, in making a distinction between the mood depicted, and the mood in which it is depicted. Hopkins often took his own depression as his subject, but I cannot believe that the language with

[1] See for example,

> '. . . birds build—but not I build; no but strain,
> Time's eunuch, and not breed one work that wakes.'

or

> 'Sweet fire the sire of muse, my soul needs this;
> I want the one rapture of an inspiration.
> Oh then if in my lagging lines you miss
> The roll, the rise, the carol, the creation,
> My winter world, that scarcely breathes that bliss
> Now, yields you, with some sighs, our explanation.'

I am indebted to an unpublished paper by Dr. Judith Waterlow for calling my attention to these poems.

which he depicted it can have failed to give him aesthetic satisfaction—at least at the moment of creation. For 'pregnant' is the appropriate epithet for the words of this lament for his sterility.

Possibly the same loophole might permit the most austere critic to admire some of those works of Wagner or Beethoven which depict, and undeniably arouse, a manic elation. For a manic mood may be immortalised by a technique which is not itself being manically employed to deny an inner sense of barrenness.

Many artists have been ill people, sometimes plunged in the deepest despair and sometimes unjustifiably elated. Such moods may give them material; but must otherwise surely diminish the amount or quality of their work. It is, I think, only in the intermediate (relatively post-depressive) phase that they are able to create in a way that can really satisfy themselves, and so also a discerning critic. But those, like Bach, who were not ill, have probably achieved the most.

* * *

In conclusion, I will try to epitomise the argument in this chapter in terms of the scheme outlined in the last one for dealing with problems of evaluations.

It was argued there that the ability to form a correct picture (or perception) of other people's minds is a correct picture (or perception) of our own internal world. If this condition is not fulfilled we are unlikely, in particular, to 'understand' a work of art; for then we are either too unfamiliar with the process of creation and reparation in ourselves to perceive what the artist was about, or too prone to project some other intention of our own into him and so altogether to misconstrue his work. Moreover, if a number of us are projecting different intentions or meanings of our own, which do not correspond with the artist's, we shall not be evaluating the same perception and will be likely to arrive at different assessments. But a number of critics in whom this condition is fulfilled—and who must, of course, also be assumed to possess expert knowledge of their subject—would perceive what the artist was about. And because they were evaluating the same perception, they would be likely to agree on whether he had or had not achieved his creative and reparative purpose, and so to arrive at very similar evaluations.

CHAPTER VIII

On Ethics

AMONG the various motives for action, or refraining from action, those called 'moral' have always seemed to form a category both separate and mysterious. For being, as they often are, opposed to our other wishes, they tend to be thought of as against mere animal instinct, rather than a product of it; and from this it was but a step to regard them as implanted in us by God and so evidence of His existence and of our affinity with Him.

Of course, when we think biologically about them, we can see at once that our tendency to grow a conscience must be as much a part of our innate endowment as the tendency to grow a beard, or any other organ or function that emerges after birth. Moreover, a conscience in the members of a group is usually in the interests of the survival of the group; so we can also see why the capacity to grow one has been evolved.

But if conscience is evolved to promote the survival of the group, it often does so most imperfectly. There are many varieties of it, some—those, for example, which promote celibacy or pacificism—seeming rather to oppose this end. We want to know how these varieties arise. We are also faced with the problem of their evaluation. We can judge them in terms of their utility—that is, according as they approximate to what selection tends to make them. But we may feel in need of some other criterion. If so, we want to discover what it is, and whether the two criteria will give the same or different results.

To answer questions of this kind, the evolutionary explanation of conscience needs to be supplemented by a more detailed psychological one. I have referred to the sense of mystery which surrounds the source of moral commands and prohibitions. The general explanation, in evolutionary terms, does not altogether remove our feeling that conscience, which can operate against our group as well as against our private interests, is in some sense an irra-

tional, and often unwelcome, intrusion from another world, rather than a useful endowment to promote the survival of our group in the material one. This feeling gives us an initial clue. For as psychologists we already know of another world: namely, the inner world of unconscious phantasy. Conscience, therefore, like religion, is a product of this other world which must seem mysterious until it is properly explored.

We do, however, know a good deal about it. In particular, we know that our picture of it—of what we do to, and make of, our internal objects—can range from being very limited and mainly false to being comparatively full and true. And we know that, as our picture of it gets fuller and truer, split objects in it tend to be united, and damaged ones repaired, till it itself becomes a truer picture of the external world of infancy. In other words, analysis operates to make it truer rather than to destroy it[1]. Moreover, since conscience is a product of the inner world, we must expect to find different kinds of conscience to be linked with different kinds of inner world. And we may significantly enquire whether the consciences of different individuals approximate to a common type as their inner worlds, of which their consciences are a product, approximate to truth. If we find this to be indeed the case, we may see in the link with truth that other criterion we were in search of, and go on to compare the results of evaluating consciences in terms of it with those obtained by assessing them in terms of their utility.

* * *

We may begin by examining the diversity of conscience as it is. When anyone acts, or refrains from acting, because of his conscience, he behaves in such a way as to avoid, or at least to minimise, a certain painful affect which he calls a sense of guilt. We know that quite different situations arouse guilt feelings in different people. Some, for example, feel more guilty at not going to church than at cheating a neighbour, while in others these priorities are reversed. But we are apt to assume, because we use one

[1] To stress another aspect: learning to know what goes on in the inner world, and to feel responsible for it, conditions the healing of splits in and so the integration of the self. Maturity may be defined as the (in practice unattainable) end result of this process. Thus maturity, integration, and the possession of a true picture of the self, are all synonymous.

word for it, that the affect of guilt itself is the same for everyone; and so fail to distinguish the two separate affects commonly involved, which ought to have two separate names.

When we regret something we have done, or left undone, we fear the consequences either to ourselves or to someone else with whom we are in sympathy. Thus if we have been angry and insulted a person, we may be afraid either that he will retaliate or that we have hurt his feelings. We may apologise either to propitiate him or to restore his self-esteem. These two kinds of regret illustrate the two kinds of guilt feelings to be distinguished. But they are not identical with them; for the regrets we experience in our relation with external figures are only secondary to the guilt feelings I am trying to describe, which result, in the first instance, from a disturbed relation with internal figures. The inner relation is never fully conscious; but people are aware of it in varying degrees. A deeply religious person, for example, is aware that his guilt feelings towards his neighbour are secondary to his guilt feelings towards his God, whose voice speaks to him, either in anger or in sorrow, from inside himself. And even those who have no overt faith may be as much aware that the pain of regret resides, less in their fear of consequences to themselves or others in the external world, than from the sense that it is against their own consciences that they have offended. Often they may feel deeply guilty when there are no external consequences for anyone to fear.

Guilt feelings, properly so called, arise, therefore, as the result of a disturbed relation to an inner figure or figures of unconscious phantasy, which are dimly sensed and, in part, consciously experienced as the voice of conscience or of God. Moreover, they are of two distinct kinds. These closely correspond with the two kinds of anxiety Melanie Klein has distinguished as persecutory on the one hand and depressive on the other. I have, therefore, called them persecutory and depressive guilt[1]. Though conceptually

[1] See my paper: 'Psycho-Analysis and Ethics', *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1952, reprinted in *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis*, 1955, edited by Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann and myself. This paper also contains some discussion (omitted here) of people who, either permanently or temporarily, are not conscious of either kind of guilt feeling—in particular, those who use a paranoid defence against it and so see it only in others, whom they blame for their own faults, and those who use a manic defence and do not experience it at all. In those who succeed in maintaining the unconscious fiction of being their own parents—and this too is manic—guilt at offending an internal parent (super-ego) is replaced by shame at failing to live up to a parental ideal with which they have identified

distinct, they usually occur together as a mixture in which one or other ingredient predominates.

Those who have a persecutory conscience and suffer more from persecutory guilt, most fear punishment at the hands of an implacable internal figure. They expect Nemesis to overtake them if they infringe the specific moral law that seems to be imposed upon them—a law which to others may often seem bizarre and preposterous. And they do penance to propitiate the Fates. Since this is the older type of conscience, one might expect it to be capable of existing in a pure form unsoftened by any admixture of the depressive element. Indeed there are people in whom persecutory guilt is so intense that the depressive element and the concern for others, either inside or outside themselves, seems to be entirely absent. But, except in infants, the apparent absence of the other type of conscience is always the result of a regression, not of its never having been developed.

Those in whom depressive guilt predominates may be said, in a literal sense, to have a 'depressive 'type of conscience. For when they err, it is not only themselves but their conscience which is felt to be depressed. Their God speaks to them in sorrow, rather than in anger, and is felt to grieve at their moral failure. But in varying degrees, He proably always shows some anger too, for guilt feeling never seems to be entirely free from the earlier persecutory element.

There are also other qualities which usually, though perhaps not always, distinguish the two types of conscience we are considering. The commands and prohibitions of a persecutory conscience often seem self-contradictory and so incapable of being adequately fulfilled—as if they came from different authorities. And they tend to contain bizarre elements, such as prohibitions against certain otherwise harmless types of food, which must seem pointless and irrational to the conscious ego. By contrast, the other type of conscience is usually much more consistent and also more in accordance with what the ego itself approves.

Now we expected to find different types of conscience to be the products of different types of inner world. This so far seems to be

themselves. Anthropologists have called attention to whole cultures—presumably those having institutionalised a manic type of behaviour—in which standards are maintained, not by the sense of guilt, but only by the sense of shame.

the case. The two types of conscience we have been able to distinguish are clearly the products of two different types of inner world: one inhabited by figures which, in extreme cases, are so vindictive and sadistic, and often so inconsistent in their demands, that they suggest a pack of devils rather than a God of Love; the other by something much more like a benevolent Deity, who can, however, sometimes be severe.

* * *

By now we are on familiar ground. We can recognise the two types of inner world as being themselves the products, the one mainly of paranoid-schizoid defences, the other mainly of what may be called a post-depressive phase in which mourning for internal figures is mitigated by internal acts of reparation[1].

In the early period, before the infant has an ego strong enough to accept responsibility for, and to decide priorities between, his impulses, the more violent ones tend to be split off and projected into the outer world. Among these are many persecutors the reintrojection of which form the core of the inner world of those who later have a persecutory conscience. Since the splitting process creates idealised figures as well as bad ones, his inner world contains some good figures too; but because of their perfection, these are almost as difficult to please.

The adult with a persecutory conscience resembles the infant in this respect, with the difference that, while the infant has not yet reached the depressive position, the adult has regressed from it. He has not been able to tolerate the depressive guilt inseparable from integration, that is, from the realisation that he is responsible for his hate as well as for his love and that both impulses have been directed at the same objects. For this reason, he has regressed to the paranoid-schizoid position, which is the lesser evil from a short-term point of view. And for this reason, his inner world is predominantly persecutory, unintegrated, and so conflicting and bizarre in its demands and prohibitions.

[1] Of the three possible outcomes of the depressive position—regression to the paranoid-schizoid one, manic denial, or mitigation by reparative activities—the term 'post-depressive' is intended to designate the third. It should be remembered, however, that so long as there are things to mourn—and there always are in the inner as in the outer world—depression can only be mitigated; its original source in past events cannot be removed, nor can those current conflicts which provide new causes for it be wholly overcome.

We can distinguish sub-stages within the period dominated by the paranoid-schizoid position. At first only simple affects are projected to form animatistic objects; in the second, when there is more integration, more complex sentiments come into play to form the concept of beings more like persons, or rather aspects of persons, which, too, are introjected. Such figures are still split into opposite extremes, one idealised, the other blackened; but corresponding aspects of many introjections tend to coalesce into two single figures representing the friendly and hostile aspects of the parents. Thus the inner world of this period is, as it were, more monotheistic. Instead of a multitude of animatistic figures, some friendly and others hostile, there tends to be one god and one devil —or perhaps a God who, in his infinite love and implacable vindictiveness, somehow combines these opposite extremes. Such was the type of super-ego first discovered and studied by Freud.

It is a moot point whether we should use the same term for the terror aroused by the hostile 'bad objects' of the earlier period as we use for the terror aroused by the hardly less sadistic aspect of a severe super-ego. That aroused by conflict with the super-ego always contains a depressive element. But in so far as we can isolate the persecutory element, it would seem to be qualitatively different in the two periods. We may, therefore, speak of 'persecutory anxiety' as, in this sense, earlier than and distinct from 'persecutory guilt'.

At a still later stage of development, which is achieved if and only in so far as the depressive position is successfully worked through, the two incompatible pictures of the parents are further modified and fused into a more consistent and realistic mentor. Even if the parents were, in reality, unhelpful, this may be correctly imputed to their lack of understanding, for which they can be forgiven; so that a better relation is established with them in the inner world, where they may develop into what they would in reality have been with better opportunities. In this sense, the inner picture may be realistic and true, even if it is an improvement on the actual parents. Such figures are no longer terrifying; but they can be hurt and disappointed if the ego puts some other interest before theirs. Whenever this happens—as from time to time it does—depressive guilt is again inevitably aroused. The spur to

morality is the desire to avoid this type of guilt, or to relieve it if it is already there by acts of reparation.

Moreover, the morality engendered by these understanding figures is such as an understanding ego can appreciate and also make its own. Since much of a child's conflict with his real parents arises out of jealousy of siblings which his parents also love, much of his later morality is concerned with his treatment of the symbols of these siblings in the outer world. His internal mentor requires him to identify with them and treat them as he would like to be treated. He may defend himself, but he must not bully them; and he must courageously defend any one who is being bullied by another. To do this fairly as good parents would, he must also not jump to conclusions about the quarrel in which he interferes, but first acquaint himself with the issues it involves. And this is no longer so difficult for him, as in the process of developing a true picture of his inner world he has come to discard those defence mechanisms of projection and denial which used formerly to falsify his picture of the external one, too.

Another aspect of this morality acts as a spur to creative work. A man's good internal parents are felt to desire life as he does. So his own similar craving to be immortal in the persons of his real or symbolic children, that is, in his accomplishments, becomes also a duty to his super-ego which is felt to aid and support him in the task.[1]

This type of morality, which contrasts in so many ways with the persecutory or authoritarian type, may conveniently be called humanistic.

* * *

We have next to consider the effects of analysis on these inner worlds and their associated types of conscience. One might suppose that an inner world of imaginary beings which have no physical existence would tend to fade away in the process of being brought to light. In fact it would seem to be quite indestructible. Perhaps it is the psychic correlate of some of the earliest and most deep seated of those self-perpetuating neural circuits which are now thought to be the physiological basis of memory. At any rate

[1] This, I suggest, is one of the ways by which a moral element may enter aesthetics.

its ghostly population do not age or decay. But their character can be very greatly changed. Some blocked part of the development normally characterising the passage through the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions may be set going again in analysis with a better prospect of this time completing its course. For what is brought to light in the transference are the motives which prevented the originally split picture of the parents (and also siblings) from being gradually corrected in the first place. As the result of this insight, and of the increasing self-knowledge and self-integration involved, the parental ghosts tend themselves to change from grotesque caricatures into much more realistic figures—that is, they change in the direction of truth—while the morality they determine approximates more closely to the humanistic type.

Even those who were unfortunate in their actual parents are not, we have seen, necessarily precluded from this result, since a better relation with parental figures still living in the inner world may yet permit many misunderstandings on both sides to be put right. Such an improvement on the original is to be sharply distinguished from those over-idealisations which falsify the picture. It results rather from these figures being permitted a better environment inside which enables them to develop into what, had they been better understood, they might have really been.

We have now answered two of the three questions we began with. The morality of different individuals does approximate to a common type as their inner worlds approximate to truth. And this type is humanistic.[1]

There is indeed more than one sense in which this morality is founded on truth. A true picture of the inner world is a prime condition for being able to form a true picture of the outer world and of the people in it. Therefore, a humanist morality reflects not only the understanding concern for each other and for all their children which good, not over-idealised, parents are felt to have,

[1] There is a possible confusion about what is, and what is *not* implied by the possession of a common *type* of morality. It is implied that if one person, A, acts in a manner which is felt as moral by him in a given situation, another person B, would judge it as moral also for himself were he in A's situation. It is not implied that, while remaining in his own different situation, he would necessarily feel it incumbent on himself to behave as A does. I claim only that people who are wise in the Greek sense of knowing themselves would tend to have the same humanistic *type* of morality—irrespective of the mores of the society in which they happen to have been nurtured. But many of the specific obligations accepted by them as moral would still be relative to their membership of this society.

but also a correct assessment of the real people in the social family with their aspirations and disputes, with which it is so much concerned. Thus, for example, a capacity to distinguish between those who are deprived and those who are envious, or between the degree of each motive involved, will ensure that the moral impulse to defend the oppressed is realistically employed.

I do not know whether there is a clear sense in which we can say we 'ought' to value this type of morality because it is founded on truth. But we can say that those who come nearest to having a true picture of the world, both internal and external, come nearest to having this type of morality. And we can also say, I think, that people would value this type of morality if they valued truth and understood the link between the two. (As to the extent to which this type of morality can be, or is, attained, we must distinguish between having it and living up to it. To possess it completely would demand complete self-knowledge which is not possible in practice; to live in accordance with it completely would demand the complete absence of contrary impulses strong enough to overcome the fear of depressive guilt, which, I think, is not even possible in theory. In neither sense, therefore, is it more than approximately achieved.)

Whether—to come to our last question—this type of morality is also the most 'useful' to the group is less easy to be certain of. But a morality which forbids gratuitous aggression, not self-defence, which on occasion demands the aggressive defence of those who are, and are not merely imagined to be, oppressed, and which demands a positive attitude to whatever furthers life, may be thought to be, on the whole, an asset to the group.

CHAPTER IX

Morals and the Problem of Political Agreement

In Part I of this book we examined the construction of world-models. We found there were two to be considered: an inner world of unconscious phantasy, as well as an outer world of common sense. The core of this inner world consists of objects and persons once belonging to the outer world of early childhood as we imagined it, often wrongly, to have been. And we found that the degree of its truth determined our capacity to form a true picture of the outer world—that is, to form a world-model which correctly represents the possibilities of experience.

One result of this enquiry was to lead us to regard the affective and conative aspects of man as, in large measure, dependent on the cognitive. Of course, our innate attitude to the world influences our beliefs about it, so that some people—those, for example, with a constitutional high 'envy content'—may have more difficulty in achieving a true world picture than others. But those with similar beliefs—that is, with similar world-models—tend to have similar feelings and desires; from which it follows that a number of omniscient people, all having beliefs which were both comprehensive and true, and therefore identical, would be likely to make similar but not identical evaluations.

This was the point stressed at the beginning of Part II, and applied in the last two chapters. The specific problem we were there concerned with was whether differences in artistic taste or moral code are the result of differences in knowledge. We concluded that, to a great extent, they are, and that the aesthetic and moral attitude of different individuals would tend to become similar, though not identical, as they increased in wisdom.

We have now to ask an analogous question about political attitudes, which are influenced by moral ones. We want to discover if, or to what extent, political differences reflect differences in knowledge, and whether, if everyone were omniscient, their

political aspirations would be similar. But we must be clear, at the outset, about the difference between a similarity of form and a similarity of content. If two equally aggressive countries are at war, there is a similarity of form between the political aspirations of two citizens each ardently fighting for victory (which there would not be if one were a pacifist); but if they belong to opposite sides, the contents of their aspirations are precisely opposite. So we will approach the problem in two stages, considering first whether, and in what sense, an individual can be said to make a rational choice in a given issue which is uniquely right for anyone in his position; and if so, proceeding to ask whether the rational choice of individuals in different positions, on the same political issue, would be likely to be similar. This may seem a pedantic enquiry. But before coming, in the next chapter, to irrational causes of political conflict, it seemed desirable, in this one, to discover what the theoretical limits of agreement would be among people who were rational.

* * *

Unlike science, politics goes beyond pure contemplation; it proceeds from the assessment of what is to the choice of what should be. Now this passage from assessment to choice, from the detached attitude of science to that of practical affairs, usually involves a change in our orientation to our world-model. In scientific imagination we get outside it and look at it objectively. In our practical affairs we feel ourselves to be at its centre and look at it subjectively. And, in changing our point of view, we may pass from a mood in which everything seems to be determined, to one in which much depends on our free will.

Looked at scientifically from without, the question of choice does not arise; for even our own acts of will, which we think of as determining a section of the future, appear to be as rigidly determined by a section of the past. And, even if we qualify this picture by introducing an element of indeterminateness, of unpredictability or chance, we are still as far as ever from seeing ourselves from without as uncaused causes of events. But as soon as we put ourselves back into the middle of the picture we are confronted by immediate problems of free choice—with the inescapable necessity

to make decisions, if only the decision to do nothing, which determine what shall be.

Looked at from the centre, therefore, the term 'a possibility of experience'—and it is the totality of these that our world-model represents—has a more complex meaning with reference to the future than to the past. Referred to the past, a possibility of experience—for example, the Battle of Hastings—is that fixed, unalterable, and even pre-determined set of experiences we should have were we to return to Hastings on the appropriate day in 1066. But to Harold, marching from the North a few days before, it is one of a number of different sets still to be determined by his and William's decisions on the spot.

To those who fear doubt, there is something perilous about the passage from the contemplative to the practical position. Science, if it does not give certainty, seems at least to offer certainty—if less absolute than was formerly believed—as a theoretical ideal. There is only one true answer, whether it is known or not, to a question of fact. But we are far less certain that there can be only one right answer to a question of choice.

Sometimes, of course, the problem is comparatively simple. If there is no doubt about the end to be achieved, and if there is only one means to it, or if one is more efficient, more economical of effort than the others, the choice of this is uniquely right. And if more than one are equally efficient, the choice of any of these is right, though not uniquely.

For those who feel safe only when they can feel certain, the more serious problem arises when what has to be chosen seems to be the end itself. But this I think is a mistaken formulation. We may seek our ends in the most irrational way; for example, we sometimes manipulate the external world for no other purpose than that of achieving a symbolic defence against imaginary dangers in the inner one. But the ends we do seek—whether rationally or not—are always given, ultimately, by our instincts. There can, therefore, be no question of having to choose them. But if they are unconscious, we may have to discover what they are; and this may be the more difficult if what has to be discovered is in some sense a compromise, the resultant of impulses which in some degree conflict.

This difficulty exists only so far as the impulses are not fully

conscious. If they are, the resultant compromise is always apparent. We may desire riches and know that they can be most quickly got by bumping someone off. But if we also abhor murder, we have no difficulty in discovering our resultant aim, which is to get rich without destroying life. The main function of consciousness is to decide priorities, or to arrange compromises of this kind. But if the conflict remains unconscious, instead of a clear-cut compromise, there may be a deadlock—a paralysing sense of indecision. Thus, while doubt about the choice of means to a given end springs from insufficient knowledge of the external world, doubt about the choice of end to be pursued springs from insufficient knowledge of ourselves, that is, from insufficient integration.

The overriding purpose, with which natural selection has tended to endow us, by the elimination of lines that least have it, is to have descendants that survive—to be immortal, if not in our own persons, then at least by proxy. The fact that we can prolong our lives by proxy, and only by proxy, has put a premium on the development of a conscience which sets bounds to our egoism and favours the survival of our descendants. Moreover, the way in which this conscience is formed, by the internalisation of parental figures, ensures that we should also be concerned about our siblings, and later their symbols: first the narrow group to which we belong, then the group to which it belongs, and so through widening circles, of diminishing affective cathexis, to the human race as a whole. Yet, if the overriding purpose is to be achieved, some egoism is also necessary, first on our own behalf—for without it, we might not live long enough to have descendants—and then on behalf of these descendants as opposed to the descendants of others. There is, therefore, always some sense of conflicting forces, between which a compromise, or resultant, has to be found.

In a state competing with other states, the conflict is sometimes departmentalised. The military staff are taught to be clear about their aim and not to qualify it even if the best means to its achievement is ruthless, the qualifying role of conscience being taken over by the Foreign Office. We should note, however, that the Foreign Office is concerned to mitigate the rigour of a purely military aim only in so far as this seems desirable to win allies, or in the long run to lessen the desire for revenge in the defeated foe.

It functions, therefore, like a conscience which is perfectly subordinated to the overriding aim of national survival.

This type of conscience, which never impedes but always furthers the survival of our descendants, is what natural selection might be expected to foster. But, if so, nothing so perfectly utilitarian has yet been evolved in us. Even if our conscience is completely normal in the sense of being founded on a true picture of the inner world, it is not perfectly subordinated to the final purpose which natural selection tends to implant in us. It permits us a certain degree of egoism, and imposes on us a certain degree of self-sacrifice, which are on the whole in the interests of the survival of our line. But it does not discriminate according to utilitarian criteria alone; some forms of self-sacrifice as well as some forms of ruthlessness are impossible to normal man, even in those exceptional circumstances in which they are clearly necessary for the achievement of this end.

But although the resultant aim of a wholly integrated person might still be less racially utilitarian than that which, at first sight, we might expect evolution to give him, it is in fact what evolution has so far given. His problem is to discover, not to choose it; and when he has done so, his only remaining problem is that of the choice of the most efficient means to its fulfilment—a problem which is factual, and in general soluble for an individual.

Moreover, since the innate aims of different individuals are similar, so, too, would be the choices they would be likely to make in any given situation, provided they were aware of their innate aims and understood the situation.

We may now turn to the second, more interesting, question. For what we want to know is whether everyone, if rational, would come to the same conclusion on any given political issue, regardless of their personal position as a member of some group. Since opposite answers have been given, the question can hardly be as simple as perhaps it seems.

* * *

So far as politics is a conscious rational activity[1] it is concerned with the choice of laws and a constitution for a state—and, in its

[1] To a great extent politics would seem to express an unconscious group activity which is by no means rational; but this aspect of it is deliberately omitted in this chapter.

widest sense, for the world as a whole. In politics, therefore, the individual is concerned not only with the choice of a policy which is best for him and his descendants, but also with persuading others that it is also best for them. Only within the limits to which this can be done is politics amenable to rational argument. Outside them, decisions against the real interest of others can be achieved only by either force or guile.

Opinions differ widely as to where these limits lie. At the one extreme, Machiavelli, in his advice to Princes, seems to take it almost for granted that their interests conflict with those of the people they govern, and that the interests of both conflict with the interests of other powers. For the advice he gives is concerned much less with persuasion by rational argument than with the intelligent employment of force or guile.[1] And a similar opinion was held by those thinkers, like Treitschke or Houston Chamberlain, who were obsessed by one aspect only of the Darwinian concept of a struggle for existence, and believed that nothing could be settled without the threat, or actuality, of war. At the other extreme, the idealist who believes that a little reason ought to solve all the conflicts of the world, clearly starts from the assumption that everyone's interests are ultimately the same.

The truth, we may think, must lie between these two extremes. But we must beware of too sharp and simple a distinction between cases in which agreement by argument on the choice of a policy is possible, because the interests of the individuals are identical, and those in which it might appear impossible because their interests diverge. Looked at from the point of view of a struggle for survival, where the competition between each family and the rest has been dwarfed by the vertical or horizontal conflicts between classes or nations, the problem of the limits of rational argument must appear deceptively easy of solution. For we are tempted to suppose that, while the best means to defeat a common enemy can be arrived at by rational argument among our friends, no rational argument can persuade the enemy group to prefer our survival to its own—a survival which may be as surely, though

[1] In fairness to Machiavelli it should be said that his cynicism may have been derived from the belief, not that the interests of Prince and People were inevitably opposed, but that the governed, like difficult children, were too immature to follow a rational argument for the acceptance of what was in their interests.

more slowly, threatened by an economic as by a military defeat.

But what is here ignored are the conditions which conscience may impose upon our final purpose. If the type of conscience we tended to develop were perfectly utilitarian, perfectly adapted to promote the survival of our line, it might come into operation only for this purpose. We should identify ourselves only with our descendants (real or symbolic) and instrumentally with the members of our group, and endeavour to protect them by every means within our power, while remaining totally indifferent to the fate of our opponents.[1] In war-time this attitude may seem to be achieved. But, in fact, we then become not merely indifferent to the enemies we kill in order to survive. We also feel sadistically about them, whether as individuals they are responsible or not; and this may well go beyond the bounds of what is likely to be useful. Moreover, a war-time conscience, even if it really is an example of the type which evolution might be expected to foster in us, has the character of an archaic regression from the peace-time type of conscience we normally have; and this discriminates in a very different way.

In the inner world, as laid down in infancy, there is nothing beyond the family. And if this contains a true picture of understanding parents, they demand that siblings too should be treated with understanding. So far, of course, as the original splits have not been healed, there will be good and bad siblings as well as good and bad parents, which are later likely to become identified with the in- and the out-group respectively. But if the inner world picture is a true one, these splits will have been healed, so that it will no longer be possible to discriminate between good and bad solely on a basis of propinquity. In other words, people will tend to be loved or hated, more for the qualities realistically perceived in them as individuals, and less according to the group they happen to belong to. Conscience will require them all to be treated as at least potentially good siblings identified with acknowledged aspects of the self; so that, even if they belong to a competing out-

[1] See Sir Arthur Keith, *Essays on Human Evolution*, 1946. So far as we do identify ourselves with our own group in this way we satisfy our conscience towards it (often at the cost of our narrower self-interest); but we come in conflict with that part of our conscience which has a wider field of concern. The moral problems that arise in this way cannot be avoided. The least we can do is to try to find optimum solutions. But this is to anticipate a point which will be discussed more fully later.

group, it will be impossible to remain indifferent to their fate, or to destroy them without scruple.

If this type of conscience is not perfectly adapted to the end of the survival of our own group and line, it is difficult to see how evolution could have managed better without depriving us of some of the intelligence which, for other purposes, it has conferred upon us. For, in order to love and hate solely on the basis of group membership, we should have to lose our capacity to form true pictures of individuals. In war-time we do often lose this power, and revert to a paranoid-schizoid mode of thought which distorts reality: we over-idealise our own side and unduly blacken the other—though sometimes, with an equal or a greater perversity, we may reverse this process and over-idealise the enemy. But the more stable is our knowledge of ourselves, and therefore of others, the harder it is for us to lose our wisdom, or the humanistic type of conscience which is an inevitable consequence of it. And this sets a limit to the ruthlessness with which, in politics or war, we can pursue our own group interests at the expense of other groups.

A humanistic conscience does not, of course, demand a blind and undiscriminating love of all mankind irrespective of quality. It discriminates between people—in the same way as it discriminates between different aspects of the self—in the main according to their moral character, and implies the ability to form correct assessments of them. If this were the only type of discrimination it employed, it might be possible to prove that politics could be wholly reduced to rational discussion. For then a universally accepted correct assessment of the character of individuals, or of groups, would lead to a universally agreed arrangement of priorities for their support: a decision in favour of the interests of A over those of B, or of B over those of C, would be accepted even by those adversely affected by it. But although it is theoretically possible for us to achieve a common and correct assessment of what people are—for this is a matter of ascertainable fact—and therefore a greater similarity in our evaluations of them, minor innate differences between us would still prevent such evaluations from being identical. Moreover, even if they were, to base priorities solely upon objective evaluations would be possible only to those who identified themselves with God as the just and impartial Father of the human race. And this identification, involv-

ing as it must the violent denial of those specific affections inevitably acquired by any human being, is incompatible with sanity. No normal parent could conscientiously prefer the survival of someone else's children, even if he evaluated them objectively as superior to his own.

My point is that there may be a conflict, not only between self-interest and the demands of a humanistic conscience, but also within the conscience itself which may have to find a resultant compromise between the special claims of propinquity and the general claims of merit. Each claim imposes a barrier to the extent to which the other can be met.[1] The resultant compromise is somewhere between the two extremes. And to the extent to which propinquity decides the issue, the compromise is relative, in content though not in form, to the location in social space of each individual.

* * *

If the argument so far is right, we can form a clearer notion of the theoretical limits of rational argument in politics. With regard to disputes between the members of an in-group whose interests coincide concerning policies to be adopted in competition with an out-group, agreement by rational argument is in general theoretically possible. For, in general, it can be found to be a fact that one means to this end is better, or more efficient, than the rest. And even if it should turn out that more than one are equally efficient, all the in-group members could in theory be convinced that the choice between them was a matter of difference. So much is obvious. But we can now add to it that the choice, though certainly in the interests of the in-group, will involve some concession to those of the out-group too. For this reason, the more complex case of disputes between members of two groups whose interests con-

[1] From an evolutionary point of view, the two barriers are not perhaps quite on the same footing. If our forefathers had not put us first, we should not have existed to inherit their excess of out-group altruism. In-group egoism can, therefore, never be bred out of the race—except, of course, by an artificially imposed system of selection such as we apply to animals. The other barrier, which limits and restricts our in-group egoism, is the by-product of an intelligence which compels us to perceive people more as they are, and not solely in terms of their group membership. And this intelligence, this capacity to see the truth, if it should imperil the survival of groups that most have it, might conceivably be bred out of the race by natural selection. One may suppose, however, that it has too many compensating advantages to suffer such a fate.

flict, if less easy of solution than the idealist wishes to believe, is also less irreducibly refractory than the cynic supposes it to be. Always assuming that each group's assessment of the other is correct—that no blackening or over-idealisation distorts the picture—each group's desire for its own advantage will be tempered by sympathy for its rival. In other words, the span of disagreement will not be the yawning chasm between two alternative absolute victories, each involving the annihilation of the other party, but the relatively narrow gap between two alternative advantages, neither of which leaves the defeated party destroyed or even very much despoiled.

This gap, relatively narrow though it may be, cannot, however, be bridged by rational argument alone. Therefore the issue, so far as it lies within this gap, can only be decided by the relative strength of the two groups concerned. It is not argument, but strength or the knowledge that it exists, which must force the weaker to give way—and in the knowledge that they have received some consideration in not being made to sacrifice still more. Indeed, always providing that the mutual assessments are correct, the bitterness of defeat will be as much tempered by an element of gratitude as will the joy of victory by an element of depressive guilt.

It is worth noting that, if the material assessments are also correct, no actual trial of strength would occur, since its outcome would be pre-known. In other words, the issue would be decided by negotiation without the actual use of force.

In practice, the major impediments to political agreement by rational argument alone spring far more from the distorted pursuit of ends, and from the wrong choice of means, because of misassessments of facts—especially psychological facts—than from any irreducible conflict of interest. But before considering what can be done to remove these other impediments, it seemed desirable to remind ourselves that there is a struggle for existence, which, though mitigated by conscience, imposes a limit to what could be achieved by rational argument, beyond which the influence of relative strength comes into play.

CHAPTER X

On Avoidable Sources of Conflict

THAT in a limited world with an expanding population the welfare of one group—whether class, party or nation—can often be secured only at the cost of other groups is a fact we may deny but cannot escape. Conscience, and the capacity to identify with the members of another group, may mitigate the ruthlessness of competition. But it cannot altogether outweigh, and is itself influenced by, the claims of propinquity. To be without preferences based on propinquity, we should have to adopt the standpoint of an omniscient God who loved all His children equally, or perhaps in accordance with their actual merits as correctly perceived by Him. But we cannot identify with God without denying the fact that we are men with limited families of our own (including symbolic ones) which have special claims upon us. No conscience, so far as it is normal, can ignore this fact or fail to operate somewhat more strongly in favour of those near us than in support of strangers. Though it inhibits gratuitous aggression and prevents us acquiring what our group desires by the violent robbery of others, it does not prevent us giving some priority to the interests of our group, and would afflict us if we failed to defend them when threatened.

For these reasons, complete agreement between the members of a group is theoretically possible only in matters that affect its collective security and welfare—that is, particularly in its 'foreign policy'. In its 'domestic policy', so far as this affects, as it usually does, the relative welfare of sub-groups within itself, complete agreement is not even theoretically possible. And from this it follows that a policy for mankind as a whole, which must be domestic (so long as we are confined to one planet), can never be unanimously accepted.[1]

[1] It is often said nowadays, under the threat of the atom bomb, that the only obstacle to peace is a failure to realise that the interests of all peoples are ulti-

So much is really obvious, and is repeated here only because of our tendency to find it unpleasant and forget it. But ineradicable conflict of interest is by no means the sole, or indeed the most important, impediment to political agreement. Most of the bitterness of disagreement, and much of the disagreement itself, springs rather from the kind of irrationality discussed in Chapter V. We there distinguished three types of it. In the first two, the life aim itself is interfered with by being, either abandoned as hopeless in the inner world and replaced by action to allay anxiety, or pursued in the inner world by means of psychotic defences in the interests of which the external world is compulsively manipulated. In the third type, the inner disturbances operate in a less fundamental way to distort, not the aim in the outer world, but only the perception of the best means to its achievement. Common to all three types of irrationality is a false or inadequate picture of the self and of the inner world, and so also of the outer. But as self-ignorance is more pronounced in the first two, I shall here use it as a heading to discuss them both under, while dividing the third into two different categories with respect to two different kinds of ignorance about the external world. That is to say, political disharmony, so far as it is theoretically avoidable, will be discussed as resulting from the following three kinds of ignorance: First, through a partial ignorance of ourselves, we may choose aims differing from those chosen by someone, in the same position, who is more integrated, and more conscious of his motives. Secondly, even if our aim is undisturbed, we may, through a partial ignorance of people, choose a means to its achievement which differs from, and so conflicts with, that more aptly chosen

mately the same. I take this to mean that, since the struggle for existence has become so dangerous to all concerned, it is in their common interest to stop competing. To effect this there would soon have to be a general agreement to maintain the ecological *status quo* under which all nations would stabilise their populations—presumably by imposing a limit on the number of children any family was allowed to have. We may note in passing that an arrangement of this kind, if carried out fairly and without discrimination, would also maintain a biological *status quo* in which there could be no progress or degeneration. But even if fair, it would never, I think, be unanimously accepted. So whether it was done fairly, or in the interests of some racial or class prejudice, or eugenic principle, it would I am convinced have to be imposed by a central authority. Perhaps the future historian will see the ideological disputes of this time as secondary to a larger issue: namely, the determination—and by no means by rational argument alone—of the group which will in future exercise this power over the ecological and biological future of our species.

by someone who knows them better. And lastly, we may do this through a partial ignorance of some abstract science, for example, economics.

The study, and so the reduction, of the first two kinds of ignorance—about ourselves and about people—clearly falls within the scope of psycho-analysis. The third—ignorance of other sciences such as economics—would seem, as clearly, to fall outside it. But although these sciences themselves are independent, there is often a 'resistance' to their development, or to the acceptance of what they have to teach, which is psychological, and may have to be understood psychologically before it can be reduced. That the general level of employment can be influenced by inflationary or deflationary policies may seem obvious to us now. But, unless there was some resistance to this knowledge, it is not easy to understand why it took so long to acquire, or why, after it was acquired largely through the work of Lord Keynes, it was not more quickly applied to the relief of the great slump, which was itself one of the causes of the rise of Hitler and so of the Second World War. No doubt, experts like Montague Norman, who opposed inflation as a remedy for unemployment, were influenced by a rational fear of its being used too much. But only an irrational resistance can account for what was then the lesser danger arousing the greater fear. That there would be such a resistance was indeed predicted in advance by Ernest Jones, who also described one of its unconscious causes.[1] Had it been more fully and more widely understood at the time, many subsequent calamities might not have occurred. For reasons of this kind, psychology is not confined only to the study of the first two types of ignorance, but must, of course with due caution, also concern itself with the third.

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One of the major conclusions of the earlier part of this enquiry, to which we must repeatedly return, is that a true picture of the inner world determines the capacity to form a true picture of the world of common sense.

There is a constant inter-action between the two—a projection of something in the self to form a picture of something in the

[1] See Ernest Jones' autobiography, *Free Associations*, 1959.

outer world alternating with a re-introjection. So long as these processes are functioning normally, they have a tentative, exploratory character which aids the growth of knowledge. In the projective phase, a new object can, as it were, be experimentally endowed with several facets of the self, or of internal objects, in turn, and observed to see which facet fits. Then, in the introjective phase, there will be an enhanced sense of what it is like to be this object, even if it differs in degree, though not in kind, from the quality of the self, or internal object, that was reflected in it. By this means, we learn to know, not only our neighbours, but inanimate objects too; a sensitive engineer, for example, projects himself into what he builds, and can judge, with a fair degree of accuracy, what load a beam will stand by sensing what it would 'feel like' to be the beam.[1] But if the defensive, and so compulsive, use of these and other mechanisms, which create the phantastic world of infancy, has not been overcome, the normal process of learning to know the world (including the self, which is a part of it) will be interfered with. The projective phase will always be liable, at least in some areas, to be used as a defence, and so to lose its tentative character; and because it is defensive—because of the reluctance to take back what has been defensively got rid of —the introjective phase will also be impeded. Moreover, what is projected will tend to be derived from an inner world that has retained its phantastic character.

We have now to consider some of the ways in which the unconscious survival of a phantastic inner world, together with the defence mechanisms responsible for creating it and keeping it unaltered, intensify, and extend the area of, political dispute.

* * *

We may begin with disputes arising from confusion about the end to be pursued.

The more a person knows himself, the more he is aware of the basic aims with which evolution has endowed him. This is immortality by proxy, a convenient term to cover a whole group of inter-related aspirations. At its core, is the wish to have descendants, and by furthering their interests, to provide for their

[1] Although this empathy does not enable him to dispense with calculations, it does, I think, help him to suspect and to find errors in them when they are wrong.

security. But it also involves the furtherance of symbolic children, works, causes and values, whether created by the self or, as it were, adopted from others. In unconscious phantasy, it involves the protection and service of the 'internal parents' who are felt to continue their lives in their real or symbolic descendants. And all this has to be done in accordance with a conscience, itself derived, if normal, mainly from love of these internal figures, which not only reinforces, but also qualifies the basic aim—widening it to include in some degree the human race, and even other species, and so preventing it from being ruthlessly parochial.

In politics, a person of this kind, without over-idealising members of his own group (party, class or nation) at the expense of their opponents, may be expected to have a strong sense of loyalty to them, tempered by an understanding consideration for other interests and a general sense of fairness. Moreover—and this is a point I first want to stress—he would be likely to have a long-term view which puts ultimate security before immediate satisfaction.

Now suppose that, instead of being a fully normal person, he has failed, in some degree, to work through the depressive position. There will then be an area in his inner world which he has never faced, and has therefore never been able to correct, containing an unrealistic picture of loved objects irreparably damaged by his phantasied attacks on them. To the extent that this is so, he will be predisposed to feel the ultimate goal to be extremely insecure. If the goal itself is not abandoned, despondency about its attainment need not affect its long-term pursuit. Indeed, it is then more likely to be pursued with the over-anxious compulsiveness of the miser, who forgoes all present satisfactions in his desperate endeavour to secure his future against every possible contingency. But a very common outcome is for the aim to be weakened, because it is too difficult, and replaced by the desire to find a short-term alleviation of despair. So far as this mechanism operates in us, we behave like a man who so over-estimates the power of his enemies (ultimately the destructive impulse in him) that he reacts to threats by getting drunk instead of at least trying to defend himself against them.

Freud long ago made the important distinction between the Pleasure Principle, under which each instinct component strives for immediate satisfaction regardless of the consequences to the

ego as a whole, and the Reality Principle which must predominate in us if we are to survive beyond the age of infancy. But as far as we have not faced some psychic reality in our inner world, we shall always be liable to avoid some aspects of outer reality as well, and to regress to the Pleasure Principle as a defence. The drunkenness I gave as an example has many psychological equivalents such as the obsessional pursuit of sexual or any other pleasure for the purpose of counteracting depression or anxiety; but common to them all is the replacement of a long by a short-term point of view.

Probably there is no greater danger to a state than a persistent tendency to do just this. History is full of examples of those which have perished through lack of foresight. And in the last half-century, our own has at least twice only narrowly escaped this fate.

The shadow of the first world war was unmistakably apparent for more than a decade before its materialisation. But those, like Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, who faced it, and wished to insure against it by adequate rearmament were hopelessly outnumbered by those who could or would not do so. Almost as long a period of warning preceded the second world war, but was as little heeded. Indeed, those who wished by rearming to prevent it were themselves denounced as warmongers. For to those who have replaced the aim of taking action against danger by the aim of taking action against the anxiety aroused by danger, the enemy is he who reminds them that enemies exist. So because the majority of us were too ill to face a possible disaster, while there was still time to take precautions, the disaster became actual.

In the economic field the short-term view can be almost as dangerous. Anyone who knew Germany and Austria during the period of uncontrollable inflation knows that this, too, can be a national disaster. But the long-term view, which accepts the need of restraint, and sometimes austerity, as a safeguard for the future, is seldom very popular.

Of course, normality in the psycho-analytic sense is not the only factor determining the wisdom or otherwise of our political aims. It is much easier for people who are well educated and comparatively wealthy to take the long view than for people who have no time to keep themselves informed about foreign affairs or econ-

omics because of their daily struggle to keep themselves and their families alive. But the capacity to face reality, first in the inner and then in the outer world, is an indispensable condition without which the long view is not possible at all.

It seems worth noting here that although the short view may prevail under any system of government, this danger has tended to be greater in states with governments dependent on popular support. Thus a condition for the survival of any democratic system is that there must be a stable majority of persons who are both mature enough to be capable of the long view and sufficiently free from current want to take it.

But the point we are immediately concerned with is that the whole conflict between the long and the short view, with which so much of politics is taken up, is theoretically avoidable. For if everyone were mature enough to look future dangers in the face (and sufficiently free from current want to do so) the long view would be generally accepted as and when required.

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People who become too easily depressed about the outer world are not only burdened by the unconscious sense of containing irreparably damaged good internal figures, with whom they often feel themselves to be identified; they have also lost that part of themselves which is capable of enjoying struggle. Too much of their aggression has been projected, in the first place intrapsychically, into bad figures who, for this reason, are alone felt to be capable of victory. In terms of religious experience, they feel as if they contained a dying god, the depository of all their good feelings with whom they are themselves associated, and that the spirit world has been given over to the devil, who is omnipotent because he has become the personification of all their own aggression. And if this is the state of their inner world, they must feel, in any crisis, the same despondency about the outer one.

But the inter-action between the inner and the outer world is always reciprocal. The emergence of an external tyrant reinforces the sense of the devil's omnipotence and deepens the underlying depression. The emergence of an external leader who is aggressive but on the side of the angels has the opposite effect of transferring to the inner god some of the omnipotence previously attributed to

the devil. And this, in turn, encourages a more optimistically aggressive attitude to the external enemy.

There is no doubt that England entered the second world war still largely in that state of depression which had prevented her from stopping it before it started. The devil, personified by Hitler, seemed almost omnipotent because he was the depository of our own lost aggression; and for the same reason, there was at first a fairly widespread lack of the more active forms of courage. This led to a needless period of vacillation, during the so-called cold war, between those who, against all the actual evidence, still blindly hoped that, if we did not provoke Hitler by attempting to defend our friends, he might not attack us, and those who now longed for active war against him—or at least for intensely active preparation.[1] If the nation was to be raised from this depressive lethargy, and so from impending destruction, it needed a leader who could feel and voice aggression, on the side of the angels and against the devil, and who by so doing could transfer it from one side to the other in people's inner worlds, so that they could regain an active form of courage. Whatever else Churchill did or did not do, he rendered us this service, which enabled us, at much cost, still to preserve our values and our freedom.

But what is again most relevant to our present purpose is that the cold war period of vacillation is another example of the kind of political disagreement that is theoretically avoidable. If an optimum degree of recovery from the depressive position of infancy had been achieved by all of us—a process involving the development of realistic pictures of our inner worlds—there might have been rational doubts about whether we could win the war, but there would have been no psychological defeatism. There would have been active courage, and agreement on the aim, from the beginning. Or rather, this would have been there before the beginning, so that the war might have been actively prevented.[2]

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[1] Of course it is important to distinguish between those who wanted active war at once, whether we were ready for it or not, and those who wanted it, as soon as we could get ready. Here there was a difference, not in aim, but of opinion on strategy and tactics.

[2] In the early stages of Hitler's preparation, for example, the mere threat of police action, had we been agreed on and ready for it, might have stopped him going into Austria.

Excessive fear of the aggressor does not, of course, always lead to a failure to take timely action. It may, if it exaggerates or invents a future threat, have the opposite effect of precipitating a supposedly 'defensive aggression' which is in fact gratuitous. And apart from the effects, one way or the other, of excessive fear, there may be a confusion between the 'protective aggression' of good objects and the destructive aggression of bad ones in the inner world which impedes discrimination in the outer. This may come about, for example, if there is an unconscious picture of a reluctant or rejecting mother, and so unconscious sympathy with a sadistic, raping father figure as opposed to a protective one. The result may be a tendency to support gratuitous aggression by one's own government; but we are here more concerned with the consequences of a secondary repudiation of aggression after a primary blurring of the difference between the purposes to which it is applied. Then the father who uses it to defend his family is unconsciously felt to be as bad as he who uses it for rape; and, in the outer world, police action to prevent a crime is denounced as worse—because it precedes the crime—than the plotting it is intended to frustrate.

People who respond in this way give the impression, to those whose conscience is more clear-cut, that they do not know the difference between 'right' and 'wrong'—at least in respect to the use of force—and do not believe that a difference exists. Or they believe that it exists only if brought into being by a legal definition on the part of an international authority. This is Ethical Relativism, which ignores the partial dependence of moral judgments on judgments of fact, in the first instance of facts in the inner world, and therefore overstresses their dependence on the mores and laws of the society we happen to belong to. In the case we are discussing, I think the internal misjudgment consists in equating the protective aggression of good objects with the destructive aggression of bad ones. And this blurs the issue in the outer world as well. Of course it is often hard to tell whether a foreign power is plotting conquest or only struggling to be free, and whether any proposed counter measures on our side are preventive or repressive, and in general whether or not they are in the ultimate interests of peace. But the inner confusion delays a clear and accurate assessment of external affairs. The plotter may have to commit

his crime before enough people are convinced that he is a criminal to permit their government to act against him; and by that time police action is too late.

Confusion of this kind is allied to defeatism, because the confused person has no strong internal figure he can trust. For this reason, he tends to distrust those of his own leaders who show signs of strength and is over-ready to doubt the justice of their cause.

* * *

We have been speaking of cases in which the basic aim of species preservation seems to be, at least temporarily, abandoned. This happens, I think, only as the result of despair about the self, and its good internal objects, being too damaged or threatened by destructive impulses to be repaired or saved. But the aim can be compromised (otherwise than by a normal conscience) in various abnormal ways as the result of lesser disturbances.

One of these comes rather close to the defeatism we have been discussing. For the basic aim does seem to be abandoned in the external world. But it is not abandoned internally, so, instead of conscious despair, or a flight into immediate pleasure, there is a partial retreat into the inner world where alone the struggle is continued.

The underlying defence mechanism here is that the split between good and bad, which usually runs through both worlds, in this as in other respects mirroring each other, occurs between them, the internal one being kept good by projecting all the badness into the outer. Extreme cases of this kind, in which the external world is abandoned altogether in despair, are known as autistic.[1] But all of us periodically revert to such defences, and some, without being fully autistic, make use of them continually. They may turn, for example, to the world of religion, or, like some scholars, retain contact with a part only of the external world, which because of its remoteness can stand for an inner world at peace. By this means the fate of the current external world becomes a matter of indifference compared with the supreme importance of the abstract world

[1] See, for example, Rodrigue, 'The analysis of a three-year old mute schizophrenic', in *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis*, edited by Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann and myself.

of thought they live in. Here only are their creative and reparative impulses unhampered by despair, and here they carry on the struggle. If, in times of crisis, people of this kind awake to current reality, their underlying despair becomes apparent. They feel the world is going to the dogs and that there is nothing they can do about it.

* * *

Even when the aim of group preservation is actively maintained in the external world, it may be severely compromised in many ways. But, so far as these are clinically abnormal—that is, a product of self-ignorance—one general formula perhaps explains them all: namely, the aim is pursued in the inner world by an inappropriate means, which, in the outer world, almost becomes the end to be pursued.[1]

Most of them probably involved the sort of 'projective-identification' described in Chapter V. That is to say, they involve compulsive attempts to force good or bad parts of the self—felt to be incapable of fusion inside, or even of co-existence—into other people in the outer world. I will try to show the operation of this mechanism in politics by two examples, one general, the other more specific; but common to them both is the partial loss of what might appear to be more basic aims through the overemphasis of what is at best instrumental to them, and may not be even that.

The life aim in the inner world (which is a specific form of the aim of self- and species-preservation) is to preserve good internal objects against the bad ones which epitomise or personify the ego's own split-off aggression intra-psychically projected into them. Its achievement depends on the predominance of love over hate; and since all the grounds for hatred are increased by ignorance of the mechanisms involved, self-knowledge tends to tip the scale in favour of the love and so facilitates success. But there are various alternatives. Instead, for example, of learning to understand the causes of the hate, efforts may be made to prevent situations which arouse it from occurring. The major situations of this kind are the sense of deprivation, and the jealousy aroused by the belief that someone else is enjoying what the ego is de-

[1] This is an abbreviation of the formula given in Chapter V.

prived of; and these can be prevented only by subjecting the internal family to a rigorous control. The baby would like to bind his good mother to him always; he would like to prevent her paying any attention to a sibling, whose feeding can arouse the greatest jealousy, and above all to prevent his parents from having any mutual pleasure from which he is excluded. And, in his inner world, where phantasy rules supreme, he can project a domineering part of himself into the internal replicas of his family—both to keep them to himself and to inflict on them all the deprivations and painful jealousies he has suffered. In unconscious phantasy he may also persuade himself that all this rigorous control is for their good.

Thus the means, which is to control in order to prevent jealousy from destroying good objects, becomes an aim, first in the inner world, and later in the outer world as well. So, in politics, the aim of species preservation, normally expressed in a concern for security and welfare, may become swamped by the pursuit of sociological fads, which are at best of secondary instrumental value to the basic aim, and sometimes inimical to it. In accordance with the unconscious jealous purpose in the inner world, in the outer, people are to be stopped, for example, from smoking or drinking or from indulging in some other vice, the injuriousness of which is disproportionately stressed. Or they are to be subject to all sorts of economic controls, the practical value of which (except in crises) as compared with the inconveniences is sometimes so overstressed as to leave no doubt that they are really being advocated for their own sakes and apart from their instrumental purpose.

Conversely, of course, there are people who are over-impatient of control even when it is necessary or useful. Their psychology is not so very different; but they have gone a step farther in that they have projected the spitefully controlling part of their own egos and see it in anyone who wants to control them, whether for their good or not. The one type is often easily converted into the other with changes from power to opposition.

In both cases, the control so obsessively desired or resisted is, in the first instance, an internal one. He who obsessively desires to impose it really wishes to project a tyrannical part of himself to become a 'conforming conscience' in others, and falls back on

external sanctions only when angered by recalcitrance; while he who obsessively resists these sanctions sees in them an aspect of his own super-ego with which he is at war because it now contains a split off tyrannical aspect of himself.

It follows, of course, that control versus freedom will become an issue in itself between them, and so incapable of being considered objectively with respect to an over-riding aim which, otherwise, they might have agreed on.

* * *

In the case of the controlling motive, what was in fact a spiteful aim in the unconscious is concealed behind conscious good intentions. But sometimes the spite comes much more into the open. Biologically, aggression is instrumental to species preservation. It operates either directly in the defence of the group, or in the interests of self-preservation so far as this is instrumental to species preservation. In particular, it operates in man in the service of sympathy for those who are felt to be oppressed. But the desire to right wrongs may become swamped by the desire for vengeance for its own sake. There are people in whom the revenge motive easily predominates over all other considerations: they will sacrifice their own and their friends' lives to it. And when we remember how often this attitude has been institutionalised, as a cultural norm, in the blood feuds of peoples among whom retributive justice has not yet been taken over by the state, we must suppose it to be far commoner than we like to admit and at least dormant in all of us. Indeed, the clamour aroused by any proposal to make justice educational rather than retributive, and so a better instrument of security, suggests that most of us have only projected our revenge motive into the state and have by no means outgrown it.

We are apt to take the desire for revenge for granted. But since we are the only species that appears to have it, and since it seems to be more inimical than otherwise to species preservation, it in fact presents a problem. And there is another curious point about it: where revenge predominates, the hated person is pursued with as much tenacity as the object of a passionate devotion.

All this can be fairly easily explained as the external manifestation of an early layer of the inner world produced by paranoid-

schizoid defences. There, hated objects are split-off aspects of loved ones, and partly for this reason they are pursued with the same tenacity. Moreover, since they are the carriers of the ego's own envious and jealous hatred of his good objects, these are felt to be in continual jeopardy as long as the bad ones exist. Therefore their annihilation becomes a matter of the first priority. But because of their nature—because bad objects are bad in virtue of their containing bad split-off parts of the self, over which the self has lost control—their annihilation is psychologically impossible. No sooner is one 'host' destroyed, than another takes its place. Indeed, in those nightmares which reveal the inner world, the destruction of one persecutor often ends only in his multiplication—as if, in the process of destroying him as a whole object, each fragment comes alive as a new and greater menace—with the result that the good self and the good internal objects are felt to have become much more threatened, instead of more secure.

As we know, however, there is one hidden gain: by projecting bad parts of the self intropsychically into bad internal objects, the ego preserves itself from depressive guilt about its own hatred of what it loves. In order to avoid this sense of guilt, a false, one-sided, picture of the self as good has to be maintained, and to this end, the very security of the good self and of its good objects is sacrificed.

All this takes place primarily in the inner world, which in turn distorts the picture of, and behaviour in, the outer. I have said that the desire to right wrongs easily degenerates into the desire for mere revenge. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that it easily regresses to it; for I think the desire to right wrongs, or to defend the oppressed, is a kind of purified derivative of the primitive, paranoid, desire for vengeance. The difference is that he who defends the oppressed in a realistic way has been able to accept responsibility, first in his inner world, for his own oppressions. For this reason, the distinction he makes between good and bad figures outside is no longer under the influence of a compulsive projection of bad parts of himself in order to deny his guilt, so that his assessments can be realistic. But in the process of defending the oppressed, it is easy to overstep the mark; and if the sense of guilt aroused by doing so is denied and projected, a cumulative regression to the revenge motive can easily take place.

The political expression of this attitude is often, though by no means always, obvious. After any war which has become embittered, there is usually a demand for vengeance—and in the name of the very security which, in fact, takes second place to it. There was a demand for vengeance after the Napoleonic wars, which Wellington, owing to his unique prestige, was able to ignore. He aimed at maximum security and minimum humiliation, and so achieved, apart from lesser wars,[1] a hundred years of peace. After the second world war his priorities seem almost to have been reversed. Maximum humiliation with minimum security produced a quick repetition of the threat.[2] The issues were complicated after the second world war by the emergence of a different threat—this time from one of our allies—and if there was more concern for security and less for vengeance (except against convicted individuals), this may have been one of the reasons. But the old controversy between those who wanted vengeance for its own sake, though ostensibly to prevent a repetition, and those whose genuine concern was for security, of course recurred.

Such disagreements clearly reflect differences between a paranoid-schizoid and a relatively post-depressive inner world, and would not arise between persons who were all mature. In other words, they are theoretically avoidable.

The revenge motive in and after war is easy to detect. But it is often, though less openly, present in domestic politics. And since it may be present in one and absent in another sphere of our interests, it may operate in us even when we believe we have understood and outgrown it. Thus people, for example, who are most anxious, on grounds of security as well as of humanity, to substitute education for retribution in the treatment of delinquents may, without knowing it, remain vindictive towards their political opponents. In this way a superfluous element obtrudes into disagreements which, though themselves theoretically insoluble by argument, are made more bitter than they need be. There might, for example, sometimes be rational grounds for wishing to coerce employers' federations on the one hand, or trade

[1] That is, wars which did not involve Europe as a whole.

[2] By the time Hitler was coming into power, we had begun to feel guilty about our revenge of 1919 and this contributed to the state of paralysis which prevented early action against him.

unions on the other, which the revenge motive may exaggerate, the better to conceal itself.

There are many other ways in which the basic aim may be abnormally compromised, but those mentioned are perhaps sufficient to illustrate the kind of mechanisms involved, and their effect in widening the area of disagreement.

* * *

The distinction between the pursuit of an abnormal aim as the result of self-ignorance and the choice of an inappropriate means as the result of ignorance of the external world is somewhat artificial—since the two sorts of ignorance are linked. But it provides convenient headings. The second of these can again be sub-divided into ignorance about people and ignorance about other sciences.

As to ignorance about people, it is clear that this leads to the choice of unsuitable instruments to fulfil our aims; and, in politics, the unsuitable choice of rulers may be followed by disaster. But I shall be concerned here rather with the misunderstandings between groups of people which may lead to a failure to solve national problems, or to an atmosphere in which agreed solutions are made unnecessarily difficult to find.

Ignorance about people stems either from an inability to identify with them in some respect, in which they remain enigmatical to us, or from a defensive projection into them of something only in ourselves, so that we not only fail to understand but actively misunderstand them.[1]

As to a passive failure to understand, this is nearly always the result of an unconscious fear of what we might find in them. And what we are most afraid of finding in them corresponds with what we are most afraid of facing in our inner worlds—figures which arouse either depressive or persecutory anxiety. Most of us dislike being made depressed, and are aware of a resistance to be overcome in listening to other people's troubles, especially if there

[1] This formulation is, I hope, wide enough to include such distortions as arise in our picture of others when we deprive them of the good qualities they have, or endow them with good qualities which they have not got. For the one presupposes the projection of an envious, greedy, robbing part of ourselves which is followed by the projection of our own sense of worthlessness; while the other springs from a too urgent need to project idealized internal figures on to the external world as a defence against a sense of persecution.

is nothing much we can do to help. For this reason, we tend to remain blind to them unless they are forced on us, and then we may brush them aside with rather shallow reassurances. We also dislike being made afraid, almost as much as we dislike being made depressed. And for this reason we may also be slow to notice when people are hostile to us.

A political example of a failure to understand is to be found, I think, in the average attitude of upper and middle class England to the social consequences of the industrial revolution. At that time, the division into two classes—two nations as Disraeli called them—was more pronounced than at any other period of this country's history; and the standard of living for what were called the 'masses' perhaps reached its lowest ebb. Moreover, while this situation developed relatively quickly, the ruling classes were slow to take it in, or to see what was happening to their country. In other words, they suffered from a partial blindness about their own industrial population as a defence against depressive or persecutory anxieties.

And when the state of affairs became so critical that it could no longer be ignored, one still has the impression of activity on side issues, which, though partly instrumental to the main one of alleviating distress, also served in some degree to divert attention from it.

If men had been half-starved because of the corn laws, and if their votes had been needed to repeal them, the franchise would have been directly instrumental to the alleviation of distress. But in itself it would still have been a side issue to half-starving men. And when we remember that the corn laws were repealed before the franchise was very much enlarged, it begins to look as if the franchise, however important in itself, was used as a diversion. In some degree this may have been true of the corn laws themselves, since the immediate effect of their repeal was much less damaging to the countryside, and much less helpful to the towns, than had been predicted.

Again, to a woman who could hardly feed her children, factory acts to stop their being employed must, at first sight, have seemed a dubious advantage. It is true that, so far as the restrictions on the employment of children resulted in the employment of their previously unemployed fathers, quick benefits may have been

achieved. But it was sympathy for the children, rather than for their fathers whose plight was far less emotionally appreciated, that caused these Acts to be passed—in spite of current economic theory which predicted an adverse effect on employment as a whole. So their effect in increasing the employment of the fathers does not seem to have been generally intended or foreseen. In the long run too, these Acts, together with those imposing Education, may well have done more than tax-free corn to raise the economic standard. For while the direct effect was to raise the mental standard, the indirect one was to increase the economic productivity, and decrease the biological fecundity, of the population, so that a more favourable balance between the two inevitably raised the economic standard. But still less was this important contribution to the main issue generally intended or foreseen.

The ruling classes of the time were rooted in the countryside. They were by no means excessively selfish or obtuse. Charity was part of their religion, in spite of the *laissez-faire* doctrine that it was economically unsound. In many respects they understood, and conscientiously applied, the art of government as well as, or better than, any ruling class before them. But, I think because they were too frightened of the problem, they do not seem to have understood the towns.

Even if they had been able to understand what it felt like to be a factory worker, the problem might well have been beyond them. So far as the population was increasing faster than production, there was no immediate means by which standards could have been maintained. And so far as trade cycles periodically depressed standards below subsistence level, current economic theory was inadequate to enable the monetary causes to be clearly isolated or intelligently controlled. But if the ruling classes had been more able to tolerate the amount of depression and anxiety which identification with a starving and an angry people would have required, they might have been able to keep the main issue more continually in mind. To have been able to do this would have also involved a capacity to face the conflict which would have been aroused by their not making the sacrifices at once demanded of them by their conscience and their sympathy and condemned by their economic theory as injurious. That their failure to become fully conscious of this conflict probably delayed the revision of the

theory, and so the solution of the problem, is a point to which I will return.

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Not understanding is conceptually distinct from, but often combined with, misunderstanding. Whenever, for example, a non-understanding of the masses by a ruling class amounts to an ignoring of them, an element of contempt may be suspected, which results from a projection. If, in place of a just assessment of the self, and its internal objects, there is an unfused mixture of over-idealisation and denigration, one or other of the incompatible portraits tends to be projected. If the idealised aspect is projected, the result is a sense of inferiority as compared with others. But the projection of the denigrated aspect leads to contempt of others and arrogant conceit about the self. And this is a disease to which ruling classes are prone, as their wiser members know.

Arrogance is not, of course, confined to any class: a proletariat suddenly conscious of the strength of numbers can become intoxicated by it. But the members of a ruling class have responsibilities thrust upon them which, being unconsciously felt as parental, can be carried without strain only by those who have achieved an optimum degree of post-depressive harmony with good internal parents. For those who have not, there remains the choice between feeling inadequate or becoming arrogant; and the respect shown to their hereditary status favours a consciously arrogant identification with ancestors to whom they may unconsciously feel themselves to be inferior.

Moreover, contempt for the inferiority projected into others often also covers an envious denial of desired qualities in them. Thus the contempt which the intellectual and the sportsman may have for each other often covers a good deal of mutual envy. So, too, in the days when class distinctions were acute, the leisured man who despised the manual workers, probably envied their capacity to support themselves, and perhaps also envied, and feared, the power latent in their numbers. The worker, on his side, may have reciprocated the contempt, consciously because he compared the apparent uselessness of a class which did not physically toil, with his own utility, and unconsciously because he envied this class, not only its possessions, but also its education

and so its capacity for a different kind of work. Although the old duality of an educated and leisured ruling class and an uneducated working class has largely been replaced by a plurality of classes each with its specialist education, the same tensions sometimes reappear, for example, between executives and industrial scientists and between industrial scientists and engineers.

Whenever arrogance, contempt, and the envy often covered by it, form an element in the relation of one class, party or nation to another, there can be little chance of sufficient mutual understanding for an agreed solution of their common problems—still less for an agreed settlement of their political differences. Neither side will make much effort to understand the other's point of view; and, for this reason, each will be unable persuasively to expound its own.

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Contempt when combined with hatred often covers fear which underlies them both. But if the fear is conscious, the contempt is not easy to maintain. Since any group whose interests are incompatible with ours is at least a potential threat, fear is one of the basic political emotions. But the danger is seldom realistically assessed.

We have already considered cases in which external danger is denied, either because the inner threat is too great to be faced or because of a confusion between good and bad figures in the inner world or because of a combination of the two. We come now to cases in which there is an exaggeration of the external threat. In the inner world of the paranoid-schizoid position, a vicious circle of fear leading to hatred, and the projection of hatred to still more fear, builds up the picture of enemies who are indeed implacable; while the split-off halves of the originals of these same figures are idealised. And so far as these caricatures have remained unmodified in unconscious phantasy, they tend to be projected into the members of the out- and the in- group respectively. The result in politics is a distorted picture of the two opposing sides, and an atmosphere in which even debate is difficult and discussion never possible.

While in discussion the aim of both sides is to arrive at truth, that of debate is to defend an opinion, if necessary against the

truth. In Parliament, non-party issues are occasionally discussed; but most of the time is given to debate. At political meetings in the constituencies even debate may be abandoned, to be replaced by mere abuse. The speaker often seems hardly to be trying to convert anyone to his point of view; for he addresses himself solely to his supporters, praises his own side and belittles his opponents, who so far as they are there at all have come to interrupt rather than to argue. In other words, there is a regression to a paranoid-schizoid mode of thought.

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It would be agreeable if it were possible to show that such procedures are wholly inexpedient. At first sight they seem far more likely to antagonise than to convert an undecided voter. And, in general, an approach which freely admitted the imperfections of one's own side, which showed some sympathetic understanding of the other point of view before attempting to expose its errors, might be supposed to be far more effective. The classical example is in the disarming initial passages of Mark Antony's oration on the death of Caesar, and in the play at least it soon converts the Romans. I call it the 'Yes-but' argument,[1] and most politicians can use it when they want to. If, therefore, in spite of this they often use a 'mud-slinging' approach, which whitewashes their own side and abuses their opponents, they may be only simulating a paranoid-schizoid regression because they believe it to be better for their purpose, and often their immediate purpose is not to convert opponents but to counter defeatism in their own supporters.

This brings me to an unadmitted but important quality in our species. We know, of course, that we like to be on the winning side; but we are unwilling to perceive an unconscious urge in us, if need be, to change sides in order to be there. Changes of this kind which involve no genuine reformulation of opinion imply the betrayal of a previous allegiance. In the inner world there may be no initial doubt about the distinction between good figures, who are constructive and benevolent, and the bad ones, who are male-

[1] Arguments directed solely at our reason are either of a 'Therefore' or of a 'Because' type, which end or start with the thesis to be proved respectively. Those directed to the emotions tend to be either abusive or persuasive, that is, of the 'Mud-slinging' or 'Yes-but' types.

volently destructive. But if the bad ones are too much feared because of their omnipotent destructiveness, the temptation to side with them, and so save the self at the expense of the good ones, may be overwhelming. The most notorious recent example of this mechanism operating in the external world is the surrender of the German people, and many others too, to Hitler. In England we like to believe that we should have been immune to the Hitlerian approach—itself the classic example of argument by mud-slinging. Yet, in a less blatant form, this is the type of argument politicians often use on us. And if they seem to use it only to counter despondency, we must remember that despondency may be an intermediate step to a change of sides.

So the mud-slinging may, after all, be more effective than it first seemed, not only in retaining supporters but perhaps also in winning them. There are rare occasions when the two parties have the actual benevolent and malevolent characters of good and bad figures in the inner world; and then abuse by the 'good' side of the 'bad' one is realistic, and would be accepted as such by any audience that was rational. As a rule, however, it is effective only on this condition: that the political thinking of the audience to whom it is addressed is already too much affected by the paranoid-schizoid part of their unconscious inner worlds to be influenced by a more rational approach.[1]

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We have conveniently, if artificially, divided avoidable political conflicts into three groups: those in which differences of aim reflect, not differences of interest, but degrees of self-ignorance; those which arise from distorted and so conflicting pictures of our own and other groups, and their leaders; and those in which disagreement about some scientific principle, for example, in economics, impedes the achievement of a common aim. This last remains to be considered.

We think of Nature as reluctant to yield her secrets to the

[1] Floating voters are often supposed to be more rational than the ardent partisan. But they include those whose expectations are unreasonably high because they attribute a god-like omnipotence to the rulers of their choice, and who then turn, from pique, against the side they voted into power. If by so doing, they influence those who are predisposed to desert a losing side, into believing that it will not win next time, they may start one of those well known swings which are relatively independent of the actual record of a government.

curiosity of man. In fact, the difficulty lies far less in Nature than in man, who must overcome resistances in himself in order to advance in knowledge. Thus, he had to overcome his pride, as Freud has pointed out, before he could accept the world as a planet of the sun, his kinship with other animals, and, still worse, the extent to which he is not even the captain of his soul.

In economics, the field that most concerns us here, psychological factors would often seem to delay the discovery of truth. They have done so, and probably still do so, in many subtle ways; but perhaps two examples may be sufficient to illustrate the point.

Not so long ago, it was almost axiomatic among those with any pretensions to a knowledge of affairs, that the more an economy approximated to a system of *laissez-faire*, the better this would be for everyone. Yet, as a means of achieving the greatest good to the greatest number, *laissez-faire* suffered from at least two theoretical defects. The most obvious was this: that unless checked by graduated taxation, saving at compound interest by a number of people, most of whom start with no capital and the rest with varying amounts, must tend to a limitless inequality of wealth. Of course this limitless enrichment of the capitalist would be only in economic power, not in consumption—since an individual's direct capacity to consume is limited.[1] But, even if it deprived the rest of no more than economic power, this is still not to their advantage; and, by promoting the production of luxuries at the expense of necessities, it is, in fact, likely to deprive them of consumer goods as well.

The other serious defect of *laissez-faire* as a means of effecting the greatest good to the greatest number was exposed much later by Keynes. It is inherently unstable, and unless controlled by appropriate withdrawals or injections of credit, is subject to periodic oscillations, in the depressed phase of which the unemployed are liable to starve.

The system, therefore, as it was in the last century, needed at least two corrections: some degree of redistributive taxation and monetary control. But both aroused neurotic fears, in the first instance, about the inner world.

[1] A rich man cannot eat much more than a poor one, and many of the material goods he owns, such as large houses, are in some degree shared with his servants and his guests.

In normal development, the infant's fear lest he starve by losing his mother is gradually overcome by the phantasied incorporation of a good breast, which gives him a basis of security throughout his life. But the more this good breast is felt to have been stolen by force, rather than gratefully received, the less secure does he feel of its possession. And this fear is intensified if, as is often the case, he feels it to be stolen, not only from his mother but also from innumerable imaginary siblings whom he has, therefore, robbed of life. All these are felt to clamour for its return; so he feels persecuted or guilty as long as he withholds it. Yet he dare not give it up lest he starve himself.

Now every slump during the period of *laissez-faire* provided an external stimulus to reawaken these conflicts and these fears among the well-to-do. What was, in fact, required of them was to accept, as a permanent measure, some rather higher taxes, and to permit or require the banks to increase the supply of money during slumps. But in their unconscious phantasy, these modest demands seemed to threaten the complete draining away of the milk of life itself, both from their own bodies and from the mother-banks from which they drew their sustenance. Moreover, the identification of the starving masses with the imaginary siblings they had in phantasy deprived of life made them unconsciously feel that such lethal sacrifices were indeed required of them.[1] So they clung to a theory that charity—of which redistributive taxation and inflation was to them a form—did more harm than good. Of course, taxation or inflation may injure an otherwise free economy if carried to excess. But the exaggerated fear of them, which had an unconscious source, was, I think, a major factor in delaying the discovery of an effective means to alleviate distress. (And perhaps one result of the delay was to increase the risk of the remedies, which were used too late, being in fact used too much.)

Meanwhile Karl Marx, in his reaction to the faults and cruelties of *laissez-faire*, was producing some doubtful economic theory of

[1] To these basic unconscious fears of early infancy, many others belonging to later periods of childhood, for example, the fear of castration, are added. Incidentally, the unconscious phantasy of competition with other imaginary children for the breast appears to be so common that one begins to wonder whether it does not date from a very early pre-arboreal period when our pre-simian ancestors still had litters. As I have argued elsewhere, a theory of this kind does not imply the Lamarckian assumption of a racial memory.

an opposite kind. While the propertied classes had an exaggerated fear of their own destitution in the event of their being forced to contribute at all to the maintenance of others, these others had an exaggerated belief in the inexhaustibility of what was denied them. Marx, of course, was far too intelligent to subscribe, consciously, to this illusion. But early communism implied a belief—that the millennium would be achieved by spoiling the despoilers—which strongly suggests the picture of an inexhaustible breast, wilfully withheld, as the unconscious basis of his system. He was a man of some loyalties, and many hatreds, probably derived, in the first instance, from envy of his parents pictured as greedily keeping their inexhaustible goodness to themselves, and so depicted as altogether bad.[1] If so, this envious picture of bad parents was the prototype in his inner world of his later picture of the capitalists, in whom he denied the existence of any good at all (except perhaps in their role of the destroyers of feudalism). Here, then, is the most likely source of several errors in the ingenious theory he developed. His complete moral condemnation of all capitalists is concealed behind an apparently dispassionate survey of the system they represent. But his conviction of their utter and irremediable badness underlies everything he wrote about them. The values of *laissez-faire* are by him not merely corrected but reversed. What, to the old economists, was virtuous thrift, and is in fact a form of abstinence that, in itself, may have either selfish or unselfish motives, appears only as an evil form of greed. And such one-sided evaluations are sustained by distortions of fact. The capitalist-manager, by organising labour, enables it to produce far more than it could do without him; but this contribution is ignored, or rather denied, in the Marxian theory that the value of commodities consists solely in the effort of the workers. Lastly, there is his denial that the capitalist system could be—as since his time it has been—humanised from within. One has the impression that such a prospect would have appalled him, that he wanted the system to remain bad, and to get worse, in order that it could be destroyed. And his followers to-day still often seem to oppose reform, because it is the enemy of revolution.

[1] This may have been achieved in two stages: first envy of the mother for keeping the good breast to herself, and then, at the Œdipean level, envy of the father for keeping the good mother to himself.

A communist, no doubt, would justify this on the ground that palliatives can only delay the general prosperity which only his system could provide. But Russia has had to wait a long time for it; and even if the standard of living of her workers ever surpasses that in advanced capitalist countries, the cost in other values may not seem worth while. So the communist's dislike of reform is more probably to be derived from an unconscious fear of the guilt which might be aroused in him if he discovered any good in the parent figures he wishes to destroy.

At any rate, the communist theory that improvement can come only by revolution has proved itself to be as false as the *laissez-faire* theory that improvement can come only by leaving things alone. Both spring, as I have tried to show, from false pictures of the inner world, which have remained unfaced and, therefore, uncorrected. I do not believe that either could have been so dogmatically held, as both were, by anyone who had—so far as this is possible—worked through the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, and so achieved maturity, or what is the same thing, integration or self-knowledge. Therefore, all the violent controversies to which they have given rise belong, in my view, to those which, among rational people, would have been much more speedily resolved.

CHAPTER XI

On Political Philosophies

WHEREAS political science is supposed to confine itself to the impartial study of political causes and effects, political philosophy seems more often to enunciate the structure of an ideal state, the desirability and possibility of which is assumed to be self-evident. Thus political science, which is needed for the achievement of the aim, may become subordinate to political philosophy. But I think this relation should be reversed; for surely it should be part of the function of political science to question the truth of the assumptions of political philosophy.

That these assumptions are empirically questionable becomes apparent as soon as we begin to consider in more detail what they mean. The assumption of the desirability of the ideal state means, I take it, that this state, if realised, would satisfy some very fundamental human needs. But we know that we may sometimes be mistaken in what we imagine would be pleasurable. As to the assumption of the possibility of the ideal, this too may be false; for our capacity to imagine something is no proof that it can exist. For example, we can imagine, but could never construct, an armour-plated, shell-proof, dirigible balloon.[1] And, in the same way, we can imagine an ideal state which would not 'fly' because of the properties of the human beings available for its construction.[2]

Now it is clearly of great practical importance to us to discover whether these assumptions of political philosophy are likely to be true. Either a negative or a positive result would be of value. The discovery of their falsehood might save us from the fate of Aesop's

[1] I take this example from a psychotic man who, after the first war, could not understand why no one had ever thought of putting armour-plate on airships in the way they do on battleships.

[2] There are here three cases to distinguish. Either the right human material could never exist because, like steel of sufficient strength and lightness for an armoured dirigible, the required combination of qualities is, as it were, chemically impossible; or it could ultimately be produced, but only after centuries of selective breeding; or, lastly, it could be produced by a suitable education.

dog, which threw away the bone in an attempt to snatch the more attractive looking reflection in water. The discovery of their truth would confirm and strengthen our purpose in pursuing a desirable and possible ideal. And if they turn out to be partly false and partly true, the ideal itself would become modified into something that is desirable and possible and, being known to be such, automatically pursued.

* * *

It may help us in our quest to begin by remembering that political ideologies originated in religion, and may still contain something of their source.

Those who, while not themselves wedded to a faith, are able to take a sympathetic, rather than a contemptuous, interest in religion, probably think of it in terms of two major elements, which are roughly, though by no means without overlapping, expressed in two major phases of its history. That is to say, they separate religion proper as reflecting, if only in a phantastic or poetic way, the 'best' feelings of man, from those seemingly more archaic aspects of animism and magic which, though still present in it, may be described as pre-religious.

Now whether or not actual religions always progress in this way from crude superstition to exalted sentiment, rather than stay still, or sometimes move in the opposite direction, from the sublime to the ridiculous, these two elements or phases are certainly related to the two 'positions'—paranoid-schizoid and depressive or relatively post-depressive—which Melanie Klein found to characterise the development of individuals. That the paranoid-schizoid position corresponds with animism and magic, or rather that the two labels denote the same phenomena, at any rate, is obvious. It should also be clear that there is a link between 'higher' forms of religious feeling and a progressive (rather than a regressive) outcome of the depressive position with all this implies in terms of a capacity to experience depressive guilt, to desire reparation, and to develop unselfish forms of love. But the precise sense in which religion is a product of the depressive position—or perhaps of its partial return at puberty—needs to be discussed in greater detail.

* * *

Having said this, we shall expect to find much truth, as well as falsehood in religion—I do not mean in its cosmology, which may be incompatible with that of physics, but in its picture of ourselves, and of the inner world of unconscious phantasy. In the first place, the integration and self-knowledge of the religious man is much in advance of that of the man who is merely superstitious. The self-picture characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position knows nothing of ambivalence, and therefore has no place for a developed sense of guilt towards internal figures. There is persecutory guilt and the fear of punishment by internal or external figures, but since love and hate are divided from each other and directed to different objects, there can be no sense of remorse at injuring something loved inside. Nor can there be any developed love for such a figure—only idealisation divorced from any feeling that the idealised object can need or be benefited by love. In sharp contrast to such a warped picture of the self and its internal objects of feeling, the picture characteristic of the depressive position is of a self who has hated his own loved objects inside, who feels responsible for, and guilty about, this hate, and who yearns to make reparation. And, at the same time, since the divergent aspects of these internal objects have become united, they are conceived much more realistically as integrated persons, like the self, who are capable of being hurt by hatred or coldness, and of being moved and cheered by receiving love.

So far, therefore, as religion—irrespective of its specific form—is a product of a successful passage through the depressive position, it represents a good and mutually sustaining relationship between the self and the memory images of primary good objects in the inner world which has been achieved as the result of the acceptance of an integrated, complete and true picture—and this includes a recognition of responsibility—of the former, less happy, stages of this same relationship. In other words, 'pure' religion, so far as it is free from superstition, is based on at least a pre-conscious acceptance of psychic reality and truth. Moreover, the sense of well-being in the inner world which it brings is secure enough to be independent of theological belief about the creation and maintenance of the cosmos.

Such a 'pure' internal religion based on a successful passage of the depressive position is, however, rare. In practice it seems

nearly always compromised by many relics of the paranoid-schizoid position. The type of 'impure' religion I especially have in mind may perhaps be described as the result of a split followed by two distinct projections. One of them takes place, as it were, intra-psychically, to form, from two opposite sets of impulses in the self, two contrasting types of super-ego; while the other externalises both as God and Devil. What would seem to initiate the process is a partial denial of ambivalence. This initial falsification of the picture of the self leads in turn to a divided picture of the internalised parents, which is false not only because it is divided but also because each aspect is phantastically exaggerated into something which, on the one hand, is conceived as pure goodness, and on the other, as pure evil—often with different locations in the body. Finally, the projection, or externalisation, of this phantastic picture of the parents creates an anthropomorphic cosmogony of God and Devil with their two locations in Heaven and Hell,[1] which is different from, and often conflicts with, that of physics. In other words, it produces a picture of the ultimate nature of the universe which not only has no empirical evidence in its support, but is often in direct conflict with our empirically based picture of the external world.[2]

This last falsification—by which the picture of our inner relationship between our unconscious ideas of ourselves and of our internal parents (and between these parents) produces a phantastic cosmogony—is that against which rationalists have directed all their scorn. What, however, is more far-reaching in its effects is the inner picture on which the outer one is based. There is, I have argued, a sense in which this can be 'true' or phantastic; and those who seem compulsively to scoff at religion may be suspected of being at war with a phantastic inner picture still active in themselves.

There is also a type of temporal splitting which is of special significance for our theme: Heaven and Hell can be divided from each other, not only in space, but also in time. The originally

[1] In unconscious phantasy, Hell with its fire and brimstone is always associated with 'bad' parts of the inside of the body, which are dangerous to the infant because they are the seat of much of his aggression.

[2] This phrase may seem to suggest that there is an external world to have a picture of. It will be remembered, however, that, when trying to be precise in my use of words, I prefer to speak of the external world as our picture of the possibilities of sensory experience.

ambivalent picture of the relation between the self and its inner objects, and between these objects themselves, is retrospectively split into two periods. In one, all is peace and love; while in the other, there is little but warfare and desolation, and the triumph of evil and hatred over love. When both are externalised they come to represent states of the universe at different times, the good one being that which was in a golden age and may, after the last trump, return, while the bad one more often represents the present of which it is a gloomy caricature.

Here, then, in the deep yearning for a return to the golden age, imagined to have occurred in early infancy, is to be found the dominant life motive for those who work for their religion—or for its secular equivalent in some political ideal.

* * *

Now the history of idealistic movements, which draw their motive from this source, leaves no doubt that they sometimes result in what we retrospectively acclaim as solid progress, sometimes in mere waste of effort, and sometimes in disaster. And we shall expect that these different outcomes are likely to depend on the degree of realism, or 'psychic truth', in the unconscious phantasies concerned in the different types of ideology pursued.

Probably the most important types of error arise in one or both of two ways: through an over-idealisation of the golden age of infancy itself, and through a false diagnosis of the causes of its loss.

During the last half-century or so, the dating of the golden age of the individual has been progressively put back. It used to be believed that our school days, or at least our later childhood, were golden. But the recovery, in analysis, of many memories of the storms and sorrows of these periods soon exploded this delusion. Freud himself believed in a golden age of first infancy, which Abraham named 'pre-ambivalent'. But Melanie Klein has exposed this also as a myth. There are blissful periods after birth, but also periods when the baby's screams suggest, sometimes a lost soul in, sometimes a fiend from, Hell. There is no post-natal age when only love and bliss exist. We may still suppose that at some stage of pre-natal life, an age of bliss existed. But this is speculation; and even if a pre-natal age, before there can be object relations in any

ordinary sense, is peaceful, it can hardly be described as an age of universal love.

There can be little doubt that the picture of a golden age of peace and universal love is a phantastic product of later infancy, and that it is unconsciously located before birth in time, and spatially inside a good part of the body of the mother (preserved as a memory inside a good part of the body of the self). Here all the imagined siblings—both those few who really came into the world and the multitude of those who, in the child's phantasy, ought to have done so—do live in peace and universal love, all equally protected by the enveloping love of the creating parents. Thus, in this Eden, there is no want or frustration, no envy, jealousy or hate—the animals, however savage they may later become, do not yet devour each other.

Moreover, this phantasy comes into being as a reaction against, and as a split-off aspect of, another, which, though also exaggerated, is perhaps nearer to the truth: the phantasy of a nature 'red in tooth and claw', of a world of greedy children, governed by envy, jealousy and hatred and a ruthless struggle for survival. For such a world (unconsciously located in a bad part of the mother's body and later of the self) can be observed to exist, from time to time, in almost any nursery.

* * *

Some further light can, I think, be thrown upon our problem by a consideration of the theories of how the golden age, when assumed to have existed, is supposed to have come to grief.

These theories are of two contrasting types. In the biblical myth of original sin, man was responsible for his own fall. In the sociological myth of primal innocence, usually attributed to Rousseau, man himself was free and noble until enslaved by evil institutions. And the two myths correspond with contrasting views of two schools of educationists, who believe, on the one side, that the inherent wickedness of children, on the other that the stupid malevolence of parents, is to blame for human ills.

To begin with the last of these two schools, we must agree, of course, that the parents' influence for good or ill is very great. Perhaps if all parents were all loving and all wise, all children would come safely through the troubles of the paranoid-schizoid

and depressive positions, and achieve maturity. But what is often tacitly assumed is that the love, without the wisdom, would be sufficient. In other words, it is assumed that if children received nothing but love, they would give nothing but love; so that, being without ambivalence, they would never enter the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, and would not, for this reason, need the assistance of parents who are wise as well as loving.

Now, as we know from Melanie Klein's work with children, the above assumption is a fundamental error, so that whatever is built on it in political philosophy is likely to be shaky. Of course, as everyone has always known, children, and from a very early age, respond with love to love. What has been often overlooked is that they can first respond to it in quite a different way, for example, with envy—and, because of envy, with a refusal to admit that they are in receipt of love.

We are all aware that envy is a common—indeed a universal—human trait; but in accordance with the 'fundamental error', we are apt to think of it as an acquired result of deprivation rather than as an innate endowment. If we wish to quibble over words, we can indeed still say that without deprivation there could be no envy; for we can describe ourselves as being deprived so long as there remains one good thing in the universe which we desire and do not possess. This, indeed, is how the child does feel when he first discovers that the gratifying breast is not a part of his own body, but belongs to the body of another person. No matter how much devoted love his mother gives him, or how much he is permitted to use the breast whenever he needs it, he will still envy his mother this possession which it is beyond her power to transfer to him outright. Indeed, the better she is to him, the more he may at first envy her her goodness.

That envy rather than love may be the first response to a 'good object' separate from the self should not, I think, seem improbable to us. For we might expect the discovery of the 'otherness' of what is most necessary to life to arouse the fear of death. And if to discover that the fountain of immortal life is not within us is to discover our mortality, then this is likely to arouse not only fear but also rage and envy. Moreover, the rage response released by the threat of death, although evolved in the interests of self-preservation, is in this first case turned against the very object on

which the infant's life depends. So a vicious spiral of fear leading to that destructive impulse against what is most valued but not possessed, which we call envy, is set in motion, and is not easy to reverse. Mere devotion on the part of the mother, though perhaps providing a temporary reassurance, may, as I have said, end by making matters worse. She may, for example, restore the infant's illusion that the breast is part of him; but sooner or later, he makes demands which it is not in her power to fulfil, and then he envies and hates her all the more.

It is then that her wisdom is required—her understanding of, and capacity to tolerate, his hatred without too much anxiety, and so to help him through his difficulties with some firmness. But even mothers who seem to be both affectionate and understanding may have children in whom envy and hatred remain predominant over gratitude and love. So perhaps the child's innate capacity to tolerate anxiety on his own behalf is variable and helps to condition his capacity to become concerned about, and so to learn to love, his mother in a non-possessive way as a like, but separate, person.

If we have arrived at the conclusion that envy and hatred, together with the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions to which they lead, are unavoidable in the infant at a certain stage, we may still under-estimate the extent to which most ordinarily normal people have hidden rather than outgrown them.

Yet only on the assumption that they massively survive can we explain the proverbial ingratitude of man. We are often too near, and too emotionally involved in, the events of our own time to see it. But a glance at history will convince us that peoples, in whose power it rests to choose leaders, seldom choose anyone of outstanding merit—except in a crisis, and then, as soon as he has saved them from danger, they exaggerate his actual imperfections and dismiss him with contempt.[1]

If envy (and the jealousy derived from it) is an expression of the will to live, neither it nor the competitive activities it normally gives rise to can ever be abolished. What is pathological about it is not its existence but the denial of it which, in fact, serves to

[1] The common belief that great leaders are often brought forth in great emergencies is probably to be understood in this sense: that people are more willing to accept great leaders in great emergencies, not that they are unavailable at other times.

augment it far beyond the level it would otherwise attain. If it were to be accepted, the excess would disappear.

The forces that maintain the denial of envy are, of course, the guilt feelings it unconsciously stirs. So we reach the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that it is the intensity of the guilt aroused by envy—an intensity which at the critical age is too great to be borne—that holds envy at a level higher than it would otherwise remain.

As the infant begins to form a more integrated picture of himself and so of his mother as a person with complex feelings like his own and, like him, capable of suffering, he begins to become appalled by, and indeed to exaggerate—since he expects the external damage to correspond with the internal—the pains his aggressive greed for life at her expense have inflicted on her. But to the extent to which his guilt feelings become too great for him to stand, he tends to project them on to her, and to blame her for the pains which her rejection of him, and her inadequacy, now seem to have inflicted upon him. So he escapes conscious depression at the cost of a return to a new form of his old paranoid sense of persecution. But what is significant for our present enquiry is that this manoeuvre, which diminishes conscious depression, increases it unconsciously; for he now has ingratitude, and the mental pain he feels it must inflict, to add to his other grounds for self-reproach.

This, of course, makes it still harder for him to become conscious of these unconscious self-reproaches, and he is likely to end, by means of a further projection, in achieving an exact reversal of his unconscious feelings. That is to say, instead of becoming conscious of remorse at his ingratitude, he consciously accuses his mother of ungratefully rejecting the love he was once prepared to give her.

This end result, false as it is, could not survive examination by his growing critical intelligence, were it not for his own capacity to reinforce it with rationalisations constructed by this same intelligence, and perhaps even to make it come true. Certainly, his mother is not perfect, either by his standards or by an analytic one—and this is less exacting—which defines 'perfect normality' as the result of 'perfect self-knowledge'. So it is not difficult for him to find 'faults' in her which he can rationally criticise and,

with an irrationality which is now easier for him to conceal from himself, to make them wholly responsible for the absence of his gratitude to her. Moreover, by treating her ungratefully he may at last succeed in turning her against him, and so retrospectively create a justification for his attitude.

The effects of primal envy of the mother on the child's relations with other members of his family are very complex. It may, for example, cause him to over-idealise his father at her expense, or he may transfer the envy to him; and, in any case, it forms the core of his later jealousy of his parents' relations with each other. But we need not follow these developments since we are here concerned only with the character of man as shown in his earliest relationship, and with its relevance to political philosophy. Its relevance is this: that if that aspect of the child's early relation to his mother in which he projects his own sense of guilt for envy and ingratitude upon her, is perpetuated as a dominant relation to the primary objects of his inner world, it will dominate his relation to the external world as well. In particular, he will put all the blame for his own shortcomings upon the state—which is a symbolic parent and not a perfect one—in order to maintain the fiction of his own inherent merit.[1]

So far, our results have been mainly negative. We now have good reasons to reject, not only the myth of a golden age of infancy, but what is more important, also the myth of primal innocence. It is not true that man is by nature good in the sense that he necessarily, or even primarily, responds to love with love. Therefore, 'bad' institutions, though they may greatly increase his discontent, can never be more than partially responsible for his envy and hatred of his fellows.

* * *

Having said this, however, we still have to consider the ideal of the golden age as an inspiration. Can it be achieved, if not by institutions alone, perhaps by education, or by a combination of

[1] Sometimes, of course, the internal parent and the external state are over-idealised as a secondary defence against the destructive criticisms envy and jealousy threaten to launch on them. If, at the same time, the desire to criticise destructively is projected on to anyone who criticises at all, the result is an inability to discriminate between constructive and destructive criticism, and an attitude hostile to all progressive thought.

the two? And with this is linked another question: Do we really want it as much as we think we do?

Let us be clear again about precisely what is meant by the ideal of a golden age. It is an age in which all forms of unkindness and hatred are banished from the earth and only love remains. Although not many people are dominated by this ideal as the major aspiration of their lives, I suppose most people have, at some time, experienced a longing for it. And even those who dismiss it as chimerical would probably regard it as something which, if only possible, would be much to be desired.

That any normal person could doubt its desirability strikes one at first sight as most improbable. But when we do begin to question it, we cannot feel so certain. We know, on general biological grounds, even if we are not aware of it by introspection, that the instincts of man contain much that is as savage as is to be found in any hunting animal. We are predisposed to take great pleasure in the satisfaction of sadistic lusts—if not directly, then by proxy through our novels and films, or in the still more disguised form in which we reserve our sadism for those in whom we think we see it. (The anti-bloodsport enthusiast will, for example, delight in hunting the huntsman of the stag or fox.) Moreover, while sadism serves hate and arouses hatred in its victims, it would appear to exist in its own right: the baby can be sadistic towards the breast from greed and not only from hatred; and the huntsman does not hate the quarry whose pursuit and Dionysian dismemberment may give him so much thrill.[1] We might, of course, find sublimations for our sadism which did no harm to man or beast. But it is not easy to be sure that in a world in which there was neither stimulus nor outlet to such passions, we might not feel impoverished. Lastly, if there is an ineradicable element of self-hatred in everyone, we might become suicidal if we could find no scape-goats for it in the external world.

Perhaps it is best to leave this question undecided; for it is academic. The conditions it envisages could not be realised in practice. Whether or not sadism can exist without hate, it is certainly aroused by hate, and hate by envy and jealousy—as well

[1] Sometimes there is even a phantasy that the fox enjoys being hunted, which would appear to be derived from an early unconscious demand that mothers should enjoy being eaten by their children. This is often part of the manic defence against the sense of depressive guilt.

as by more reputable motives—which, as we already know, would be aroused in some degree in any imaginable world.

* * *

This is not, of course, to say that hatred cannot be reduced, either by changing the institutions of society, which is the aim of all materialistic Utopias, or by changing man himself, which is the aim of higher religious systems and of what may be called social therapy—or by a combination of the two.

I think it would be true to say that in its early days communism aimed at the abolition of all sources of envy and jealousy. For it attacked not only material property but also property in persons as expressed in marriage laws. The rule of equality was to apply in the sexual as well as in the economic field. The unconscious aim was, I think, a world without privileged parents, only with children who should all be equal and have no preferences among themselves.

This is often the phantasy of the child who, for external or internal reasons, feels himself to be an outcast, rejected by parents and siblings alike. Although sometimes he may really have been coldly excluded in this way, his belief that he has is often false—a defence against his own sense of guilt because, having envied his parents and been jealous of his siblings, he has hated his family and estranged himself from it. And if, in later life, he should eventually succeed, through his political endeavours, in realising the kind of sexually egalitarian society he has dreamed of as an ideal, he is likely to discover that it fails altogether to give him satisfaction. For, perhaps more than others, he does not want to share the objects of his love but to keep them entirely to himself.

Those communists who once included the abolition of sexual property among their ideals have long since become disillusioned about this part of their programme. So we should waste no time in trying to explode a myth which is already exploded. Nor should we too lightly assume, from this analogy, that that part of their ideal which is concerned with other forms of property is equally delusive. It may, indeed, be true that the desire for property in things is derived from the desire for property in persons. A man's wife and his house may both be symbols of the mother he once wished to keep for himself alone; and for this reason, he is likely to prefer a house of his own to one conditionally provided for him

by the father state. But a house is not the same as a wife, in spite of certain symbolic similarities. It is not human; and, being an artifact, it is more variable in quality and size: it can range from a palace to a hovel. So we cannot conclude from the intolerability of a state without property in spouses that a state without property in houses would be equally frustrating. Moreover, we may suspect that, with material possessions, the problem is quantitative: that it is concerned, not with whether goods should be held in common or privately possessed, but with where and how to draw the line between these two alternatives. (Moreover, the level of technical development and the density of population may be assumed to affect the point at which to draw the line.)

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We may take, as a hypothetical example, a state in which there is a high degree of inequality both in possessions and in opportunities, and consider the different means by which changes can be brought about, and their psychological effects.

One would expect to find a good deal of at least unconscious envy among the deprived masses,[1] and of an unconscious sense of guilt among those who had all the wealth and opportunity. But for a long time both might remain unconscious: the envy being covered up by an over-idealisation of the aristocracy as admired parental figures, and the sense of guilt denied or perhaps neutralised by reparative activities if the aristocracy is conscientious.

A state of this kind, divided into two main classes which remain unconscious, the one of its envy and the other of its sense of guilt, can be quite stable. But there are several ways in which it may cease to be so. The upper class may cease to play a parental role which can be idealised or social theorists may arise to stir the people, and in either case their latent envy begins to express itself in hate. Or, alternatively, the upper class may begin to become more conscious of its sense of guilt and itself initiate some changes in the direction of equality. This may also come about less from motives of generosity than because the upper class is split, and one party plays for popularity in order to get the support of the people against its rival.

In all these cases, the change occurs as the result of a partial and

[1] Much enhanced if there is a taboo on intermarriage between the classes.

one-sided increase in self-awareness. If it is the suppressed classes who become aware of their hatred, they remain ignorant of at least some part of its motive. They will not, for example, be aware that their wish to possess what they feel to be unjustly withheld from them is directed to three distinct types of objects: necessities, such as food, fuel and housing, which relieve physical discomfort and distress; luxuries which they could enjoy but would not have thought of desiring if no one else possessed them; and non-transferable commodities. On the fringe of this last category I would include some material luxuries, such as large and beautiful estates, the individual possession of which cannot be transferred to everybody; but its core consists of qualities such as looks, intelligence and courage or a distinguished heredity. We know from analysis that individuals are more hated for their non-transferable admired qualities than for any other reason and that this source of hatred can hardly ever be admitted. So when the people begin to hate those upper classes which they previously idealised, they will not know that they hate them also for such virtues as they still unconsciously believe them, rightly or wrongly, to possess. But it is these real or imagined superiorities which they may most seek to destroy, at the same time denying, on the principle of equality, that such superiorities ever did, or could, exist.

When these hatreds are expressed in a revolt, its initial fate depends largely on the response of the upper class. If this class remains confident—a state of mind which may be derived in part from a sense of being the current depository of an idealised ancestry or tradition—it will be able to assess the situation without panic, and, therefore, with a good deal of realism. It will perceive that some of the demands made on it are reasonable. It will make generous concessions to the people as a whole, and then destroy their leaders, who, having lost the support of the more moderate bulk of their followers, will have become defenceless. Probably the end result will be a return to normal, with some small increase in equality maintained.

But if the revolt stirs large quantities of either persecutory or depressive anxiety in the class it is directed against, the outcome is likely to be different. In the former case, that in which the upper class is paranoid, repressive measures will be panicky and violent; so that, even if effective for the moment, they will sow the seeds

of yet greater trouble in the future. In the latter, where the upper class is more nearly conscious of a sense of guilt because the lower stands for potential siblings whom its greed had deprived of life, depression may paralyse resistance so that the revolt succeeds.

In the flush of victory, the golden age will seem to have arrived. Greed itself, as personified by the old possessing classes, will seem to have been destroyed, so that nothing can remain to bar the reign of universal love. And, indeed, for a short time brotherly love will be predominant. But below this hyper-manic surface darker forces will be gathering their strength. In the first place, it is now the turn of the victorious proletariat to be disturbed by an unconscious sense of guilt—not, I think, on account of the necessities or even the luxuries they have now acquired, but for those non-transferable qualities which, out of unconscious envy, will have been destroyed. And an unconscious bit of everyone will deeply regret what they have done and wish to restore the shattered parent symbols. But because they cannot consciously admit it, they will tend to project this bit on to their comrades, whom they will begin to suspect of counter-revolutionary activity. Moreover, the witch-hunts which will then break out will arise from motives of a paradoxical nature characteristic only of the unconscious. For those who perish as suspected, but not actual, traitors to the revolution are also the scapegoats for the unacknowledged sense of guilt at being revolutionaries which their executioners project upon them.

Such reigns of terror, which often follow successful revolutions, work themselves out in time. But as they subside, other and more permanent grounds for disappointment begin to emerge. For it does not seem in the nature of man to be content with mere equality. He may think he wants it so long as he is in a condition of inferiority; but as soon as he has it, he desires superiority. Moreover, no state can be run without some kind of hierarchical arrangement. So ambition and the necessity for organisation combine to reproduce new types of inequality, which may well be as galling to those below as the old ones. Indeed, failure to achieve a rank which everyone has an equal opportunity of winning may well cause more humiliation than failure to get into a class which is semi-hereditary.

Even the equality of opportunity gained in the revolution is

likely to be lost. For those who have not only clamoured for, but also profited by, it, may regard it in a different light when it bars them from passing on to their own children any of the advantages they have won in life. Of what use has it been to struggle so, they may well ask themselves, if they cannot help their children? And indeed, the desire to do so is so closely linked with the overriding urge implanted in us by evolution that it usually provides the main motive for work. For these reasons, those who have been successful and reached the upper levels in the new pyramid of rank will tend not only to oppose that principle of equality of opportunity to which, in no small measure, they have owed their own position but also to defend the inheritance of benefits as providing a necessary incentive to parents to work efficiently, for the benefit of the state. So beginning with entry to better schools, the old hereditary principle will tend to reappear, until in the end the cycle is complete, and a new ruling class with hereditary privileges has been established.

Unlike technical change, which has on the whole been linear and upwards in the direction of a greater mastery, sociological change has, on the whole, been circular. Such cyclical changes were observed by Greek philosophers in their city states; and cycles in which the pyramid of power, opportunity and wealth became gradually flattened, only to rise again with sudden violence as dictators spring from the ashes of democratic revolutions, have been recurring on a larger scale since then.

* * *

From what has been said, there might seem to be no reason why social change should ever cease to be merely circular; and, indeed, I believe there can be no escape from this without some linear change which we can call progressive, either in the biological nature of man or in his psychological understanding of himself.

It might of course be argued that advance in technical knowledge, including the knowledge of the external world it depends on, which is, I think, the only definite advance we can claim in the last few thousand years, must affect the social cycle. But it is by no means certain, as used to be supposed, that such advance favours a democratic flattening of the pyramid. Certainly the

power of the armoured knight was diminished by the development of the long bow and finally destroyed, with his castle, by the invention of gunpowder. But if these developments favoured the many against the few, more recent weapons have immensely strengthened the hand of the few against the many. Indeed, a small group, once in sole possession of atomic weapons, and of the technique of propaganda, could indefinitely dominate the world—if their own internal rivalries did not disrupt them from within.

As to changes in the biological nature of man himself, there seems to be no evidence, since the dawn of history, of linear development in the direction of lessened ferocity or increased intelligence. It is true, of course, that groups which have been isolated, either geographically or by social barriers to intermarriage, over long periods, and subject to selective breeding, have often developed a specific character. Among aristocracies, for example, with whom specific traits of stature, looks, disposition or intelligence (or the reverse through a preference for small heads) have been consistently valued for centuries, and so have influenced choice in marriage, breeds having these qualities in an enhanced degree may be expected to emerge—just as they do when dogs or cattle are subject to a similar, if more conscious, process of selection.[1] But such breeds, whether because of their supposed or of their actual superiority, are exactly those most likely to be attacked in revolutions, killed off, or at any rate dispersed; so that, as a breed, they disappear, and their descendants, if any, revert to the ancestral type.[2]

* * *

There remain only changes in man's psychological understanding of himself to be considered. These depend, in large measure, on the development of language; for, as Freud was the first to

[1] We do not speak of a breed of animals unless every member has the characteristics defining the breed. But we do speak of a group of inter-related people as a breed if a significant minority has the defining character.

[2] If farmers were as envious of the several excellences of each other's cattle—Friesians supreme in milk yield, Herefords in weight, Jerseys in butter-fat content, and so on—there would be periodic proscriptions of these pedigree breeds, and a return to an ancestral type devoid of special merit. We should condemn such farming, in which no progress could be made, as a stupid sacrifice to spite; but these are the lines on which our own breeding seems to have been conducted in historic times. A recent example of the process I have in mind is the destruction of the admittedly arrogant, but also superior 'Long-Ears' by the 'Short-Ears' described by Thor Heyerdahl in *Aku Aku*, 1958.

point out, becoming conscious of ourselves in the main consists in finding verbal descriptions for our moods and other states of mind. Probably some permanent gain has been achieved, but it has been spasmodic and subject to many set-backs. The illiterate barbarians of the Middle Ages, from whom most of us are now descended, were far less subtly conscious of themselves than the classical Greeks. Moreover, even those periods in which material knowledge has most rapidly increased do not seem to have been necessarily distinguished by a comparable increase in insight. Indeed, the self-understanding of the Victorians, with all their rationalism and science, may well have been less than that of the Elizabethans in the time of Shakespeare.

Perhaps the supreme achievement of Freud was to have elaborated a definite technique for the exploration of ourselves. What he himself, and those who learned it from him and from each other, have discovered with its aid has been impressive. But none of those who have had it applied to them, and have learned to apply it, can claim to have achieved anything like a complete understanding of their own or other people's nature. Moreover, what they have learned can be only partially communicated by books and lectures, and for this reason still remains a semi-esoteric knowledge. In other words, great difficulties will have to be overcome before this knowledge becomes deep enough and wide enough to have much effect on the kind of social cycles we have been considering.

We do not even yet know whether these difficulties can be overcome. Some analysts believe that envy, which seems to be inherited in unequal measure, imposes, in those who have it strongly, an insuperable barrier to insight. If so, even the limited self-knowledge now attained by the best analyses could never be general. But although we do not know whether self-knowledge can ever become both deep and widespread enough to affect the social cycle, we can, I believe, with more sureness predict the effect it would have if it did so.

There would be a change of outlook both among those who may be broadly called the aggressive political idealists and among their conservative or liberal opponents.

The idealist would lose his most dangerous delusion. He would perceive that man cannot be made good and loving by means of

an equal distribution of wealth and opportunity alone. For there would still remain those non-transferable inequalities which now unconsciously arouse the greatest and most destructive form of envy. And even if these, too, could be abolished, and all men made genetically as like as identical twins, he would foresee that the achievement of complete equality could only serve to expose the underlying wish of each to be *primus inter pares*. Moreover—and this is the fundamental point—his becoming conscious of primal envy and of the deep sense of guilt it inevitably evokes would diminish it in him. The unconscious impulse to deny or destroy the achievements and qualities of persons rightly or wrongly felt to be superior would tend to be replaced, if they are really superior, by gratitude for their existence. The destructive element in ideological movements—the unconscious passion to destroy what cannot be shared—would greatly diminish in intensity, leaving the constructive element—the desire for a more even distribution of what can in fact be shared without loss—in large measure free from what is now a hidden but very poisonous impurity.

The effect of insight on the opposition would also be important. Opposition may spring from many motives; but its statistical distribution among different income groups suggests, as we might expect, that the main motive is the wish, on the part of those who have possessions, to keep them for themselves and for their own children. This, of course, is in itself a natural motive. But it may be greatly intensified by all sorts of unconscious fears. Possessions, whether in land or cash, almost always symbolise the mother, and particularly her breast, which provides the infant not only with actual nourishment but relieves his ever-lurking fears of destitution and death. The infant, and later the man, never feels entirely sure of being able to keep it; and this is far less because of his actual experiences of its temporary loss than because of his own innate destructiveness. Now this innate destructiveness, expressed both in envious attacks on the breast for its very goodness and in jealous attacks on his father and real or imaginary siblings who seem to demand a share of it, is, as we know, projected into his picture of this father and these siblings who now seem to threaten it directly as well as to threaten his possession of it. So in later life, to the grown-up infant who has inherited or acquired possessions, the threatening father and siblings are felt to have

become incarnate in the persons of those who demand equality. It is true, of course, that the danger from these revolutionaries is more actual than from the figures of his infantile unconscious phantasy. But his hatred and his fear may result far more from the phantasied nature of the attack than from the real one. If, therefore, he can perceive that what he most hates and fears in those who wish either to share, or to rob him of, his possessions is a personification of his own destructive cupidity, he will be less frightened of it. And this, in turn, will enable him to assess their demands with greater objectivity, to separate what is purely destructive from what is reasonable, and so to defend himself, with a clearer conscience and with more courage, against the one and to be more generous about conceding the other.

One may suppose that there is a golden mean—different in different periods—between a complete equality, which destroys what cannot be divided and is incompatible with progress,[1] and great inequality, whether of power, of opportunity or of possessions, which causes real hardship,[2] and widens the gulf between those who envy what others have and those who, because of their unconscious sense of guilt, have exaggerated fears about the loss of what they have already got. We may not be able to determine in advance exactly where, in any period, this golden mean should lie. But if both sides were fully conscious of the sources of the tension between them, and were each able to form true pictures of themselves in relation to the other, an approximation to it would come about.

* * *

No psycho-analyst who has struggled for years to extend the range of consciousness—or what is the same thing, to correct and enlarge the world-models—of himself and his pupils and patients will underestimate the difficulty of achieving this on a scale large enough to ensure an age of rationalism in politics within a nation. And the difficulty is, of course, enhanced when the conflict between a revolutionary ideal and a conservative or liberal opposi-

[1] If progress had to be all along the line and for everyone at once, because all unequal advances were prohibited, it would be very slow.

[2] However equal the division, unavoidable hardship must, of course, arise whenever the population of a state exceeds the current capacity of that state to feed, clothe and house its people.

tion appears, as now, on a world scale between rival groups of nations. For years after the second world war the Iron Curtain resisted the spread of insight as if it were hostile propaganda. So, in default of a spontaneous change, one or the other side seemed likely to dominate the world by the threat, if not the actual use, of force, long before insight could affect the issue.

Both feared, and still fear, an atom war. Yet neither could afford to be the first to discard any of its weapons; for each inevitably wished to encroach and had reason to dread the encroachment of the other. The democracies believed, rightly, I think, that communism—at least in the form till then taken by it—was based on a psychological misunderstanding, and that, being incapable of providing satisfaction, it could be maintained only by tyranny. Therefore they could not, without renouncing both their beliefs and their humanism, cease to further, as far as they dared, whatever weakened the Communist bloc, whether by the defection of a satellite or the growth of an internal 'heresy' which could bring the Communist outlook a little nearer to their own. The Communists, on the other hand, could not feel secure so long as there existed states having a different system from their own, and providing more satisfaction than theirs had yet provided. So, again as far as they dared, they endeavoured to encroach, and meanwhile they were forced to isolate their people as far as possible from truth.[1]

It is, of course, to be hoped that a desire for truth is arising spontaneously at the apex of the Communist pyramid of power; and indeed, whether for this reason, or as a result of dissensions with China, there is evidence of a wish for better understanding with the West. But for the democracies to imagine that, by being the first to disarm, they could induce a desire, if not for truth, at least for friendship among the Communist leaders, might be to embrace that type of lethal delusion to which they are themselves most prone. Given time, no doubt, the desire for truth eventually arises at the apex of any autocratic system; but if, meanwhile, the Communist autocracy had been allowed to dominate the world, most of the psychological knowledge we have so painfully

[1] During this period there was already some evidence of a periodic wish at the top to let in more light, but the first attempts to do so seem to have been abandoned as too dangerous.

acquired would have been lost, and might take centuries to rediscover.

A temporary disaster of this kind may seem less awful than, by retaining the capacity for atomic retaliation, to risk the extinction of the human race in an atomic war. But if this risk to all concerned leads, without the surrender of any of our values, to an agreed measure of controlled disarmament, and so to a lessening of tension, its acceptance by us for the time being will prove to have been worth while.

There is no certainty, of course, that this will be so. One or other of these disasters may come about. And if it does, the Communist share of the responsibility will be in part attributable to dogmatic adherence to an ideology based on false beliefs about the causes of human discontent. The patient, whose illness was wrongly diagnosed, would have been made worse, or killed outright, by the treatment he had received from the doctor he had helped to choose.

* * *

But to say this is not to condemn all ideologies as both false and dangerous. The myth of a golden age expressed as a longing for something we can call progress is a part of us, and extinguishable only by death. I have argued only that the idea of a moral progress to be achieved by a material redistribution alone can be a dangerous illusion. Moreover, most ideologies have no firm foundation in a clear idea of what is meant by moral progress. There is a persistent notion that it is better to love than hate (and from it, the ideologist deduces a justification for his own hatred of whatever, in his view, stands in the way of universal love). But this ignores the fact that love and hate are automatic responses to the assessments we make. We must agree that it is better not to hate people whom we falsely imagine to be unpleasant; but do we seriously mean that it is good to be deluded into idealising people who are unpleasant, in order that we can love them?

Since assessments, especially of strangers, tend to err more on the unfavourable side, an increase in insight would increase the amount of love. But to argue, without regard to the level of insight, that we ought to turn all hatred into love is to miss the premiss and exaggerate the conclusion into an impossible com-

mand. If, instead, we were to desire more insight, in the first place, as the basic form of progress, more of the love we consciously value, as well as some material benefits we wish for, would come to us of their own accord.

To state that we 'ought' to value insight for its own sake would be to invite a lengthy argument on the precise meaning of the 'ought'. Let us, instead, endeavour to enquire whether we do value it or not. Man's knowledge of himself—the level of accuracy and completeness of his picture of his inner world—has been peculiarly unstable. At certain periods of history it has, as we know, been comparatively high, and was highly valued by those who had it; and then, in some social upheaval, the slow gain has been lost—and much more completely than the gain in our knowledge of the external world. Now it seems probable, in the light of what we know of envy, that the main reason for this periodic loss was, not that insight had too little value, but that it was unconsciously envied too much—in other words, that barbarians destroyed, as worthless, what they unconsciously felt unable to possess.

But perhaps these periodic holocausts will some day have an end. For when, in an individual analysis, envy begins to be recognised as such, it tends to diminish and gratitude appears. So, too, if insight were to be once generally recognised as a major object of envy, we should begin to feel grateful for the existence of, and so more capable of learning from, those whose understanding exceeds our own—instead of consciously ignoring and unconsciously wishing to destroy them. In other words, there would seem to be a critical point in the general level of insight—the point of perception that insight is a major object of envy—after which continuous progress in insight, and what it might bring in social benefit, would be secure.

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